157. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks to the Department of State1
8905. Subject: START—IFFT-Roslyakov luncheon conversation, October 9, 1986.
1. This is NST/START Memcon VI–M–025. Secret—Entire text.
2. Meeting date: October 9, 1986
Time: 12:30 p.m.—2:30 p.m.
Place: Ambassador Restaurant, Geneva
3. Participants:
| U.S. | USSR |
| Dr. Edward Ifft | Mr. Yu. I. Roslyakov |
4. Subject summary: Reykjavik; Summit; U.S.-USSR Relations; heavy ICBMs and improving delegation procedures. End subject summary.
5. Highlights: Roslyakov and Ifft had a wide-ranging discussion on possibilities for the summit, U.S.-Soviet relations, and the Moscow bureaucracy. Roslyakov said that the Soviet START delegation had not had instructions to table the ideas discussed by the experts, but had gotten permission to do so from Shevardnadze personally. He said he found procedures in Geneva, especially in the post-plenaries, too formal and little more than scoring debating points. He made a plea for greater informality, trust and discretion, and noted the inhibiting effect of having additional people, including interpreters, in the discussions. End highlights.
6. Roslyakov invited Ifft to a get acquainted lunch and the discussion was wide-ranging and pleasant. Roslyakov moved into substance immediately by asking whether Ifft thought progress could be made at the Reykjavik meeting. Ifft said that he had no special insights as to what might happen at the meeting. Setting a date for the summit would be the single most useful result that he hoped to see. He hoped that progress would be made on arms control, but noted that the agenda was broader than arms control and that the time available for discussions was not great. In addition, since the meeting was a Soviet initiative, one would anticipate that the Soviet side would have some moves to make.
7. Roslyakov replied that he likewise had no special insights into Soviet plans for the meeting, although he had seen Gorbachev’s letter to President Reagan2 and was convinced of the sincerity of the thoughts expressed therein. He asked Ifft whether a “framework agreement” was a likely outcome. Ifft replied that he personally thought that a framework or basic elements type of document would be a logical next step in our work. Roslyakov asked whether such a framework would include the subjects being discussed in all three negotiating groups. Ifft replied that he was thinking particularly of START, although his impression was that INF might also be ripe for agreement. Roslyakov noted that today’s “Herald Tribune” had reported that Petrovsky had stated that progress on a test ban and on INF were considered prime summit topics by the Soviet side. This led to a brief discussion of Gorbachev’s moratorium proposal in which Roslyakov said that there is strong opposition to the continuation of the moratorium among the Soviet military, but that the MFA supports it. Ifft remarked that the Soviet side had been quite stubborn on this subject and that the morato [Page 663] rium had continued longer than he would have expected. If Gorbachev had thought originally that the United States would accept either a moratorium or a CTB, he had gotten bad advice. Rather then surprising us with the dramatic move of a moratorium, if he were eager for some progress on the nuclear testing issue, he should have explored the subject privately with the USG to see what might have been possible. Instead it had become an area of conflict in US-USSR relations. If the same degree of Soviet restraint had been shown in some other area, there might have been a big payoff. Roslyakov basically agreed with this and said that Gorbachev had had very little experience in international relations and was still learning. Nevertheless, the moratorium had not been a propaganda move but a reflection of Gorbachev’s personal and sincere conviction, which Roslyakov compared to that of President Carter when he sought a CTB early in his administration.
8. Continuing on the summit theme, Ifft again noted the importance of setting an early date. He saw no reason to believe that further delay would lead to better results and the current window of opportunity could not last indefinitely. He then said that he had personally believed for a long time that summits should be more or less regular events, without great fanfare and inflated expectations. Roslyakov said he did not disagree with this, but the next summit is “different.” Because of the special circumstances and background surrounding this summit, it must produce concrete results. These results must be in arms control, since the military situation is the focal point of U.S.-USSR problems. Human contacts and exchanges are fine, but peripheral.
