Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

45. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, April 15, 1987, 2:10–4:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • Secretary Shultz
  • Amb. Nitze
  • Amb. Matlock
  • Amb. Lehman
  • Amb. Glitman
  • Amb. Ridgway
  • Amb. Rowny
  • Amb. Cooper
  • Amb. Holmes
  • Mr. Perle
  • Mr. Linhard
  • Mr. Mobbs
  • Mr. Timbie
  • LTG Moellering
  • Mr. Adelman
  • Mr. Ermarth
  • Mr. Simons
  • Mr. Parris
  • Mr. Stafford (notetaker)

• Soviet

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Vice-Minister Bessmertnykh
  • Amb. Dubinin
  • Amb. Karpov
  • Amb. Masterkov
  • Amb. Obukhov
  • Mr. Mikol’chak
  • Mr. Tarasenko

SUBJECT

• Final Plenary

Summary: The Secretary and Shevardnadze reviewed the results of the three days of discussions, focussing primarily on arms control. In each arms control area, they listed areas of agreement and key remaining issues. In INF, they agreed on the Reykjavik formula of 0/100, with reductions occurring in two or three phases over 4–5 years, and with strict verification provisions. On SRINF, the Soviets proposed immediate negotiations on the elimination of these missiles within one year. Areas of disagreement included conversion of LRINF missiles, the degree of concurrency in the reductions, and the location of the remaining LRINF missiles. On START, the sides agreed on 50% reductions to 1600/6000, on separate limits covering nuclear-armed SLCMs of longer range, on strict verification, and on the heavy bomber counting rule. Disagreements involved linkage of START to Defense and Space, sublimits, and the timetable for reductions. On Defense and Space, the sides agreed on nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time and strict compliance with the Treaty during that period. They disagreed on the timeframe for nonwithdrawal, the right to deploy after the period, and testing restrictions during the period. Starting dates for Round VIII of NST were set for April 23 for INF and May 5 for START and Defense and Space. On nuclear testing, the sides agreed to task experts to study alternative verification techniques. On CW, the sides agreed to reciprocal visits of CW destruction facilities. Shevardnadze handed over responses on several human rights cases that had been raised by the Secretary. End summary.

Shevardnadze opened the plenary by saying he had just come from a meeting of the Komsomol Congress. The participants in this Congress came from an interesting generation; they were on a different intellectual level and were amazing people. The Secretary said he had found the writers with whom he had just met similarly interesting. The writers had said that Shevardnadze was probably meeting with the Communist League this morning and would probably be talking about glasnost. The Secretary said he hoped Shevardnadze had done so, or the writers would be disappointed. Shevardnadze replied that Soviet writers are very active these days. Returning to the subject of the Congress, he said the spirit was so enthusiastic, he did not feel like leaving.

Shevardnadze said he had a package of documents which he wished to hand over.² These responded to requests that had been received from the Secretary, President Reagan, and other American representatives; they included emigration, reunification, and other cases which had been considered and favorably resolved. The Soviet side had given all cases serious consideration and study.

Turning to arms control, Shevardnadze said he had met with his “foremen” and wished to share with the Secretary some of their views. Regarding medium-range missiles, he had received the following information from his associates. This subject was the one where the most headway had been made, and which provided the best chance for agreement in the near term. He understood that, both yesterday with Gorbachev and in the regular plenary meetings, the Secretary had agreed that the sides would be guided by the Reykjavik agreement on medium-range missiles. They had agreed to implement reductions in medium-range missiles in a phased manner. The U.S. side proposed three phases, the Soviet side two. Their negotiators would straighten this out. The sides agreed that the overall timeframe for reductions would not exceed five years. The U.S. side proposed four years, the Soviet side five. A mutually acceptable solution could be found here. The sides agreed to include provisions on strict verification. They could record verification principles in general terms, while details could be worked out in Geneva. There was agreement on provisions regarding the elimination of operational-tactical missiles in Europe. The Soviet side favored elimination of these missiles. Gorbachev had expressed the view in his meeting with the Secretary that the sides needed negotiations to achieve their final objective—the elimination of medium-range missiles and perhaps of operational-tactical missiles. Shevardnadze said he believed there was agreement in principle on the implementation of an agreement on operational-tactical missiles. This would be done promptly, in a timeframe of one year. After the agreement was signed on medium-range missiles, they would be eliminated in 4–5 years; the sides could find a comprehensive solution here. Operational-tactical missiles would be eliminated within one year. The Soviet side disagreed with the following aspects in the INF area: conversion of medium-range missiles and other arms; lack of concurrency in reductions—the U.S. wanted the Soviet side to reduce in the first phase while the U.S. did not, and the Soviet side preferred proportional reductions; and the location of medium-range missiles within striking range of the other side—deployment in Alaska would be unacceptable to the Soviet side. The Soviet side could not adopt the following provision of the U.S. approach to operational-tactical missiles: the right to build up while the Soviet Union eliminated. Shevardnadze said he hoped the U.S. would reconsider the Soviet proposals and that he also hoped he had accurately characterized the areas of mutual agreement and disagreement. He looked to the delegations to negotiate more actively and intensively. He could agree to restart the INF negotiations on April 23. Since medium-range missiles represented the most promising area, perhaps the sides could have their delegations work at a higher level and coordinate better with their foreign ministers. In the next round, the delegations could continue to work on the U.S. draft treaty and the Soviet side would table its own draft.

