Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

31. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, March 27, 1987, 1:30–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Review of Security Problems Embassy Moscow (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• The Vice President’s Office

  • Craig Fuller

• State

  • George P. Shultz
  • Ambassador Jack Matlock
  • Robert Lamb

• OSD

  • Caspar W. Weinberger
  • Craig Alderman
  • Lt General William Odom

• CIA

  • Robert M. Gates

• JUSTICE

  • Arnold Burns
  • Ann Rondeau

• FBI

  • Judge William Webster

• JCS

  • General Robert T. Herres
  • Lt General John Moellering

• White House

  • Howard Baker
  • Ken Duberstein

• NSC Staff

  • Frank C. Carlucci
  • Colin L. Powell
  • Barry Kelly
  • David Major (notetaker)

(1:40 p.m.) The President began the meeting by stating that as the facts of the Marine espionage case in Moscow emerge, it appears the damage to our national security may be severe; we must get on top of this situation immediately. Our actions must be well coordinated, and we must take the steps necessary to protect our national security interests against the activity of hostile intelligence services. We should remember, however, that Marines have defended our embassies faithfully for years. The President asked Frank Carlucci to coordinate an overall effort to assess the extent of the damage to our national security from recent espionage cases as well as to recommend what actions we should take to improve our defense against espionage attacks upon all our embassies. The President stated he will also ask his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to participate in the review of these developments. The President then turned the meeting over to Frank Carlucci. (U)

(1:41 p.m.) Frank Carlucci stated that this may be the most serious espionage case we have faced in years. The ramifications extend from political intelligence to COMSEC to counterintelligence issues. While the Marine case is our primary concern today, the problem is broader, and we must consider the impact of other recent espionage cases on our national security. He asked each official present to give a short assessment of the situation as it appears now and to advise what steps are currently being taken to respond to this challenge. He also asked the Department of Justice to weigh the merits of prosecution of the Marines involved against the need to get as much information as quickly as possible to complete a timely damage assessment. He then asked Bob Gates, Acting DCI, for his comments. (C)

(1:42 p.m.) [1 line not declassified]

[The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.]

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

[The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.]

Frank Carlucci then asked Secretary Weinberger to comment.

(1:47 p.m.) Secretary Weinberger characterized the case as a very serious loss of intelligence information. DOD is currently looking at measures that should and must be taken in the wake of this incident. DOD has decided to recall the entire Marine detachment in Moscow. This detachment will be returned to Quantico for further investigation. The Marines are looking at this incident to study lessons learned, to include: the possibility of more regular use of polygraph with Marines assigned to a Warsaw Pact country and better psychological profiling of Marines selected for the program. DOD will study the basic qualification criteria for the Marine guard force and the possibility of improper unequal treatment of Marines by the other embassy personnel as a contributing factor in this case. (C)

Secretary Weinberger then asked Lt General Odom to comment on the impact this may have. [The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.] (TS/[codeword not declassified])

(1:50 p.m.) Lt General Odom indicated that [The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.].

Mr. Carlucci then asked the Secretary of State for his comments. (U)

(1:52 p.m.) Secretary Shultz indicated he agreed with the general outline of the previous comments. The State Department is taking a number of immediate steps to respond to this situation. All electronic communications have been shut down to and from Moscow. A courier is flying daily to Frankfurt from Moscow with cable traffic and from there cables are being forwarded. The Embassy has been put on a 6-day work week cycle, and State security is in the process of erecting a new secure conference room on the sixth floor which will be operational prior to his arrival in Moscow. State security is also installing a new temporary secure voice link and communication system to be in place by the time the Secretary arrives in Moscow. (S)

Concerning the Marine problem, it is necessary to look at the whole issue. The root problem is one of management. We must review what else has happened in Moscow and in other Warsaw Pact countries between women and Marines. Unfortunately, the regularity with which this happens is impressive. Recently Marines have been caught in the following: 2 for sexual contact with Soviet foreign nationals, 2 for attempting to rape a British national during December 1986 in Moscow, 2 for currency violations, and 4 for having unauthorized females in the Marine residence in Moscow. (C)

The problem is that personnel must be more aware of the implications of these kinds of activities. This reflects on the methods by which the embassy is managed; Jack Matlock (the new Ambassador in Moscow) understands the issue and will take the needed corrective actions. (U)

We need to think of the people going to Moscow. The Marines have a 40-year history of success. Yet sexual contact with Marines is a fact of life we must learn to cope with better. It is too early to say what to do. We need to explore the situation and then find out what changes should result. (U)

