114. Notes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting1
-Pres sent a proposal by Sovs 3 weeks ago
—2 purposes: (1) sound good
(2) self surving [unclear]
-Lumped in many systems not strategic
-Paper this weekend gave 5–6 approaches
-3 for discussion today
-2 issues
(1) substance—what should say?
(2) if yes, when how present—when, how, where?
-in UN
-in Sec mgt with Shev
-round on Nov 19
-Turned to chart
-col 2—Current US position
-EXAMPLE A2
-1800 figure is figure Sov Union posed previously
-4500—Sovs have 8900 RVs now—it 50%
-3000—50% of 6K figure suggested in offer
-1500—ALCC
-6000—4500 + 1500 ALCM
-EXAMPLE B
-do 50% across board
-1250 is 50% of what sovs
-280 is 50% of SALT Acct bombers
[Page 427]-4500 is 50% now
-3000 either 50% of 6K or 60% of 6K
-1500—needed to get 6K of 4500
-Tuffened up by a—50% cut in TWT3
-50% cut in size of new RVs
-BAN ALL Ballistic, land based missiles
(SS–24 and SS–25s, NOT [unclear])
-This numbers—can we get views?
SEC STATE4
-need to make counter and things in A or B mod are sensible
-launchers from Scowcroft—fewer warheads on launchers 1800 figure better
[less than 3 lines not declassified]
-MIRVed mobiles ban—not just mobile missiles
-MIRVed not all mobiles if choice
-Make a proposal—either OK
RCM—There are defense and space on SDI, strat def,
EXAMPLE A—would say reductions are linked to defense—reductions tied to adhere to ABM Treaty—work talks on research & test
EXAMPLE B—no commit to ABM
-0—0: not a proposal but a ploy if no ballistic missiles, no need for SDI—not a proposal
SECSTATE—set it up so reductions tied to SDI
-an insurance policy, if Congress cuts SDI undercuts support for reductions
-clarifying what research is be permitted from negotiator asked what mean by that—must explain
-research means also that manner of testing needed to answer your questions
-we are already exploring coop trans
Pres
-we start from position that they have more than we—they are more modern
-would we stop MX
Cap-we would be banned from MX D5 Midget ATB under their proposals
[Page 428]-most import decision of your term
-got paper on Sunday, revisions today
-no decision today, no change at UNGA, if move, do it just prior to Geneva
-why not just repackage current position
-both A&B are insufficient—too many hard targets
-1995 date assumption that Congress will permit us to mod.
-Sov can tell what they do
-We cant guarantee
-spend more time on developing proposal both A&B are insufficient
RCM—what insufficient5
Cap—total weapons/targets
-Chiefs can show
-Actions in D&S invite all arguments said would not make
-clarification will not help us
-I feel that phase 0–0—we will abandon SDI—never suggest abandon SDI
-all research is permitted
-any oral reaffirmation bad
-stay out of D&S in counts
-if 50% cut is made in TWT—still Soviet ahead
-INf—SS–20s has 3 warheads
-if 1 off, [unclear] hit US
-any freezes etc can still move Asia—Europe
-not cant do something, but not now 2–3 days before [unclear] to respond
-repackage what we have on table now
SecState—a lot more uncertainty on our Congress, then what they can deploy
—get theirs down now
Pres—need to replace older missiles
[1 line not declassified]
Cap—[less than 1 line not declassified]
Pres—in an agreement, Congress will have to commit to cold, hard facts of numbers
-if we are serious arms, inability to compromise etc—need to sound like their proposals to appear to meet
[Page 429]-I don’t think there’s any way to restrict SDI—keeping your gas mask
-SDI only meet them on is being willing to share with world—[unclear] willing to get rid of off
-if able to modernize, A or B offer potential to legit arms reduction
-no way we can match great expanse of Sov—cant hit all
Crowe—fundamental assym is in target base
-they have fewer targets to hit
-look at what $$ does via our strat
-easier for them to have sufficiency
-worked on (B) overnight—1995—all modernization—ban all MIRVed only—simplifies targeting and verification
Pres—agree to ban all mobiles
Cap—may make targeting may increase verification—may neve[r] know
Pres—need heavy verification
-what does 1580 mean
Rowny—mistake
RCM—Sovs want 1800
take 280 from 1800 1520
1250 is 50% of today
-a range
Crowe—on mobile missiles
we have net advantage if no mobile missiles
-on (B) reasonable deter
about 1600 weapons short
500 RV short
-11% off on time request—Economic short-out of missiles
-no RESERVE
-if 175 KG a problem for D–5
avoid make jump to hurt