The Secretary said he appreciated the detail of Shevardnadze’s report. He was disappointed, however, because he had thought he had made headway with Gorbachev. He could only guess that the Soviet working group did not agree with the General Secretary. Shevardnadze joked that, in that case, perhaps the working group should resign. The Secretary said he agreed on the Reykjavik formula of a global 100, with Soviet deployments in Soviet Asia and U.S. deployments in the U.S. Nothing had been said at Reykjavik about Alaska. Some staged manner of reductions clearly was the way to approach the problem; he assumed this could be worked out. The timeframe for reductions was close, and could also be worked out. He agreed on strict verification; the U.S. had spelled out its ideas in detail in its draft treaty and he was sure the Soviet side would have ideas of its own. The negotiators could go into this. With regard to SRINF, he had agreed with Gorbachev that this category would include the SS–12 and the SS–23. He had set out U.S. principles for this category that he thought had been agreed to by Gorbachev. These principles included the following. First, the sides should make provision for this category in an INF Treaty. Second, the number of SRINF missiles existing at the time negotiations started would be the present Soviet number minus those withdrawn and destroyed from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Third, the concept for handling these missiles would be global, not European. This was because these missiles are highly mobile and can be put in airplanes and moved around quickly. Geographic restrictions on the missiles would therefore make no sense. The Secretary said he thought Gorbachev had agreed on that, and he was surprised to hear that there were differences on this point. Fourth, it was important that the U.S. have a right to equality, which implied a right to match the Soviet level. He thought Gorbachev had agreed on this. Fifth, the sides agreed on follow-on negotiations about SRINF. Gorbachev had said the Soviet position in these negotiations would be that SRINF missiles should be reduced to zero. Shevardnadze had now added that they would go to zero in one year (he hoped this meant zero globally). The Secretary had said the U.S. position was that we must consult our allies on this question; he would do so tomorrow in Brussels.³ In summary, he had thought that SRINF issues were narrowed down to the question of the positions of the sides in the follow-on negotiations on remaining SRINF missiles—the Soviet side said zero and the U.S. side would provide a response. He did not know what the Alliance response would be, but it would be essential that the reductions be global. Shevardnadze had said Alaska was unacceptable, but nothing had been said about this at Reykjavik. The U.S. side did not accept the Soviet concept of defining “strategic” on the basis of being capable of reaching the territory of the other side. The U.S. side based its definition on range. If the USSR had a missile that could hit a U.S. ally, such as Japan, it was the same as hitting the U.S. So the sides differed on the place of deployment. The U.S. side would continue to advocate the complete elimination of LRINF missiles, but it was quite prepared to sign a treaty leaving 100 missiles. It would prefer elimination to ease verification; the confidence level would be much higher and the expense of verification much less. The Soviet side might want to consider this. The expense of verification was not negligible at all; it involved lots of manpower and the equipment was costly. The U.S. would like to save the money; nevertheless, it wanted very strict verification. The Secretary said he felt when he left the meeting with Gorbachev that the sides had just about gotten there on INF. From what Shevardnadze was saying, he now felt that the sides had not gotten there after all. He asked what the Soviet side wanted to keep in Asia when it proposed to eliminate SRINF only in Europe.

