Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

130. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, March 6, 1986, 0903Z

2233. Subject: (U) Strt-end of round report. Ref NST/START-III-026 (85 Geneva 10590)²

1. This is NST/START-IV-024. Secret entire text.

Summary

2. The expectation that Round IV would be a productive one for the START group, given the groundwork laid at the November meeting between Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, was not realized. The Soviets were not receptive to seeking areas of convergence between the U.S. and Soviet proposals, as mandated by the November 21 joint statement, which called for early progress in areas where there is common ground, in particular, the principal of 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms appropriately applied.

3. The Soviet approach to reductions in strategic offensive arms as presented on September 30, with its inherent inequities, remained fundamentally unaltered by the Soviet January 16 program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century. The Soviets took no steps this round to remove any of the most important obstacles to agreement, such as the precondition of a ban on “space-strike arms” or the unacceptable and artificial composition of forces which would include U.S. INF missiles, most dual-capable aircraft in Europe and Asia, and carrier-based aircraft in aggregate of forces to be limited in a strategic offensive arms agreement. The Soviets chose to hold progress hostage to these areas of continuing disagreement rather than carry out the mandate of the November 21 joint statement.

4. We believe that the Soviets decided to put START essentially on hold for Round IV, focusing instead on their January 16 program and on the new INF proposals contained therein.

5. Paragraphs 6 through 10 contain background information on the round and the January 16 Soviet program. Our analysis of the Soviet approach to Round IV begins with Paragraph 11. A summary of the U.S. approach to the round begins with para 21. Prospects for Round V are contained in paragraphs 30 through 33. Finally, recommendations for interagency group work between rounds and public diplomacy are contained in paragraphs 34 through 38.

Setting

6. NST Round IV ran from January 16 through March 4. There were six weekly start plenary meetings, as well as four “joint” plenary meetings of the entire NST delegations. These were supplemented by heads of negotiations group meetings, post-plenary conversations, and several other informal meetings.

7. At the opening joint plenary on January 16, the Soviet delegation tabled its new “program” for the complete elimination of nuclear arms before the end of the century. This would be achieved in three stages. This new program did not change the Soviet START proposal of September 30, 1985 (now incorporated into stage one in the new program), except to propose a duration of 5 to 8 years. (See reftel for details of the September 30 Soviet proposal) The U.S. NST delegation provided the formal U.S. response to the “Gorbachev program” on February 24.³

The January 16 Soviet Program

8. Stage one:

—Within 5 to 8 years, the United States and the USSR would reduce by 50 percent those nuclear arms capable of reaching each other’s territory. Each side would retain no more than 6000 nuclear weapons on the remaining delivery vehicles of this kind.

—The United States and the USSR would ban “development, testing and deployment of space-strike arms.”

Soviet and U.S. medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles in the European zone would be eliminated.

The United States would assume an obligation not to supply strategic or medium-range missiles to other countries.

The United States and the USSR would agree from the outset to stop all nuclear explosions.

9. Stage two:

—Would begin no later than 1990 and last 5–7 years.

Other nuclear powers would begin to take part, initially assuming an obligation to freeze all their nuclear arms and not to have them on the territory of other countries.

The United States and the USSR would continue first-stage reductions, take further measures to eliminate medium-range nuclear arms and freeze tactical nuclear systems.

After completing their 50-percent reductions, the United States and the USSR would eliminate their tactical nuclear weapons (up to 100km range.)

The ban on “space-strike arms” would become multilateral, with leading industrial powers required to participate.

All nuclear powers would stop nuclear weapons tests.

The development on non-nuclear arms based on new physical principles whose kill capabilities come close to those of nuclear or other systems of mass destruction would be banned.

10. Stage three:

—Would begin no later than 1995.

All remaining nuclear arms would be eliminated.

By 1999, no nuclear arms would remain on earth.

