Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

168. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 29, 1986

SUBJECT

• NSPG Meeting, 11:00 a.m., October 27, 1986²

John Poindexter summarized the agreement reached at Reykjavik:

a. 50% reductions in strategic arms to 1,600 SNDVs and 6,000 warheads.

b. INF, 100 warheads globally, 0 in Europe.

c. On Space Defense, 10 years to 1996, no withdrawal, free to deploy after the 10 years; 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms within five years; by 1996 zero offensive ballistic missiles.

He then summarized the consultation trips of Secretary Shultz, Ed Rowny, Ken Adelman, and Secretary Weinberger, the visit of Kohl, and mentioned that Mrs. Thatcher was coming.

Secretary Shultz mentioned that the President had told us all to brief fully. Everyone had taken the President seriously; the briefers were well coordinated.

The Allies liked the proposals made on INF. They wish something to be agreed on nuclear testing; it will help relieve their political problems. They are pleased with the breakthrough in START; on zero offensive missiles, they have problems. These highlight the steps that must go with the elimination of missiles. Our Allies have many questions; these need to be recognized; a great deal of work needs to be done.

Secretary Weinberger reported on the NPG meeting. He thought the public statement that emerged from the meeting was fine even though the Greeks and Danes had reservations. Our Allies are worried about a sufficiency of forces for deterrence. They question whether we will have enough ALCMs, gravity bombers, etc. They emphasized we must always maintain forces adequate for deterrence. Weinberger said we assured them we would never give up what was needed for deterrence. They were worried about verification. He said conventional deterrence hinges on being able to obtain adequate Congressional support.

Secretary Shultz continued that we would be moving into a world where a different kind of deterrence was necessary.

Poindexter turned to the Geneva instructions. He said Karpov has not yet returned to Geneva. Gorbachev is saying there can be no separate INF agreement. The present round of negotiations will end on November 4th. We need to send the remaining instructions tonight. There are two issues:

—On definitions, there are three positions:

a. We should negotiate on what the Treaty says.

b. We shouldn’t negotiate.

c. We should make the decision contingent upon prior Soviet agreement to our framework.

—On non-withdrawal: All agree that we cannot fail to respond to Treaty violations.

Secretary Shultz responded that:

a. In the end, understanding with the Soviets on what is permitted and not permitted is necessary;

b. It is well to paw the ground—it is taking a long time to come to grips with an issue of this kind.

c. Our negotiators should be in a position to patiently express what is permitted and not permitted. They would describe it pursuant to the broad definition. They should engage in creative listening; i.e., re laboratory testing (Shevardnadze’s suggestion of a box versus Dubinin’s suggestion that all outdoors could be a laboratory). He said this is not a time for active negotiations and a lot is to be gained by explaining the Treaty and letting it be known that the Soviets are attempting to change it.

The President said that he had talked about sharing if and when the Treaty came into effect. He said Gorbachev had commented “if I had it I wouldn’t share.” He said they never respond when he talks about cheating. He referred to a Russian proverb, “trust but verify.”

Secretary Weinberger said nothing was to be gained by our negotiators talking about something that we are not willing to negotiate about. Interpretation of the Treaty is not the obstacle; the Soviets don’t want us to work on SDI. If we want to deploy we need to decide that that is what we want to do. We can’t now define what we need to do to be able to deploy. Our goal is not the Treaty but to deploy. We will never be able to verify limitations in the Treaty. We shouldn’t get into this at all. The more we open the subject up the more we do ourselves in. At the NPG, the people were most impressed by his statement that 71% of the US people agree to SDI. If we limit research, we won’t be able to deploy in 10 years.

The President said that maybe we were not so far apart. He said he had not read the exact clause in the Treaty but he did not see why we could not lay that on the table.

Secretary Weinberger said that as you get into conversation about these matters, you cut yourself down. Broad interpretation is what we support but he said he worried about talking about it.

Poindexter said we must be in a position to talk about the Treaty.

He thought the group should now talk about non-withdrawal. Weinberger said it was difficult to say we will not withdraw for any reason for 10 years. We can say we will not withdraw for certain reasons.

Somebody commented that in all likelihood we won’t be able to deploy within 10 years. Weinberger answered that the Soviets may be able to deploy in that time period. Our goal is not the strict observation of the Treaty, our goal is to get a defense developed and deployed. We need a new Treaty which will let us do so.

Secretary Weinberger said no nation can surrender its right to react to violations.

Secretary Shultz said he agreed that it should be made clear that non-withdrawal does not mean we will not react to non-observance.

The President asked whether we can’t just say we are strictly observing the ABM Treaty.

Admiral Crowe said they had done lots of analysis. The Chiefs have constantly been supporting arms control and reduction of ballistic missiles; however, the time-frame for reductions presents a problem; i.e., 50% in five years and 0 in 10 years. In order to do an analysis it was necessary for Captains and Lieutenants to make an assumption what national policy would be under very changed circumstances.