Shevardnadze said there was a question he must straighten out. Did the U.S. side agree to prompt negotiations on operational-tactical missiles, or did it want to wait to sign a medium-range missile treaty first? If the U.S. side were to agree on prompt negotiations conducted concurrently with those on medium-range missiles, these negotiations could solve the question of eliminating operational-tactical missiles in Europe as well as issues in Asia. Perhaps the outcome would be similar to that for medium-range missiles, perhaps there would be zero operational-tactical missiles in Asia. The question was when these negotiations would begin. The previous day, the Secretary had said that the U.S. in principle advocated elimination of medium-range missiles. The Soviet side wanted elimination of operational-tactical missiles as well. The question of Europe and Asia would have to be discussed in the negotiations. If the sides could agree today when the negotiations would begin, then they could solve the other problems. If they could start without delay, they might set the objectives of eliminating all operational-tactical missiles in Europe in one year and also solving the issues in Asia.

The Secretary said the sides had already been negotiating on SRINF missiles since 1983; the U.S. side was ready to continue addressing this subject. The question was what subject would be left over after the sides got through with their current negotiations. Perhaps all SRINF missiles would be eliminated. In other words, the U.S. side was ready to negotiate and had been doing so. Its proposal was already on the table, and the sides had been talking about it here. Ambassador Glitman noted that the U.S. side had an article in its draft treaty that dealt with SRINF, Article IV. The U.S. side had been discussing this with the Soviet side. The Soviet side had recognized in the past the importance of this issue, and had addressed it in its own draft treaty that it had previously tabled. The Secretary concluded that the U.S. answer was yes, it was ready to discuss this question and it had been.

Shevardnadze replied that this was important, and that he would say the two sides were ready to start negotiations on operational-tactical missiles. When the U.S. side reacted with incredulity, Shevardnadze said the U.S. side should not jump to conclusions. The question was how to address the problem in Geneva. The sides could perhaps have a special group in Geneva; this was not a problem. There would be a formula. He understood the U.S. side agreed to start negotiations on operational-tactical missiles.

The Secretary replied that the sides could not say that they would start such negotiations when they had already done it. They should say that they would continue the negotiations, and would make this topic the first order of business when they reconvened on April 23, a date on which the U.S. side agreed. He would be glad to say that on April 23 the sides would make this question the first order of business in the negotiations.

Shevardnadze said he would thus assume the U.S. side did not object to continuing negotiations on operational-tactical missiles. But there was a fundamental point to straighten out here. If there were no agreement on operational-tactical missiles, would a medium-range missile agreement be signed?

The Secretary said an INF Treaty must treat SRINF missiles. It might not be complete treatment, so it might be necessary to have follow-on negotiations. He had set out the principles involved, to which he thought the General Secretary had agreed. He did not know what the final objective of the follow-on negotiations would be; the Soviet side wanted zero, the U.S. side would have to consult. The U.S. side would not walk away from the negotiations leaving this question totally up in the air. There was no reason to do so, based on the previous day’s discussion. The sides had gotten the question pinned down to the Soviet number with negotiations on where to go from that number. He had thought the issues were narrowed down very well, and that there were things the sides could say about an INF Treaty.

Shevardnadze said he still thought there was some misunderstanding here, if the U.S. side assumed a medium-range missile treaty could be signed despite no agreement on the entire complex of operational-tactical missile issues. The sides must negotiate in the framework of Geneva, or in a parallel forum. The U.S. side said it was addressing this question, but it must be discussed on a fundamentally new basis based on the positions described the previous day. New conditions required a new approach. He did not think there was cause for alarm. Why not have a separate negotiating group in the framework of the NST negotiations?

The Secretary said the U.S. side was prepared to make this question the first order of business. He could give the press the following statement: the draft U.S. treaty contains SRINF limits; the Soviets have made a proposal on this question; the sides will discuss it as the first order of business when they reconvene April 23. The U.S. side was anxious to get this question settled.

Shevardnadze suggested the sides say the U.S. needed to consult with its allies and the sides would decide this issue later. This was a fundamental issue—when the negotiations would begin and what format they would involve, and whether it would be a separate negotiation or within the framework of the Geneva talks. The Secretary said the negotiations had begun in October 1981 and again in March 1985. This was not a new issue.

Shevardnadze said the U.S. draft treaty called for negotiations after the signing of an agreement. If the U.S. was not ready to agree to negotiations now, it should consult. The Secretary replied that the U.S. draft made certain statements that the SRINF issue needed to be agreed on. The sides could not separate the issue off; it must be agreed in the context of an INF Treaty. They could probably get this issue settled, or at least get close to the settlement.