9. Ifft asked Roslyakov how, as a newcomer, he viewed the negotiations in Geneva. Roslyakov said that the procedures here were quite different than what he had been used to at the United Nations. He was not used to working under such strict control as seemed to prevail on this delegation. In particular, it seemed to him that the post-plenary discussions, which should be opportunities for informal exploration of issues, were little more than sterile exchanges and attempts to score debating points. They should be made much more informal. In particular, it seemed to him that the custom of keeping detailed notes of these discussions had to have an inhibiting effect on the exchange of views. As an example, during a recent post-plenary discussion, he had, in response to a U.S. question, ventured his personal view that the number of SS–18s would naturally come down in the course of agreed reductions. When he noticed the U.S. notetaker writing all this down, he became very uncomfortable, in view of the fact that what he had given as a reasonable personal view was not reflected anywhere in the Soviet side’s formal instructions. He thought that Colonel Koltunov had also been uncomfortable at this point. Ifft said that he could sympathize with much of what Roslyakov was saying. Our procedures had not [Page 664] always been so formal. However, the alternative would be to rely upon someone’s memory some time after the conversation had occurred and this might not be desirable either.
10. Roslyakov continued in the same vein, noting that he had chosen Colonel Koltunov to accompany him in post plenaries and had the highest respect for him. Nevertheless, he had to feel somewhat inhibited in the presence of Colonel Koltunov. He knew for a fact that Ambassador Obukhov, and perhaps even Ambassador Karpov, felt somewhat inhibited by the presence of interpreters at their conversations. Ifft remarked that there is absolutely no problem regarding the U.S. interpreters, who are both highly professional and discreet. It was his impression, however, that the presence of a Soviet interpreter did sometimes inhibit Soviet delegates. Roslyakov appeared quite uncomfortable with this observation but did not contest it. Ifft then suggested that one way to deal with Roslyakov’s problem would be for him to distinguish clearly between times when he was expressing an official position and occasions on which he was expressing a personal view. Ifft himself did this and respected this distinction scrupulously when made by Soviet delegates. Roslyakov nodded but was clearly unconvinced.
11. Roslyakov remarked that, on the Soviet delegation, there were individuals who insisted upon a very strict following of instructions and others who were willing to be more “creative” in implementing these instructions. The former, in referring to the latter, were always saying in effect, “look what those bastards are up to now” He assumed that a similar division existed on the U.S. side. In this connection, he noted that he had been unable to give Ifft a straight answer to his earlier question regarding Soviet positions as put forward in the experts’ discussions, because this had not been specifically provided for in the Soviet side’s instructions. Ifft noted that the Soviet side had in fact tabled the ideas discussed by the experts. Roslyakov explained that this became possible because Shevardnadze personally approved this and it had not been necessary to go all the way to the Politburo and the Soviet equivalent of the NSC.
12. Roslyakov then gave some negative personal observations on the Reagan administration along familiar lines. However, he said he did not want to give the impression that current problems were all the fault of the U.S. side. For example, in retrospect, the Soviet Union should have helped Secretary Vance, who was a good man. He said that it would not come as any surprise to Ifft to learn that there are two schools of thought in Moscow. One said that the situation was hopeless and the Soviet Union should wait for a new U.S. administration. The other, with which he associated himself, thought that efforts could and must be made to reach an agreement. Ifft said that he thought [Page 665] that a real opportunity now exists to make major progress toward an agreement, but that the sides do not have unlimited time to accomplish this. In this connection, Ifft was disturbed at the obvious ploy of the Soviet START delegation in refusing to credit U.S. moves or to recognize the considerable common ground which exists. Ifft said that he interpreted this as a tactic to put pressure on the defense and space negotiators but that this was a serious mistake. Roslyakov said that the Soviet side had been marking time, not knowing what might come out of the Reykjavik meeting. He hoped new instructions would be received after this meeting and that things would begin to move.