Secretary Shultz also stated that one good thing about this situation is that the arrests have been made and the facts suggest this has not been going on for a long period of time. (U)

To preclude the possibility of further involvement by Marines friendly to Longtree and Bracy, all Marines are being pulled out of Moscow. (U)

The relationship between the State security officer in Moscow and the Marines must be examined to evaluate the chain of command and ascertain the checks and balances in place from a management point of view. (U)

We know that spying takes place, however, in this case we have caught the Soviets spying on our sovereign territory; we should register the fact of our displeasure in some manner with the Soviets. He added that while we should register a complaint, he did not know how to do this. (S)

Secretary Shultz ended by stating “This is the most distressing thing I have been involved with in all my years of government service.” (U)

(2:00 p.m.) The Secretary of Defense responded to the Secretary of State’s comments by noting the Marines are managed to the extent they can be, but they work for State security. He added he was very worried about the Secretary of State’s planned meeting in Moscow. He seriously doubted a secure telephone link could be set up in sufficient time for the trip. The phone might be secure, but there is no secure area in our embassy, since the KGB had unlimited access to the embassy on 20–30 occasions. (S)

Lt General Odom commented that given the access the KGB had to the embassy, he believes it will not be possible for State security to build in two weeks an area that will be secure. [2 lines not declassified] (S)

The Secretary of State asked if DOD and NSA were saying that it was impossible for him to have secure communications during his visit to the Soviet Union. (C)

Both Secretary Weinberger and Lt General Odom responded that is exactly what they were advising. (C)

Mr. Carlucci asked DOD, NSA and State to work together to try to resolve the issue of reestablishment of secure spaces in our embassy by the time the Secretary of State traveled there. (C)

(2:01 p.m.) The President then asked if the Marines were indoctrinated in any way prior to being assigned to Moscow. (U)

Secretary Weinberger indicated that he felt the training was insufficient and should be expanded. (U)

Secretary Shultz stated that the Marines have a regular school they attend that is six weeks long; 40% of the Marines who start the school are screened out. They are taught and should know that fraternization with the locals is against the rules. (U)

Mr. Carlucci commented that in all fairness, the Soviets have also sexually targeted individuals other than Marines in the past. They have done the same to Ambassadors, embassy wives and military attaches. (U)

Mr. Gates commented that we are currently making a worst-case scenario; we may yet be lucky and find out the damage is not as bad as we currently are predicting. It is important we talk to everyone and find out what happened. (C)

Secretary Shultz concurred that we are assuming the worst-case situation. (C)

(2:04 p.m.) Mr. Burns stated he also believes this case looks like it could be one of the most serious in our history. As such, it is important to ascertain the extent of damage. There is some attractiveness to granting one or both of the two Marines immunity. A few years ago, we had another serious espionage case involving Christopher Cook, a Lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force assigned to SAC as a missile launch officer. Cook attempted to volunteer his espionage services to the Soviets and was caught. He was subsequently granted premature immunity. The damage was considered so serious after he described what he did that the Air Force attempted to withdraw the immunity grant. This was not possible and Lt Cook walked away from his espionage activity with no punishment. (U)

It has been the experience of the Department of Justice, as a result of a number of other espionage cases, that premature immunity provides no assurance that the truth will emerge. If we go the immunity route at the wrong time, the government loses the necessary leverage to get the truth. (U)

For these reasons, the Department of Justice recommends that discussion of immunity is premature and recommends the legal process be followed. The UCMJ allows for great flexibility in prosecution and allows for the death penalty in espionage cases. That will give the government a lot of leverage to ferret out the truth for a damage assessment. (U)

Mr. Carlucci than asked that the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense and State keep the NSC and the President advised of the progress on this matter. (C)

(2:07 p.m.) General Herres commented that the Marines go through a very intensive screening process; however, the State indoctrination program is very short. (U)

(2:08 p.m.) The Vice President advised that the remedies to this problem are to insure that counterintelligence concerns are taken seriously by embassy personnel in Moscow. He apologized to the Secretary of State in advance and stated that the environment that allowed this to happen had been sown by the attitude of Former Ambassador Art Hartman. (S)

The Vice President stated he received a briefing from the FBI on the counterintelligence problems in Moscow in 1984 at which time he read a cable sent by Art Hartman entitled Counter-productive Counterintelligence. This cable reflected an attitude of disregard for CI and everyone attending the meeting should read this cable. (The cable mentioned is attached to the minutes of this meeting.) (S)