Ken—avoid
Cap—that’s why we need more time to study
Crowe—modest toying can be done but hurts presentation
Ken—try to use 4 pts of Sovs
-50%, 3600 (60%),—6000K, ban on modernization—mobile MRV and RV weight
-turn these
-agree with mod of #’s as Shultz
[Page 430]-agree with JCS toying
-in public diplomacy—if margin small put up #’s
-any tie to SDI before reductions bad
-reductions good before SDI came along
-we should clarify research, our job, no negotiate
-can see how wait tell before Geneva but shows seriousness to have Shev—neg—table
Ideas to Shev
concept at Geneva
details in ltr prior to summit
TIMING
Shultz—if do something, should say so at UN—that told to put something forward
-good idea to give Shev an idea of plan
-table this in detail before end of round—don’t hold back
-if leaks out—fine
Cap—2 problems
(1) if you refer to in UN, loose all else lot of press on proposal
(2) not quite worked out—tuff for Nov
-better time after Nov 1—a few days before Summit
-consid arguments too soon
-elements could be put together
-not today
-not ready before 1 Nov
-2/3 weeks to chew it up
Pres—what is advantage of telling in advance advantage is what say
Shultz—If we want agreed to, adv to have it set out in detail by negotiators
-you can get broad
Pres—Another idea, Sovs have presented
-in UNGA—have Sovs provided #’s
Ken—given #’s
Shultz—all in domain
Pres—What if simply say, that after numerous proposals they have mad[e] specific, we will shortly present to negotiators some of aspects acceptable
Meese—from these proposals, sees of negotiation
-details handled by negotiators not you
-ask the negotiators to stay an extra week—shows move
[Page 431]Cap—if ready, Pres statement OK
-not acceptable, basis for negotiation
-still need to study
Pres—dont put in idea of not acceptable
-got to remember that Gorb must take back something to show he’s “Big sht McGuire”
-if we simply indicate an area here, General, he will have to come to [unclear] in meeting but he can see elements and pocket
-lets not go in and again drive him to yet give him something he can claim will
-give him (not concede) must be in US interest—but must play game need to compromise
Meese—need to talk up verification issue
you need raise
no problem for us
a plus for us
Cap—yes
Ken—dont think you should worry about Sovs like this—close to 1982—not need to study
-not wise to overpromise at UN make mgt all arms control
-largely an SDI summit—Soviet aggression overseas
Pres—arms control a sideline issue if remove hostility
-they have gone public, if can use their numbers—give an OUT to Gorb
-if we fall into trap of arms control summit—weaken selves
-PFIAB made report—we are planning for any contingency that could happen—Soviet Union is planning a WAR—a surrender or die ultimatum—SDI changes rules, need to reevaluate whole war scenario
CIA—reductions not militarily significant
-to layman—Soviets not very far apart [therefore] only reason not do it is US insistence on SDI
-the latter the proposal made the better
-game is on SDI—more we talk about ABB
Pres—ans must be if we get it, we then, must say we will share it with world
Casey—need to think when on table
-Sovs want to use ABM to undercut SDI
Ken—agree, need counter-counter focused on offense-offense
Cap—adv in many things—TWT—50% still leaves them up on us
-goal is parity
[Page 432]-pt. is it is a defensive weapon, share it with world—cut ground out of RCM—2/3 lines on UN
- Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, NSPG 10/22—NST. Secret. Drafted by Linhard. The original text is handwritten. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix D. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Situation Room from 11:19 a.m.–12:29 p.m. Linhard’s notes from meetings of the Senior Arms Control Group on October 1, October 8, and October 21, are in the Reagan Library, Linhard Files, NSPG 10/22—NST. In a diary entry for October 22, Reagan discussed that day’s meeting: “N.S.P.G. meeting on how we reply to the Soviets Arms proposals. We’re still working on that. My own idea is that we undermine their propaganda plan by offering a counter proposal which stresses our acceptance of some of their figures—such as a 50% cut in weapons & a total of 6,000 war heads etc. Those are pretty much like what we’ve already proposed.” (Reagan, Personal Diary, October 22, 1985) ↩
- See footnote 2, Document 113.↩
- Not found. ↩
- Not found. ↩
- October 20.↩