Shevardnadze pulled out the U.S. treaty and said there was confusion due to the U.S. proposal that negotiations on operational-tactical missiles start after signature of an INF Treaty. If there were negotiations in parallel with those on medium-range missiles, then he thought there would be no ground for dispute. As to how and where those negotiations would proceed, this could be settled in practical terms.

The Secretary responded that the U.S. provision for follow-on negotiations was operative only if there was something left on which to negotiate. The U.S. side was fully prepared to continue its current efforts to negotiate. Moreover, Shevardnadze had been reading from Article XIII, which dealt with leftover LRINF missiles; the U.S. would prefer to eliminate Article XIII by going to a global zero on these missiles. Article IV dealt with SRINF missiles. Both sides agreed they wished to work energetically on the SRINF issue. In the previous day’s discussion of SRINF missiles with the General Secretary, the sides had made a lot of headway. The Secretary had thought they had established a set of ideas to govern the subject, that on a numerical basis the sides would come down to a number derived from the present Soviet number minus those in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The General Secretary had said the Soviet side was prepared to eliminate these missiles, and today Shevardnadze was saying this would be done within one year.

Shevardnadze said these were difficult issues. Everything said by the General Secretary regarding missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia stood. The discussion now should focus on the principle of handling this class of systems. The sides needed the immediate start of negotiations, regardless of outcome. The Soviet side favored zero in Europe and would discuss Asia. It favored a global solution, but could not do that today. It needed negotiations now; it was the U.S. idea to start SRINF negotiations after the conclusion of an INF Treaty.

The Secretary said the sides had been negotiating, and the U.S. wanted to continue. If they could get it done as part of an INF Treaty, the U.S. wanted to. The sides should agree on a global basis. Shevardnadze said the sides should agree about negotiations.

The Secretary said the two Ministers could tell the delegations to work on the problem energetically. It could be done; the U.S. wanted to settle. Shevardnadze said the Soviet side favored immediate commencement of discussions of this issue. The U.S. should consult, and the sides would clarify the problem on April 23. The Secretary said there was no disagreement on the importance of addressing the problem. Shevardnadze said he was talking in principle about negotiations. Agreed negotiations ought to start immediately without delay.

The Secretary said he would put this subject to the press, the NATO allies, and Ambassador Glitman in the following way. The sides had agreed on the Reykjavik formula of 100 LRINF missile warheads on each side. Both favored a strict verification regime; the U.S. had tabled its in detail, the Soviet side would table its soon. The most important remaining issue was SRINF, about which the sides had been negotiating from the beginning. During the meeting with the General Secretary, the sides had made considerable progress in this field. They had agreed that by the time an INF agreement was concluded, the USSR would remove its missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia and destroy them. This category must be handled on a global basis. The U.S. must have a right to match; it could not be in an unequal position. The Soviet side had said remaining missiles should be eliminated within one year. The U.S. side would take that up with its Allies, and would expect to continue negotiations on this subject energetically in Geneva as the first order of business when the talks reconvened April 23.

Shevardnadze said he thought the sides should specify a formula for the negotiations. Perhaps before the signing of an LRINF agreement, the question of operational-tactical missiles would be solved. If the sides were to start discussion now about how many warheads were allowed at each stage, they would not have sufficient time. Instead, there should be a discussion in principle of how to conduct the negotiations.

The Secretary replied that the sides had agreement on the principle of globality; they should say so. They had agreement on equality. He could see if there were going to be reductions to zero in a year, it would make no sense for the U.S. to deploy. He did not think the U.S. would deploy, but he could not say so. He needed to get the agreement ratified, so the principle of equality was important. He was thinking about guidance to the negotiators here.

Shevardnadze replied that if the sides were going to talk about the principle of equality, then they must discuss everything in detail. The question arose of the U.S. build-up of operational-tactical missiles. He thought today the sides should agree that they would negotiate on operational-tactical missiles with a view to eliminating those missiles. This elimination responded to the principle of equality.

The Secretary said zero was an equal number. He recognized it was the Soviet position, and that the Soviet side had added that elimination would be done in one year. He would discuss this in Brussels the next morning.

Turning to the papers that Shevardnadze had handed over, the Secretary said he had not read the papers, as they were in Russian, but he could see they contained names of people. He welcomed and appreciated the Soviet response. As Shevardnadze knew, the U.S. always handed over representation lists. Ambassador Matlock would give the list to Bessmertnykh after the meeting.⁴ Shevardnadze said the list looked like a telephone directory. The Secretary said some names would be familiar to Shevardnadze.

