Round I concluded this week and the three U.S. negotiators briefed the
NAC before returning home on
Thursday.2 Twenty
plenary sessions were conducted; five full delegation and five each for
the three negotiating fora. A summary of this week’s activities is at
TAB A.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the National Security
Council3
LAST WEEK IN GENEVA (22–26 APRIL 1985)
—Defense and Space: The fifth meeting of this
group took place on April 22. Kvitsinskiy assumed the “bad cop” role in delivering
a sharp diatribe on U.S. START
and INF proposals as well as the
now common attacks on SDI.
Kampelman
rebutted his attempt to ridicule the U.S. proposals, suggesting that
between rounds the Soviet negotiators should take a more serious
look at what the U.S. had said. In post plenary discussions
Kvitsinskiy
has made the false charge that our Thule radar was an ABM Treaty violation due to its
location. He was laying the ground work for a counter to our
Krasnoyarsk concerns. This issue is under active discussion in the
SCC.
—April 22 Heads of Delegation Luncheon: During
the course of a three hour luncheon the two delegation heads had a
candid discussion on procedures for the next round and major
differences. On the former, both agreed that fewer full delegation
plenaries and more contact in the three negotiating groups would be
required. On the latter, Kampelman opined that two major issues divide us:
(a) agreement in one area hostage to agreement in another, and (b)
the differences of opinion on the intent of SDI. Karpov responded that he could envision the
building of “models of agreements” in the three areas but that if
two or more of the areas were “organically” related there could be
no finalization. With regard to the intent of SDI, he reiterated the Soviet view
that SDI was part of the U.S.
offensive planning to cope with a Soviet retaliation to a U.S. first
strike.
—Final Plenary Round I: The fifth and final
full delegation plenary session of Round I took place on April 23.
Both sides used the occasion to review the bidding. Karpov kept to
the standard line that no reductions in offensive arms would be
possible until the question of stopping an “arms race in space” is
resolved and then, both criticized the various U.S. proposals on the
table and touted the Soviet moratoria. Indeed, in content this
statement was very similar to the one he delivered at the beginning
of the round. Kampelman contrasted the flexibility and forthcoming
approach by the U.S. in all areas with Soviet stonewalling tactics
involving preconditions and freezing the very conditions that
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the sides should be
working to improve. He pressed for development between rounds of the
basis for a serious dialogue on the offense-defense relationship and
for movement toward radical reductions in offensive arms.
—Next Rounds: In various meetings last week,
general agreement has been reached on the term of subsequent rounds;
Round II—May 30–July 16, and Round III—September 29 through early
November. Agreement emerged that there would be at least one plenary
session per week for each of the sub-delegations; START, INF and Defense and Space. There would be joint
plenaries scheduled for the beginning, middle and end of the round
with the caveat that either side could call for additional meetings
as it saw fit.
Attachment
Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and
Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State4
Geneva, April 24, 1985, 2042Z
3777. Subject: NST: Ambassador
Kampelman’s
End-of-Round Assessment.
1. This is NST–1–036, Secret—Entire
Text.
2. Addressees will have received end-of-round assessments from each
of the three negotiating groups. The following is my personal
assessment of the first round of our negotiations as a whole.
3. It was not a very productive round, largely because the Soviets
chose to infuse it with a large propaganda content. The six-week
session did, however, give us a chance to lay out our own positions
and to draw some conclusions about where Soviet priorities lie.
Clearly, SDI is the main Soviet
target, and they tried in several ways to test and erode our
firmness on proceeding with the research program.
4. Early on, Karpov indicated that the Soviet interpretation of
“interrelationship” in the January 8 joint statement5 was that progress in the offensive area
had to be connected with banning “space-strike” weapons. This
pre-condition was most visible in the Soviet description of the
linkage between SDI and START. From the beginning to the end
of the round, they left little doubt that agreement in START had to be
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preceded by agreement on SDI.6 In fact, in START there was a double link—both
to SDI and to INF, agreement on which also had to
precede agreement in START. The
linkage was weaker between SDI and
INF; the Soviets indicated that
in principle they were prepared to accept a separate INF agreement (on their own terms, of
course).
5. In both offensive negotiations, for which a negotiating history
exists, the Soviets showed little or no flexibility.7 In INF, their bottom line was familiar:
zero U.S. missiles in Europe. In START, the Soviets even went backwards by broadening
their 1983 ban on cruise missiles to include ALCM’s.8 In the Defense and Space Group, for
which there is much less of a negotiating history, the Soviets
sought from the outset to ban SDI
research and thus gut the program.
6. To sum up, the Soviets used a dual tactic to get at SDI—both through a ban on research and
through a tight link to the strategic area where we have proposed
radical reductions. To this tactic they added a venerable propaganda
ploy—moratorium proposals in each of the three areas. These, too,
had an SDI component: research on
“space-strike arms” was to be stopped. An old chestnut waiting for a
public blossoming, the moratorium idea seems to have had only a
brief efflorescence in Europe following Gorbachev’s April 7
interview.9 In Geneva, we
sought to wither it with probing questions exposing its
blights.10
7. It seemed to me a bit strange that Gorbachev should have
chosen the moratorium for his first major foreign policy initiative.
Perhaps this transparent and unproductive exercise indicates that,
however flexible Gorbachev may eventually prove to be, he is at least
for the moment aligned with the rigid elements of Soviet foreign
policy which have predominated in the past few years.
8. Karpov’s final statement yesterday sounded very much like his
remarks in the very first plenary at the beginning of the round. I
suspect the similarities were not accidental. The Soviets seemed to
be saying that they were not ready to show any flexibility at all.
It is difficult to tell whether they have set the tone for a
continuing period of rigidity
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or whether they have simply felt compelled to
go through a compulsory exercise in toughness and propaganda.
9. Whatever the Soviet motivation, I have no doubt that they will
take back to Moscow with them the firm conviction that the U.S. will
not abandon its SDI research or
accept preconditions to serious negotiation on offensive weapons.
There was indeed some tangible, if minor, improvement in tone during
the last few days of the round—an indication, perhaps, that the
Soviets had finally read our message, but I expect continued
toughness during the next round.
10. The Soviet negotiating position in Round II and onward will
inevitably be heavily influenced by the political environment
outside Geneva. The Soviets will undoubtedly look carefully at—and
indeed do their best to influence—European views toward SDI, the actions of the United States
Congress in funding SDI research,
the INF situation leading up to the
Dutch deployment decision, and possible signs of Allied disarray or
disunity in the runup to and aftermath of the Bonn Summit. The
Soviet negotiating position may also be affected by the approaching
Gorbachev-Reagan
summit and by the increasing likelihood that Gorbachev will unveil a
major Soviet arms control initiative at the UN early this Fall.
11. As we return to Washington, we will be looking at ways to deal
with new approaches which the Soviets may throw at us. Without
prejudging what may be decided in the next several weeks, I am
firmly convinced that we need two qualities above all
others—consistency and patience. The Soviets have shown us very
little flexibility and have evinced very little interest in the
flexibility that we have told them we possess. They have no doubt
been testing the adage that Soviet intransigence can provoke
American concessions. This is a good period to prove them
wrong.11 The best way to force them into a genuine
negotiation is to let them know that they can’t intimidate or
stampede us. The ineffectiveness of the Soviet tactics we
encountered in Round I should be grounds for confidence that they
cannot use Geneva to weaken either our strategic position or our
ties with our allies.
