Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

55. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 26, 1987

SUBJECT

• The Next Six Months with the Soviets

The Venice and Reykjavik meetings² cleared the decks for a very active phase in our relations with both the Soviets and the Allies. We need to integrate our Soviet strategy with our policies within NATO and to put the emerging calendar of events to work for us.

Gorbachev seems to have concluded that his interests are best served by remaining engaged with you, and he is working from your agenda. You thus hold strong cards to nail down historic arms reductions and to put our gains on human rights, regional issues, and bilateral cooperation on a firm basis for your final year in office and beyond.

Venice and Reykjavik also underscored that there are more than two players in the East-West game. NATO governments face tough political choices on next steps in nuclear and conventional arms control and modernization. Where they come out will bear great influence on our dialogue with the Soviets, and could define the direction of the Alliance for the remainder of the century.

Thus, the next six months may represent a decisive moment for your East-West policy. There will be at least three main events to steer matters with the Soviets—two visits by Shevardnadze and your summit with Gorbachev. With the Allies, the action will be more continuous and complex, and we should plan on intense, visible consultations to manage it. The strategy below outlines the groundwork we must lay through the summer and early fall so that your leverage is at a peak at a fall meeting with Gorbachev.

First Shevardnadze Meeting

Now that our SRINF position is on the table, we expect the Soviets to agree soon to a July meeting. We should use the occasion to set in motion an intensive work plan leading to a summit this fall. Specifically:

—We should aim at wrapping up an INF agreement by late summer. In advance of the meeting, Mike Glitman will pursue Soviet hints of flexibility on German Pershings and the remaining 100 LRINF. Our INF delegation should plan to remain in Geneva over the summer to focus on remaining issues, notably verification.

—We should keep the Soviets’ feet to the fire on START, parrying their calls for a “key provisions” agreement by emphasizing how near we are to an agreement of historic importance, and continuing to insist that we work on a joint draft treaty. Over the coming weeks, Max Kampelman will probe in Geneva for any softness in the Soviets’ linkage of START to SDI, and seek to put off the ABM Treaty interpretation issue.

—We will try to secure Shevardnadze’s agreement to a sequenced approach to nuclear testing negotiations, with delegations initially addressing verification of existing treaties and the agenda for a second phase. This will enable us better to support the nuclear testing program. We also need to resolve interagency differences on chemical weapons to get off the defensive on this issue.

—Human rights will have an especially high profile if recent backsliding on emigration and political prisoner releases continues. My letter to Shevardnadze³ already has put down a firm marker on this score. I will be in close touch with Congress and private groups to ensure we can confront Shevardnadze authoritatively with the truth that token gestures will not do the trick, and that we need routine Soviet implementation of its Helsinki Final Act commitments as a continuing mechanism for solving such issues as emigration and family reunification. We will also consult with the Allies at the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting⁴ to firm up an end game strategy aimed at extracting maximum Soviet concessions on human rights.

—We want to move the regional discussion beyond recitations of positions to results on the ground. With Shevardnadze, we can reinforce the message that the key to an Afghanistan settlement is for Moscow to make the hard decisions on a withdrawal and an interim regime. We can also exploit Soviet expressions of flexibility on the Middle East to obtain substantive concessions on the peace process. And we can press in the UN and privately to secure Soviet cooperation to end the Gulf War.

—On the bilateral front, we should concentrate on restoring momentum to your people-to-people initiative. We have collaborated with Charlie Wick on a draft letter to Gorbachev which would reemphasize the importance you attach to this area. We can also use the Shevardnadze visit as a way to get started with expert-level discussions on new exchanges agreements in the areas of Basic Sciences and Transportation, and as the occasion for signing the agreement reached earlier this year on establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

—Finally, we can use the occasion to reinforce the strong demarches we have already made on the need for Soviet cooperation in restoring Embassy Moscow to full operations and in implementing Jim Schlesinger’s recommendations on the new embassy building.

With the Allies, we should take every opportunity during this period (High Level Group meetings, reinforced NAC’s) to urge implementation of the Montebello nuclear modernization program⁵ and Conventional Defense initiative, while taking the lead in shaping a comprehensive arms control approach that protects our nuclear guarantee to Europe.

We should achieve a NATO consensus during the summer on draft mandates for negotiations on conventional stability and on confidence building measures, developing initiatives for each to put the Soviets on the defensive. We will also need to shore up NATO consensus for our overall approach to the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference and later meetings on human rights. I will share our strategy for the forthcoming Shevardnadze meeting with my NATO (and Japanese) ministerial colleagues beforehand, and give them a report after.