The Vice President characterized this situation by stating, he is appalled by what happened and we must begin to take counterintelligence concerns for our embassies seriously. (U)

Mr. Carlucci added that this case must be viewed in the broad context of other espionage cases. We must look at the leadership, procedures, attitude, training and legal aspects of this problem. Mr. Carlucci asked whether we need to reevaluate the espionage laws and determine whether there should be some relaxation of the law to allow for easier prosecutions. He would undertake to establish an interagency task force to address the issues raised by this case and attempt to look for corrective actions that should be taken in the future. (C)

The President commented he had just returned from a trip to the midwest where he met with some students and educators. He asked whether this espionage case, along with others, was not the by-product of the value neutral, no opinion of right or wrong attitude that has become pervasive in our educational institutions. (U)

The meeting was adjourned at 2:11 p.m.

Attachment

Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State²

Moscow, November 5, 1984, 1552Z

14220. For the Secretary and Under Secretary Armacost. Subject: Counter-Productive Counterintelligence.

1. Secret entire text.

2. I have watched with amazement the expanding activities of a small group of people inside and out of the government who, by wrapping themselves in the mantle of defenders against hostile intelligence operations, are making mischief that can set back indefinitely any movement towards dealing seriously with the Soviet Union. The more I learn about the ideas being floated in the guise of strengthening counterintelligence, the more I am convinced that the real effect of such proposals will be to make it impossible to have any operational capability here in the Soviet Union for no gain in US security at home. Some of the purveyors of these proposals are perfectly well aware of that likely outcome and would welcome it because they have never believed that any contact with the Soviet Union—either overt or covert—serves any useful purpose. If these decisions are made in this direction, we may as well close up shop here and go home. On the basis of our talks with the President I don’t think that is what he wants.

3. You are already aware of the influence of the counterintelligence drumbeaters in selling their ideas to the Hill. Specifically in the Leahy-Huddleston Amendment. Their next objective is to make a run at the President. Presenting him with a set of interagency options arrived at in a group called IG-CI that is stacked against the foreign policy, foreign-intelligence and real national security interests of the United States—to say nothing of its ignorance of the President’s policy. Rather than working to enhance the effectiveness of the FBI by giving it the resources it needs, the IG-CI has concentrated on a set of proposals frankly geared to forcing a reduction in Soviet official presence in the US (which for several years has been limited by a ceiling). These proposals are accompanied by a misguided effort to build up the number of US personnel assigned in Moscow. Ignoring questions of efficiency, vulnerability to entrapment, and logistic support for our employees.

4. Quite apart from the outrageous effort by ignorant people to instruct me on the way to staff this post, I object to these schemes on the simple ground that they run absolutely counter to our policy. First, they are not based on realism because they ignore the absolutely predictable Soviet reaction, which will take the form of retaliation designed to hurt us most—this after all is the closed society. They are based not on a premise of strength but of weakness. They assume that we are so inept that we cannot combat the threat of a few hundred resident Soviet citizens and a few hundred Soviet visitors each year. While the Soviets somehow manage to cope with over 200 American permanent employees, dozens of long-term construction specialists on our building site, and 50,000 American visitors each year. The argument also neglects the fact that we are an open society that will not close for this purpose and agents of any nationality including unfortunately a few Americans can be bought by the Soviets and their third country friends. And finally, most importantly these proposals are guaranteed to sabotage the realistic dialogue we seek with the Soviets. You’ll recall the deep personal anger of Gromyko when we placed limits on his airplane. The all-out assault (and that’s what it is) on Soviet official presence in the US, coupled with demands for an increase here, will lead to four years of arctic, solid-frozen relations. Is that what the President wants?

5. I would ask you to take a personal hand in turning off this foolishness. Which I understand is to be discussed at a senior-level interagency meeting on November 9. It is no coincidence, I’m sure, that this meeting is on the calendar for a time when the President will be resting after the campaign away from the White House, and many other senior officials will be taking a breather.

6. I am prepared—even delighted—to be quoted to the President, Bill Casey and Bud McFarlane on this whole issue. If it goes ahead, it will rival, perhaps exceed Carter’s grain embargo as a self-defeating move in dealing with the other superpower.

Hartman

1. Source: Reagan Library, 1987 SYS 4 RWR INT 40151–40200. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. [The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.] The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. Secret.