Soviet Approach

11. The Soviets spent considerable time during Round IV touting the virtues of their new program. Korniyenko’s February 20 speech to the CD and Gorbachev’s February 25 speech to the Party Congress provided additional support for these efforts. The Soviets did not, however, push hard for stages two and three and acknowledged that our negotiating mandate remains unchanged from earlier rounds.

12. Soviet linkage of 50 percent reductions in START to a ban on “space-strike arms” remained very strong and appeared unchanged from earlier rounds. However, at one point Karpov said that the Soviet side had not considered what level of reductions would be possible in the event of an agreement that did not ban “space-strike arms” completely.

13. Soviet linkage of START to INF was less clear. On the one hand, they continued to take a hard line on the importance to them of the principle of taking account of all systems which are capable of reaching Soviet territory (the “reach criterion”). On the other hand, they placed more emphasis on the principle than the numbers. In addition, Karpov stated that “an effective solution to the problem involving U.S. medium-range nuclear systems capable of reaching USSR territory would do much to clear the way for deep reductions in nuclear arms in General.” In this connection, some Soviets hinted that an INF agreement could help resolve the composition of forces issue, presumably by eliminating some or all of the U.S. non-strategic forces now included in the Soviet aggregate. However, it is not at all clear that resolution of INF issues would settle this matter, especially if the agreement covered only INF missiles because the Soviets could continue to insist on counting U.S. medium-range and carrier-based aircraft in START. Informally, the Soviets hinted that IIs and GLCMs rather than aircraft, and said informally that their proposal to eliminate U.S. and Soviet missiles in the European zone had been intended to narrow differences in START.

14. While the Soviets continued to insist on including SRAMs and gravity bombs in their strategic weapons aggregate, Khromov, speaking personally, raised informally the possibility of applying a “threat coefficient” to discount bomber weapons relative to ballistic missile RVs in the aggregate.

15. The Soviets seemed to adopt a more forthcoming attitude regarding verification. In contrast to earlier vague references to “cooperative measures,” they stated formally that “with respect to the arms to be destroyed and limited, verification would be carried out by both by NTM and through on-site inspection. The USSR is ready to reach agreement on any other additional verification measures.” Numerous informal Soviet comments support the possibility that a change has indeed occured in the Soviet approach to verification, but we have yet to see how this new Soviet posture, including the reference to OSI, will be applied in practice to systems to be limited.

16. The Soviets showed little interest in the U.S. November proposal, essentially dismissing it with little detailed analysis. They took the position that the November proposal had been overtaken by the November summit meeting, by the Soviet January 16 program, or both. Criticisms of the U.S. position dealt primarily, as before, with the absence of limits on SLCMs, SRAMs, and gravity bombs, lack of aggregation, and the failure to take account of INF systems and “space-strike arms.” After a period of silence on mobile ICBMs, they attacked our proposed ban in a mid-round plenary statement.

17. Despite the fact that it is not part of the NST negotiating mandate, the Soviets devoted noticeable effort to subject of a ban or moratorium on nuclear testing. Informally, they suggested this subject could be negotiated in the START negotiation group. They did, however, make clear that Soviet proposals related to nuclear testing are not a precondition to progress in START.

18. Karpov raised the idea of working out a “model” (or framework) of an agreement. Informally, others described this as a set of principles to guide the later formulation of an actual treaty text which would include the standard Soviet preconditions. In an informal conservation the model was said to be something that could be signed at the next summit meeting. No further explanation was provided and no draft was tabled.

19. Although the Soviets claimed they wanted to begin practical work, their behavior during this round belied this claim. The Soviets seemed deliberately to emphasize differences rather than common ground, but, as the round progressed, they did increasingly, although critically, address the U.S. agenda.

20. The Soviet proposal of October 1 to reduce 200–300 ICBMs was briefly discussed. When it became apparent that a ban on “space-strike arms” was a precondition and that the United States was not prepared to make a a counteroffer, the subject was dropped.

U.S. Approach

21. In accordance with Round IV instructions, we made no substantive changes in the U.S. START position as tabled in the November proposal. (See reftel for details of the November proposal.)