September Shevardnadze Meeting

Shevardnadze’s attendance at the UNGA traditionally provides an opportunity for a meeting here or in New York. The focus of a September meeting would largely depend on progress in INF. It is conceivable that we would already have reached sufficient agreement to have announced a summit. If so, we would use the September session to review progress across the full agenda which might be recorded at a summit. If not, outstanding INF issues would claim priority. In either case, we would want to:

—Push hard on START, if necessary exploring a document short of a full agreement which could subsequently lead to a full START treaty during your administration. We would also review the bidding on such issues as nuclear testing and chemical weapons to determine how they might figure in a summit.

—Press for human rights progress, taking advantage of the Soviets traditionally greater flexibility on human rights in advance of high level meetings.

—Follow-up on our summer diplomatic efforts in such areas as Afghanistan, the Gulf and the Middle East, and review the results of expert-level meetings in those areas.

—Take stock of progress in implementing existing bilateral exchange agreements and of negotiations on new agreements which could figure in a summit meeting: basic sciences, transportation and various Coast Guard-related agreements.

—Provide the Soviets with a definitive statement of our needs for completing our new chancery in Moscow, following technical work on the Schlesinger recommendations.⁶

Normally, at the UN, I meet with Summit Seven ministers, and with the British, French and Germans. There is also a host of bilaterals with other Allies. These will be good occasions to tie them into our objectives for the second Shevardnadze meeting.

Throughout the period, we will work closely with the Allies to coordinate an active strategy for the human rights/humanitarian side of CSCE, and to push for conclusion by the end of 1987 of both the Vienna meeting and NATO-Warsaw Pact informal talks on a mandate for conventional stability negotiations. A high priority will be to orchestrate semi-annual ministerial meetings of the Defense Planning Committee and the North Atlantic Council in order to demonstrate the unity of our defense and arms control programs.

Gorbachev Visit

The climactic event with the Soviets would be a Washington summit. The Soviets have hinted that early October or late November would be most convenient for Gorbachev. As the Soviets have made clear that an INF agreement would be a condition for a summit, there would be a natural tendency to view signing of that Treaty as the focal point of the event. We would need to ensure that our full agenda received full attention. To do that, we would rely on:

—Emphasis during the summit in private and in public statements on the importance of consummating a START agreement enshrining 50% reductions as the priority task of the next year.

—High visibility events keyed to human rights themes by you and other administration spokesmen. The end-phase of the Vienna CSCE meeting would be a natural opportunity; radio or other addresses by you and other senior spokesman could also be used. We should be prepared to acknowledge progress where it is underway, but hammer away at the need for long-term improvements and seek concrete Soviet commitments to procedures that would guarantee them.

—A major address on regional issues and strategy during the pre-summit period. The UNGA is the obvious forum.

—Events during the summit which focus on cooperative activities of interest to us: signing of bilateral exchange agreements; a ribbon cutting at the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center; a Rose Garden reception for participants in people-to-people programs.

We should also be willing to allow Gorbachev to pin down a second meeting in Moscow, to be scheduled for the summer of 1988, while reiterating the visit would have to be well-prepared.

High-Level NATO Consultations

If we can achieve an INF agreement and schedule a U.S.-Soviet summit, we would want at that point to hold a high-level meeting with our allies. Such a session would set the stage for the Gorbachev visit, provide a high visibility opportunity to emphasize our full four-part agenda, provide visible Alliance consultations, and reaffirm the NATO security and arms control consensus. I think it should take place in Brussels. After the Gorbachev summit, you could write to each of the Allied leaders to report the outcome.

A Final Note

This is an ambitious agenda. I believe it is a realizable one. With the necessary clarity in our objectives and unity in our ranks, we should be able to close out 1987 in a strong position to achieve even greater progress during your final year in office.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Subject File, Soviet: Six Months. Secret; Sensitive. Shultz handed a copy of this memorandum to Reagan during their June 26 meeting, which took place from 1:17 until 1:41 p.m. at the White House and which Reagan, Shultz, Bush, Howard Baker, Duberstein, and Carlucci attended. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Notes from this conversation are in the Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (05/29/1987–08/13/1987) [Meetings with the President—notes].
2. References are to the Venice G–7 Summit, June 3–11, and the Reykjavik NATO Ministerial meeting, June 11–12.
3. The letter was transmitted in telegram 184547 to Geneva, June 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N870005–0294)
4. The Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting took place January 15–18, 1989.
5. Reference is to the October 27, 1983, decision by NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group to reduce stockpiles of short-range intermediate nuclear forces while modernizing remaining systems.
6. See Document 61.