127. Editorial Note
On January 15, 1986, Secretary of State George Shultz received from Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin a letter from Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to President Ronald Reagan calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. In his memoir, Shultz describes a telephone conversation he then had with President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs John Poindexter: “‘I have just received an extremely important letter to the president from Gorbachev,’ I said. ‘Dobrynin says that Gorbachev will go public with the content in Moscow in a few hours. This is very different from anything we have seen before and is a matter of high priority. I will have a restricted group take a look at it. A messenger will hand-deliver it to you for the president in five minutes.’” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 699)
In his letter, dated January 14, Gorbachev called on Reagan to “agree on a stage-by-stage program which would lead to a complete nuclear disarmament everywhere already by the turn of the next century. The Soviet Union envisages the following procedure of the reduction of nuclear weapons—both delivery vehicles and warheads—down to their complete liquidation.” Gorbachev went on to lay out three stages: the first would last 5–8 years, during which time the Soviet Union and the United States would reduce by half their nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other’s territories and leave no more than 6000 warheads on delivery vehicles; the second, to begin no later than 1990 and last 5–7 years, would include the United Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of China and lead to the reduction of U.S. and Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons and the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons of all of the nuclear powers; the third, to begin not later than 1995, would feature the liquidation of any remaining nuclear weapons and the verification of their destruction via national technical means and on-site inspections.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690024, 8690124)) The full text of Gorbachev’s letter is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 177.
On February 3, President Reagan chaired a meeting of the National Security Planning Group in the Situation Room from 11:15 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. to discuss General Secretary Gorbachev’s proposals. Poindexter characterized the letter as “subtle and clever, making some points that would appeal to certain domestic US and Soviet audiences, some that would attempt to drive wedges between the US and Allies,” and noted that the “the thrust of Gorbachev’s letter was seen by some as a purely publicity ploy, while others viewed some areas as unique opportunities [Page 504] to move arms control negotiations forward.” After a discussion of whether to adjust U.S. arms control positions, Reagan “argued that we need to make the Soviets expose the fact that they are not really serious about reductions negotiations. The US should go to the negotiations, point out that the Soviets have made a general, overall offer, and agree on the overall aims of the process.” The President called for emphasis on the fact “that what the US seeks now is a practical way forward: a way to achieve verification in a concrete agreement, even if such involves a proposal we have already made,” and “the point that we are trying to find a practical way to move forward in implementing the agreed eventual goals.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSPG Meeting File, NSPG 0127, 3 Feb 1986, Arms Control—Responding to Gorbachev.)(declass) The minutes of the National Security Planning Group meeting are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 188.
On February 4, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 210, “Allied Consultations on the US Response to General Secretary Gorbachev’s January 14, 1986, Arms Control Proposal,” which included this section: “Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). I am not inclined to change our November, 1985, positions in those areas in which the Soviet Union has failed to indicate any motion on their part, nor even addressed fully our most recent proposals. Therefore, I do not envision new U.S. initiatives in either the START or Defense and Space areas at this time.” (Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/05/1986–02/06/1986))(declass) The full NSDD can be found in National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 092, NSDD 210.