Returning to arms control, the Secretary said the sides had agreed to restart INF on April 23. The U.S. side had suggested earlier that the other groups resume May 5, partly because it would give Ambassador Kampelman more time to recover and also because the U.S. side had a lot of work to do to prepare its draft START treaty, which it wanted to present at the next round. If May 5 was agreeable to the Soviet side, the sides could agree to that. The April 23 starting date for INF would indicate the urgency the sides lent to those talks. Shevardnadze said he could agree to those dates.

Shevardnadze continued that he should note a few things about START. The sides had agreed to 50% reductions to 1600 delivery vehicles and 6000 weapons. They would limit nuclear-armed SLCMs of longer range to a separate agreed level while assuring proper verification.

The Secretary said it was agreed that SLCMs would be treated separately; the greatest difficulty lay in how to handle verification. Ambassador Nitze interjected that the Reykjavik formula on SLCMs was that a mutually agreed solution would be found.

Shevardnadze said that it was also agreed that reductions in strategic offensive arms must be strictly verified. The following elements were unacceptable to the Soviet side: the U.S. attempt to isolate a START solution from an agreement strengthening the ABM Treaty; U.S.-proposed limits intended to disrupt the structure of Soviet forces; and a U.S.-proposed timetable that was not on the basis of the Reykjavik agreement. The sides would need additional study of a mutual restraint regime on strategic offensive arms. Their experts could discuss appropriate restrictions on building up arms while the sides negotiated in Geneva.

The Secretary said there was agreement on 50% cuts and the 1600 and 6000 levels. Also agreed were discussions on the SLCM question and the need for strict compliance. On the latter, the sides could learn from their INF effort. The sides disagreed about the possibility of delinking START from Defense and Space. On the question of force structures, the sides needed a path to reductions that recognized they had different structures, that neither side can force systems on the other, and that they need an equitable and stable way to come down. The U.S.-proposed sublimits came from the 50% idea, and from ideas the Soviet side had proposed last year, such as the 80–85% proposal. The U.S. had proposed other restrictions within the total. The sides had agreed on 50% reductions in Soviet heavy missiles, to a level of 1500 warheads. He would tell the press that the sides had discussed START issues, but had not made much headway. He would have to go then to the points he had just outlined. These were important markers derived from Reykjavik. The U.S. would continue to pursue its proposal. The General Secretary had said strategic offensive weapons were the root problem; President Reagan agreed, and the U.S. side would continue to work on it. The Secretary added that the heavy bomber counting rule had also been agreed.

Shevardnadze said there was not much point in debating these issues now. The General Secretary had said the Soviet side held to its Reykjavik position regarding levels and sublevels. The sides should let their negotiators debate these questions. With regard to Space, he could say that the sides had agreed on nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time and strict compliance with the Treaty during that period. There was no agreement on a specific timeframe, so the sides would need a general formula for now. The Soviet side disagreed with U.S. plans to deploy large-scale systems by 1994, which signified the collapse of the ABM Treaty by then. Perhaps the two Ministers would discuss the rationale for space-based defense systems next time. He had read the U.S. paper; it was a fascinating document, but he categorically took issue with it. The Soviet side had a different approach; they wanted to eliminate nuclear arsenals. Space defense should not be deployed. He stood ready to discuss this question with the Secretary at greater length next time. He expected the U.S. side would carefully consider the Soviet proposal on the issue of ABM research, as well as their proposal for a list of devices whose introduction into space would be banned. These were new ideas which required study, and which could be discussed in the future. The Soviet side also expected responses to its proposals on ASATs and space-to-earth weapons.

Summarizing on arms control issues, Shevardnadze said the Soviet side would table a medium-range missile treaty in the next round. They proposed to accelerate work on a joint paper. He wished to underscore the importance of the paper the Soviet side had provided on Monday⁵ on key provisions of START reductions and space limitations. The Soviet side considered it possible to reach agreement at the summit level on an INF Treaty. He knew the U.S. side would be tabling a START Treaty, but thought, in practical terms, that there was insufficient time to agree on all strategic issues. The subject was too complex. The key provisions represented a framework scheme to address at the summit level, if a summit were to take place, along with an INF Treaty. The Soviet side also expected an answer to its proposal for a special SCC session at the level of Defense Ministers or deputies. Everything regarding the ABM Treaty had to be cleared out of the way, including the question of violations. The sides might raise the level of SCC negotiations; it would be a good idea for Defense Ministers or deputies to get together to discuss ABM Treaty issues thoroughly.