22. The central theme of our approach in Round IV and the subject of our first plenary statement was the mandate to seek areas of convergence between the U.S. and Soviet proposals. To that end we reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the goals in the November 21 joint statement, which called for early progress in areas where there is common ground, in particular, the principle of 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms appropriately applied.

23. The areas in which there appeared to be potential for convergence included:

Reductions in ballistic missile warheads (the U.S. proposes an equal limit of 4500. The number the Soviet Union might deploy under its proposed ceiling of 6000 weapons would appear to be in this vicinity);

Reductions in ICBM warheads (the U.S. proposes an equal limit of 3000. This represents a compromise between the original U.S. proposal of 2500 and the current Soviet offer which, in effect, caps ICBM warheads at 3600);

The magnitude of reductions in ballistic missile throw-weight (the U.S. proposes reductions to a level that is no more than 50 percent of the higher of the levels currently possessed by either side. The Soviet proposal “will lead automatically to the reduction of approximately one-half of the throw-weight of Soviet ballistic missiles”);

The levels of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers (the U.S. could accept an equal limit of between 1250 and 1450 ballistic missiles). The U.S. has also offered an equal limit of 350 on heavy bombers. These limits would result in a reduction from current levels to an equal total of 1600-1800 delivery vehicles, which falls within the range of limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles previously and currently proposed by the Soviet side.

The Soviets showed little interest in seeking convergence and minimized the existence of areas of common ground.

24. We also addressed in plenary the issue of the composition of forces that should properly be discussed in START. We noted this had been a contentious problem since 1969, the sides have never shared a common definition of the term “strategic,” but this has not precluded the sides from reaching agreements. We urged the Soviets to return to the approach agreed in SALT II, and which appeared in Soviet START proposals until September 30. The Soviets, however, continued to press their definition of “strategic,” which includes U.S. INF missiles, most dual-capable aircraft in Europe and Asia and carrier-based aircraft, along with ICBMS, SLBMS, and heavy bombers, in their proposed U.S. “strategic” aggregate.

25. In plenary we formally refuted Soviet linkage of START and defense and space issues. Regarding procedural linkage, we noted that the November 21 joint statement should set to rest the proposition that progress in one negotiating group should be tied to progress in another. Regarding substantive linkage, we rebutted both notions that deep reductions and the deployment of defenses are incompatible, and the suggestion that reductions cannot begin as long as even the option of deploying defenses in the future has not explicitly been renounced. Soviet substantive linkage remained as firm as in previous rounds.

26. We pressed the Soviets to provide detailed reactions and a counterproposal to our November proposal. Although the Soviets did not present a point by point rebuttal, the nature of Soviet objections to this proposal is now clear, and centers on the issues of the composition of forces in START, long-range SLCMS, and whether to limit directly all bombers weapons.

27. We explored the Soviet January 16 program, noting that stage one is essentially their September 30 proposal and that stages two and three are beyond our negotiating mandate. We also emphasized that any agreement must stand on its own merits and not depend upon later agreements to rectify its deficencies.

28. We informally raised the problem of RV counting noting that previous solutions may not be adequate, and suggested either informal discussions or the establishment of a working group to discuss the issue. The Soviets rejected the idea of a working group. They gave conflicting signals regarding their willingness in principle to discuss the issue informally, but in fact no meaningful discussion of the problem was achieved.

29. Because of the negative Soviet attitude in Round IV, our concluding plenary statement emphasized that if this negotiating group’s mandate is to be fulfilled, the Soviets must approach Round V in a different spirit. We urged the Soviets:

To reconsider their approach of linking strategic offensive arms reductions with defense and space issues, and to recognize that the two sides can proceed now, when possibilities for deployment of effective defenses are still years away, to conclude and implement an agreement deeply reducing strategic offensive arms without closing off future options for meeting their perceived security requirements.

