57. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJ
- Ministerial with Shevardnadze
There are signs of both Soviet activity and inactivity which should be carefully noted and evaluated in Washington. They disturb me.
It is significant that we still have not received a response from Moscow as to a date for the ministerial. Your message2 on proposed [Page 265] dates was conveyed to Shevardnadze while he was travelling. Vorontsov told me ten days ago that the earlier proposed date was probably unsatisfactory because it conflicted with the FRG President’s3 visit to Moscow. He thought, however, without committing Shevardnadze, that the dates of July 13 and 14 would probably work and we would hear when Shevardnadze returned to Moscow. It is now ten days since Shevardnadze’s return to Moscow and we have heard nothing. We have reason to assume that the dates and possible new negotiating moves depend on Gorbachev, who until quite recently, was preoccupied with matters of the economy.
A related development covers the private channel4 Dobrynin has with his Senator5 friend, who received a message from Dobrynin last week. On Friday morning, the Senator asked me to meet with him and shared with me that message to the effect that “things are moving rapidly” and the Senator’s friend, serving as liaison, should hold himself in readiness to return soon to Moscow. That afternoon, the date of July 15 was proposed by Moscow and for personal reasons rejected, with a suggestion by the Senator’s friend that he could come sooner. Dobrynin responded by reaffirming that “things are moving rapidly” but that it was not necessary for the Senator’s friend to rush to Moscow.
We do not know the “whys” for all of the above. We do know that matters have come to a grinding halt in INF this week and Soviet movement appears to be frozen.
It is my opinion that the Soviets are proceeding on the assumption that we require a ministerial more than they do; that we require a summit; and that we are sufficiently eager for some kind of an arms control agreement with them so that they have leverage and want to play it. It is essential that we not feed that misperception. We should always appear publicly to want to meet with the Soviets, which is why you invited Shevardnadze to Washington and why the President invited Mr. Gorbachev to Washington. Whether they accept is for them to decide. It is our view that our joint interests and world stability would be strengthened if these meetings and an arms-reduction agreement take place, but we are a strong country and can certainly live without those meetings or an agreement if the Soviets do not agree.
It is also my strong recommendation that we begin at all levels of Government, from the White House down, to emphasize our interest [Page 266] in not only achieving the abolition of all nuclear systems in the world with a range between 300 and 3100 miles (LRINF and SRINF cover 500 to 3500 kilometers), but that we also want what the President and Mr. Gorbachev agreed upon in Geneva in November, 1985, i.e., 50% reductions in all long-range strategic missiles to the level of 1600 launchers and 6000 warheads agreed upon in Reykjavik. The Soviets have been playing coy in this area and it would not hurt us to begin expressing the view that we hope Mr. Gorbachev has not changed his mind with respect to these important reductions.