The Secretary said both sides had said that START was a matter of extra importance; it deserved a great effort. The question of a framework or set of statements on START could be decided at some time in the fall. The approach should be to have the negotiators work on the issues and do a summary statement at that time on where things stood. The sides should try to resolve as many issues as possible and see where they were when the time came. Regarding ASATs, the U.S. side had not heard how limits could be verified and still did not see how this could be done. The Soviet side had the only operational system. On space-to-earth weapons, the U.S. SDI program had nothing to do with this subject. Ballistic missiles that go through space to the earth were all too efficient for this job. The U.S. side had provided assurances about SDI. The SCC idea was interesting. It might be fun to have the Defense Ministers go at it. Weinberger had provided an invitation long ago to meet Sokolov, and had gotten no answer. He was sure Weinberger would welcome a chance to meet.

Shevardnadze suggested the two Ministers make the Defense Ministers get together and quarrel while they watch; it would be a switch in roles. Regarding ASATs, the Soviet side wanted a fundamental decision to ban them. Soviet scientists had come up with interesting ideas for verification as had some U.S. scientists. A decision in principle was needed on both ASATs and space-to-earth arms. On nuclear testing, he thought the Secretary had been a bit too optimistic the previous day. His associates proposed that the sides agree to a single forum with a view to limiting and terminating nuclear testing. Taking into account U.S. statements, the name for the negotiations could be Negotiations on the Limitation and Termination of Nuclear Testing. The first order of business would be yield verification and ratification of the existing treaties. The sides had agreed on the need to improve verification and would conduct agreed experiments at each other’s test sites.

The Secretary said he had thought, given the discussions and reports he had received from his delegation, that the sides might have the basis for getting negotiations going. He thought it was now too late to negotiate language. What Shevardnadze had said was quite a distance from what the U.S. side was willing to set out. It was important to get an understanding about the process of verification. It would be a good thing, if there were a summit in the fall, to complete the efforts on the two treaties. The sides needed to negotiate to make such an advance. Given the current emphasis on compliance issues, both sides needed to have confidence that verification was assured. The Soviet side had made interesting comments on Monday about CORRTEX, its views that seismic methods were better, and its readiness to use these methods at respective test sites to find out. He was willing to say now that both sides agreed that means of verification were important, and the sides would set out now to have experts work on this. He assumed the sides were ready to task experts for cross-testing experimentation. Shevardnadze agreed.

The Secretary said he was inclined to tell the press that the sides were prepared to seek the best methods of verification through joint work. Shevardnadze said he agreed with this formulation. The sides needed a decision in principle on negotiations. They could let their experts get together and continue in the same vein as in previous experts meetings.

The Secretary replied that he would say that experts will continue to meet on the subject of nuclear testing, that it would be useful to pursue the question of various means of verification and their relative accuracy, and that they would instruct their experts to investigate this subject. Shevardnadze said the U.S. experts were tough. The Secretary said Baker had been rewarded for his toughness; he had been promoted to ASD.⁶

On chemical weapons, Shevardnadze said the sides agreed to accelerate work on a convention prohibiting these weapons, would agree on a strict data exchange, would implement reciprocal visits at the expert level of CW destruction facilities, and would continue intensive bilateral discussions on these issues. On Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, there were no particular problems.

The Secretary said, regarding Shevardnadze’s points on CW, that he thought discussions had gone beyond the question of agreeing on the need for strong verification measures. The U.S. side had made precise verification proposals. A key question was the need for mandatory challenge inspections; the sides needed to get down to detail there. The U.S. regime was more stringent than the Soviet regime and that of some U.S. Allies. A general statement on CW should not indicate that the sides had resolved the challenge inspection issue. The agreement to visit destruction facilities was good, and the sides should report that. He had agreed with Shevardnadze’s other points, but the sides must record the important differences in the verification area. The Secretary added that the U.S. side was ready to receive Soviet experts at the U.S. destruction facility when they wished to come. He asked when U.S. experts could visit the Soviet facility.

Shevardnadze said this could be worked out elsewhere. With regard to challenge inspection, the Soviet side had always advocated the most global, comprehensive verification measures. Many countries, however, did not share the Soviet approach. At the ongoing negotiations, there was a British proposal, and an Indonesian and Swedish proposal, which must be considered. He would like to hold additional consultations on this issue, even at the Ministerial level.