13. Noting that Roslyakov had worked at both IUSAC and IMEMO, Ifft asked how he compared the two institutions. Roslyakov said that IUSAC is the stronger of the two, especially since the end of the Inozemtsev era at IMEMO. Ifft then asked whether Arbatov was in or out of favor, noting that he had seemed to be in eclipse but then had reemerged. Roslyakov said that Arbatov had good relations with Gorbachev, although he would not say that they were close personal friends. Gorbachev was the sort of informal man who would call upon anyone with expertise regardless of bureaucratic considerations. Arbatov’s problem was not so much that he was in disfavor. Under the Brezhnev and Chernenko regimes, Arbatov had appeared as a star when compared to the others around these two leaders. Now Gorbachev had surrounded himself with very impressive people, such as Dobrynin and Yakovlev, and Arbatov was no longer the brightest person in the room. He remained, however, a formidable debater and pamphleteer. Roslyakov then noted that there had also been a change of the guard in the MFA with smart younger people (whom Americans might call “yuppies”) coming into positions of influence. Ifft observed that he had the feeling that Arbatov’s career might have suffered because he had made some major incorrect predictions in the past. Roslyakov agreed that this was a factor. Both Arbatov and Inozemtsev had gotten caught up in a euphoria regarding US-USSR relations at an earlier time. In addition, Arbatov had made major errors, for which he should be punished, regarding the possibilities of US-USSR trade. Specifically, the favorable effect of the importation of western technology had been greatly overestimated, when the real need was for structural economic reform. While the Soviet Union would not become isolationist, it would, in the future, rely more on its own resources. Although both Arbatov and Inozemtsev had become full academicians in the economics division of the academy of sciences, neither of them knew any more about economics than he or Ifft and this had been part of the problem. IUSAC remains very weak on economic affairs but IMEMO is stronger in this area. Academician Varga (IMEMO) had been a truly outstanding economist. Roslyakov added that another problem with Arbatov is [Page 666] that, although he had been too euphoric about U.S.-USSR relations earlier, he had now swung to the other extreme and become a hard-liner and was opposing a summit meeting.
14. Ifft noted the recent Soviet references to more detailed work on verification and asked whether Roslyakov could provide any clarification regarding what specifically the Soviet side has in mind. Roslyakov did not seem well-informed on the subject, but said he did not think his delegation had in mind anything dramatic, such as formally establishing a verification working group.
15. Roslyakov fished briefly for Ifft’s views as to whether the experts would be reactivated after the Reykjavik meeting. Ifft said he knew of no plans to do this but could not predict the future. Roslyakov cautiously expressed the view that it was better to use the delegates here in Geneva than to have further experts’ discussions, since this tended to confuse matters and create problems as to what is or is not an official position.
16. Roslyakov sprinkled the conversation with praise for Gorbachev. He came back to his point that Gorbachev bears some resemblance to President Carter. Like Carter, Gorbachev is highly intelligent, sincere and holds high principles, but will make some mistakes due to inexperience. Roslyakov said he sometimes reads in the U.S. press that Gorbachev is not in firm control. This is not correct. Gorbachev is in firm control, but there is some opposition and some sniping by the old guard. He also said he is reading Raymond Garthoff’s book “Detente and Confrontation” and is favorably impressed. He said this book is not well known among his colleagues, but he is recommending it to them. It lays out very well exactly how earlier negotiations were conducted. He seemed to imply that this would be a good model to follow if we want progress here in Geneva.
17. As the conversation was drawing to a close, Roslyakov said he had forgotten to ask one question. What sort of framework agreement did Ifft think could be achieved in START? Ifft then outlined the structural similarities between the current U.S. and Soviet positions. This area of common ground is already considerable and our leaders might perhaps be able to resolve some of the remaining problems. In Ifft’s personal view, this could get recorded in a document, which could guide the delegations in their work later on. Roslyakov asked whether such a document could be agreed at Reykjavik. Ifft replied that he thought that would be most welcome, but that it was more realistic to think in terms of the real summit meeting, which he hoped would take place later this year in Washington. Roslyakov agreed.
18. Roslyakov ended the conversation with a plea for a greater level of informality and trust between the two delegations. He noted [Page 667] that progress would be difficult if individual members of the two delegations could not rely upon each other’s discretion and goodwill.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860759–0072. Secret; Priority. Sent priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.↩
- Presumably a reference to Gorbachev’s June 23 letter to Reagan. See Document 136.↩