He said with respect to INF, the Chiefs fully agree. With respect to START, the risks increase with 50% reductions in five years. If we can modernize, risks will eventually go away, if we assume no cheating.

If we go to our proposed elimination of ballistic missiles in ten years, the problem is analytically difficult. We will have to shift from a triad to a monad, perhaps to a dyad involving bombers and cruise missiles. We have had to dream up a new strategy. We have assumed certain high-level decisions. We need guidance on whether these assumptions are valid.

We believe that ASW on both sides will undergo dramatic expansion. We need to assure US security at every step not just at the end. If we are to overhaul submarines so they can carry cruise missiles rather than ballistic missiles, that will take time. We must give serious consideration to the security of our Allies with respect to the conventional threat they will face. We have no handle on costs. We will have to build additional bombers, tankers, air defenses, ASW and modern conventional munitions. All this would involve expenses and expenditures.

He said the Soviets will also have their problems. In summary, the Chiefs support the President’s position in principle but the name of the game is stability—a host of other steps, rather than merely reductions, are required.

A preliminary conclusion of the Chiefs is that much can be done in 10 years but if we go to zero missiles we could be at a distinct disadvantage at the end of 10 years. There are substantial risks and the Chiefs cannot advise that we move in that direction.

There are questions as to whether a time beyond 1996 would be more feasible, and whether there are work-arounds with respect to some of the problems. Also, in time it should be possible to have a better handle on costs. We also need to elaborate our thinking on the posture of our Allies with respect to the conventional threat. If we can do all these things, we can derive better answers.

Secretary Weinberger said the Soviets had strong air defense while they can rely on gravity bombs because we have none. The Soviets are developing defenses against cruise missiles. He also pointed out that 1996 gives us about 9 years rather than 10.

Secretary Shultz said he agreed with the President’s objectives at Reykjavik; however, they give us plenty of ground for thought that more dollars would be needed for an adequate conventional defense. But we would be buying a lot; we would be getting rid of a threat that in 30 minutes all would be gone. We have an economy that is producing $4.5 trillion a year. We are messing around with a $3 hundred billion defense budget. We would need something much larger.

Secretary Shultz said he wished to raise another subject. The Soviets are attempting to arrange the debate so it will appear that the President’s having suggested getting rid of nuclear weapons was somehow scandalous. We need a unified line to handle what they are trying to do. We have made public the position that the President formally tabled. There was no closure on those positions. If we are asked: “Was the President in favor of eliminating nuclear weapons?” The answer is yes.

Poindexter interjected that in 1983 the President said not only that SDI was intended to make nuclear weapons obsolete but he further stated it was his intention to eliminate nuclear weapons. He has agreed with Gorbachev’s goal of eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000 but indicated that there were preconditions and that the most urgent problem was to agree on the first phase reductions.

The President said that getting rid of nuclear weapons should be in our favor. The U.S. and NATO are in position then to be superior. The Soviets cannot go much further than they are in defense expenditures. Gorbachev knows that, if he faces an arms race with the U.S., we can out-strip him. No one can get an advantage regarding a first strike. Gorbachev broached the idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons. I said I understood. The President then turned to his electioneering in Oklahoma. He said he had gotten the most applause when he said, with respect to SDI, that he had offered to share it with the Soviets, and when he said how proud he was of our 2 million men in the military forces.

Secretary Weinberger said Gorbachev needs an agreement. He said he is worried about the Congress. Don Regan asked what were the prospects for a partial SDI deployment. Weinberger answered that the Treaty authorized a limited deployment in one area of the country. Regan then went back to the question of the budget. He said the defense budget will grow to $325–360 billion by 1990. He thought the main consideration should go to the makeup of that budget—it is impossible to go above it; the Congress will not go along. Weinberger replied that if the President’s goal is a budget no greater than 6% of GNP, it will be 6% but if the goal is security, more will be needed. Regan said if we’re going to shift, we should move now. It will be a major battle.

Jim Baker asked whether the Soviets don’t have similar problems.

Weinberger replied they easily have wide public support. The President commented that if Congress knows we have an agreement and must then present the Soviets with a credible threat, we have a good chance Congress will agree.

Ken Adelman said the Europeans were much worried by the prospect of being de-coupled from the nuclear deterrent. Poindexter said that is not the question. The question is how we proceed to support the President’s policy. Adelman went back to his point saying the difficulty is the time period—is 10 years practical; to concentrate on 50% reductions and 5 years is alright, but to agree to elimination in 10 years is not.

Miller commented that Congress will not cut domestic expenditures to provide an increase in defense without raising taxes. The President said he will share with the Soviets but if they do not wish that, we will deploy an almost impregnable shield. If we get an agreement with the Soviets, the tone in Congress will change.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files, 1953, 1972–1989, 1986. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum.
2. Formal minutes of this meeting are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 3.