The Secretary said this was fine, as long as there was no misunderstanding on Shevardnadze’s part that the sides had a fundamental difference of view that was unresolved. But there were things worth saying on CW. Shevardnadze said it was up to the Secretary to decide what he would say to the press. The Secretary said he would report things that were accurate. He wanted to record for the U.S. people where the sides had managed to come together, that the sides knew they had differences, but that they were also capable of resolving some problems.

Shevardnadze said he thought what the sides had said the previous day about the Secretary’s meeting with Gorbachev was just that. It had been a constructive, useful meeting, but many other things were outstanding. These plenary sessions, and the meetings with the General Secretary and the Prime Minister, reflected the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Those relations were complex and contradictory, but there were truly real and good prospects for improving relations in the security area and on other bilateral matters. All in all, the negotiations had been useful. There were many results; other things were outstanding and would require further contacts. The INF negotiations could be accelerated to work out the conditions of an agreement; this was perhaps the main conclusion from these sessions. His general conclusion was that the experts had discussed a broad range of issues.

Regarding other issues, Shevardnadze noted that the question of consulates appeared to have been put on the back burner. If the U.S. side had lost interest in this question, the Soviet side would not insist on a resolution. It was up to the U.S. side; the Soviet side could live without an additional consulate. The Secretary replied that the U.S. side intended to follow up on that question, and would be prepared to do so before long.

Shevardnadze said that, before concluding, he wished to say that the less noise made about spy mania, the better. The U.S. side might find itself in a very difficult situation. It would not be able to find any sensors at its building. It could go to the International Court of Justice and invite experts to look for sensors. The problem was a failure of U.S. experts; they had put the Secretary and the President in a bad position. The sides should seek a normal atmosphere for joint work. They should not create artificial difficulties. He thought it was his duty as a Soviet citizen to say this. In conclusion, he was thankful for the Secretary’s openness and candor during these negotiations. The dialogue had been very forthcoming and useful.

The Secretary replied that, with regard to the espionage area, Shevardnadze did not have to convince him of the efficiency of the Soviet intelligence services. The U.S. side believed that the degree to which the Soviet side had gone in its activities, particularly against the U.S. Embassy, was excessive. The problems in the new building were quite substantial. How it would fix them, the U.S. side did not know.

Shevardnadze asked what problems the Secretary was talking about. The Secretary said the beams at the Embassy were honeycombed with devices. Getting those devices out would raise questions of the structural soundness of the building.

Shevardnadze said the Secretary was being deceived. The Secretary said this was incorrect; he had seen the situation himself that morning. He did not know when the U.S. side could move into its building, but per the agreement between the sides, the Soviet side would not be able to move into its new building in Washington until the U.S. side moved in in Moscow.

Shevardnadze asked if the Secretary could show him at least one of the devices to which he was referring. His people told him that the Soviet side was not doing this. If there was something there, the U.S. side should show them. The U.S. side should organize an exhibit like the Soviet side had.

The Secretary said the next time one of his experts made this claim to him, Shevardnadze should bet him that if evidence could be produced, Shevardnadze would win ten tickets to the Bolshoi. Shevardnadze would win the tickets; in fact, the expert probably would refuse the bet. The situation at the U.S. Embassy was impressive; Shevardnadze would be amazed if he saw what the Soviet side had done. The Secretary had seen it.

Shevardnadze replied that the sides should have international experts look at the situation. Why does the U.S. side spare the Soviet side? The Soviet side had not spared them. He need not have raised this issue, but he had.

The Secretary said he shared Shevardnadze’s estimate of the quality of the discussions they had held. He appreciated all the time the two Ministers had had together personally. The two sessions the day before had been very rewarding. There was an unfulfilled agenda item—ideas about the future. He had discussed this some with Ryzhkov and Gorbachev, but they hadn’t been able to go into much depth.

At this point, the Secretary requested that he and Shevardnadze have a one-on-one discussion,⁷ and the plenary adjourned.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Stafford; cleared by Graze. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Mansion.
2. Not found attached.
3. Shultz traveled to Brussels the evening of April 15 and briefed NATO Foreign Ministers the following day.
4. Not found.
5. April 13; see Documents 38–40. Paper not found.
6. Robert B. Barker, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy.
7. See Document 46.