Office of the Historian

163. Memorandum of Conversation1

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986, 2:05–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.

    • Secretary Shultz
    • National Sec. Advisor Poindexter
    • Ambassador Nitze
    • Assistant Secretary Perle
    • Robert Linhart, NSC
    • D. Zarechnak (Interpreter)
    • Others?

  • USSR

    • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
    • Ambassador Karpov
    • G. Arbatov
    • Notetaker
    • P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

This meeting was decided upon at the very last minute of the previous meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, which ended at 1:35 pm. To save time, the meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze was conducted in simultaneous (without using equipment), and consequently, I was able to take (some) notes on what Shevardnadze was saying, and none on what the Secretary was saying, since I was interpreting as he was talking. The following is the gist of what I wrote down and recall:

Shevardnadze stressed that the main thing on which the sides would have to agree was the time period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. If that could be agreed, a formula for the talks on nuclear testing could be found, and everything else could be agreed. But without [Page 721] agreement on the period of non-withdrawal, there could be no document. The two sides had agreed on a 50% reduction of strategic forces, on zero medium-range forces in Europe, and a solution on Asia.

The Soviet side could not agree to less than a 10-year period of non-withdrawal. The U.S. had proposed 5–7½ years, and the Soviet side had proposed 15–20 years initially. Now it had come down to 10 years, and could not go lower.

The Secretary indicated that the U.S. could not agree to a 10-year period.

Shevardnadze said that it would take that long to physically destroy the existing systems. It was not accidental that the Soviet side had indicated a period of 10 years. But the U.S. side wanted to create new weapons within the 5–7 year period. The General Secretary was very adamant about this time period.

Shevardnadze mentioned that other nations would have to join the USSR and the U.S. in reducing nuclear weapons at a certain point, and the Secretary agreed.

Towards the end of the meeting, the Secretary proposed to Shevardnadze a draft text which had been worked out during the meeting by Poindexter, Perle and Linhart. The Secretary indicated that the text had not been cleared with the President, and Shevardnadze should bear that in mind. The text was the following, which was translated simultaneously to Shevardnadze:

“Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides will continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of a second five-year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of the ten-year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to introduce defenses.”

Shevardnadze seemed not to have any problems with the first parts of the proposal, but immediately seized upon the last sentence, and was very critical of it. The meeting ended as this was being discussed.

  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 1, Reykjavik Conversation Oct. 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak. The meeting took place in Hofdi House.↩