To return to the composition of forces to be limited in a strategic offensive arms agreement that was agreed in previous negotiations and that the Soviets themselves has proposed until September 30;

To focus genuinely on the first phase of their long-term program and to narrow the differences between the two sides’ proposals for achieving 50 percent reductions;

To study carefully the U.S. November proposal, and return prepared to respond in depth to each of its elements; and,

To develop revised elements of its own September 30 proposal so as to narrow differences between the sides, just as the U.S. November proposal narrowed differences between the earlier U.S. proposal and the Soviet September 30 proposal.

Prospects

30. We believe it unlikely that the Soviets will be willing to reconcile the converging proposals of the two sides on the ballistic missile RV numbers issue, the ICBM RV numbers issue, and the throw-weight issue, until there is resolution of the composition of forces to be included in START.

31. The Soviets are unlikely to fall off their “reach criterion” for the composition of forces until a solution is found in the INF negotiations. Even then, there is no guarantee that a mutually acceptable solution on INF missiles would cause the Soviets to abandon their “reach criterion” (including its application to U.S. medium-range and carrier-based aircraft). And the major problem posed by the Soviet linkage of progress in START to a ban on “space-strike arms” would, of course, still remain.

32. We believe there may have been a positive change in the Soviet approach to verification. However, testing and exploiting this possible change will be difficult until specific constraints are under discussion and until we are in a position to present specific verification proposals of our own.

33. Given these circumstances, the current deadlock in START could well continue in Round V. This pessimistic assessment is consistent with Soviet statements indicating INF and a nuclear test ban are their priority issues for the next summit.

Recommendations

34. Given the negative Soviet approach in Round IV, completion of the START draft treaty is not now a priority task. However, interagency work needs to continue on this project. The START negotiating group has discussed the ACDA draft treaty at length and welcomes the draft as a useful step to focus attention on important unresolved substantive issues, but generally believes many of the issues in the draft treaty require more study before decisions can be reached. In particular, we need to consider carefully how the new ideas proposed in the draft treaty would limit the Soviets. In order to facilitate discussion within agencies and in the interagency group, an informal paper has been prepared commenting on several of these issues. START negotiating group members will have this paper for reference in Washington.

35. Prior to Round V it would be desirable for two previously tasked interagency group papers to be completed in order to flesh out U.S. positions:

Details of the U.S. proposal banning modernization of SS–18s need to be finalized.

An acceptable option or options for RV counting, suitable for presentation to the Soviets, should be completed.

36. Additional papers will also eventually be needed and would be helpful in Round V:

Developing our definition of throw-weight. This is needed before we can discuss with the Soviets how their proposal would reduce Soviet throw-weight by 50 percent, including the baseline figure to be used.

ALCM issues: The negotiating group needs guidance on ALCM range and armament. Eventually, in the context of a decision on a START framework, the ALCM counting issue also will have to be resolved.

37. To better counteract Soviet arguments in Geneva, two additional papers would be helpful:

An analysis of the Soviet “reach” criterion which clearly develops the U.S. position on how medium-range aircraft, including carrier-based aircraft, should be handled by the START and INF negotiation groups. The purpose of this paper, which would be coordinated with the INF interagency group, would be coordinated with counterarguments to the Soviet “reach criterion.”

A paper providing counterarguments to the Soviet position which seeks to ban all cruise missiles of a range greater than 600km. This paper should differentiate issues involving ALCMs, GLCMs, and SLCMs, e.g., range, armament, and verification for each. This paper would also have to be coordinated with the INF interagency group.

Public Diplomacy

38. A very important aspect of the START negotiations which requires attention is our public diplomacy effort with the congress, the allies, the news media, and directly with the public. In particular, the inequities built into the composition of forces in the Soviet proposal need to be highlighted. We have been doing so with the congressional observers in Geneva, in backgrounders of the press and briefings of allied officials; but much more needs to be done and this requires priority high-level coordination in Washington.

Kampelman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860531-0847. Secret; Immediate. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.
2. See footnote 1, Document 117.
3. See footnote 2, Document 129.