26. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- Moscow Consultations on Regional Issues
1. General Impressions
—Hopes are stirring in Moscow for an upturn in US-Soviet relations. Your visit next month is considered a potential turning point which could shape the contours of the relationship for the next several years. Dobrynin virtually predicted a 1987 summit in the United States. The Soviets are prepared to discuss the full range of issues when you are in Moscow. It is clear that they will focus on nailing down an INF agreement, and exploring for further give in our position on Defense and Space. It is somewhat patronizing of Moscow to tell us repeatedly that they are still ready to deal with the Reagan Administration. But it is also an accurate measure of Mr. Gorbachev’s own apparent need to lock in some arms control understandings promptly.
—The Soviets are prepared to discuss regional questions with us, but this is not high on their agenda. Vorontsov is an urbane and engaging diplomat who knows how to put a benign face on Soviet policy. But the Soviets put no new ideas in play during this week’s talks. They played defensive ball on Afghanistan and Cambodia. With respect to Southern Africa and Central America, they seemed to relish our difficulties while wrapping themselves in UN resolutions and international legal principles. On the Middle East Peace Process, they recited familiar procedural proposals whose major purpose is to get them into the game.
—From what I saw in Moscow, Soviet society doesn’t work very well. It is little wonder that Gorbachev has set domestic reform as his number one priority. There is a palpable sense of change. Glasnost has stimulated a good deal of intellectual ferment. Whether Gorbachev can [Page 95] control the forces he is unleashing is anybody’s guess. The highly touted structural reforms of the economy appear to me a pretty mixed bag. None of the Foreign Ministry people I encountered could provide an intelligible explanation of these reforms. Perhaps Gorbachev or Ryzhkov can furnish a more effective rationale. Having seen Moscow for the first time, I will never again believe a DIA threat assessment of the Soviet Union!
2. Afghanistan
This issue was the centerpiece in my regional discussions. It came up in my talks with Vorontsov, Shevardnadze, and Dobrynin; all took the same line.
—The Soviets declare emphatically that they are getting out of Afghanistan. Shevardnadze said they have told the Afghans that the mission of the Red Army has been completed, and that a timetable for troop withdrawals has been set. Having avoided characterizing the Afghan government as “communist” or “socialist”, Moscow has preserved the latitude to dissociate Soviet interests from the fate of the current government in Kabul. The Moscow News has carried articles in its English and Russian editions describing plans for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan as a strategic setback for the United States.
—Assuming the Russians have made a firm decision to withdraw, they are preserving maximum flexibility on the tactics and timing of their withdrawal. They pointed to the Afghan government’s 18 month timetable as a display of flexibility, and called for a more forthcoming response from Pakistan. They did not tip their hand as to what may be offered at the next round in Geneva. I am confident they have not come to their bottom line.
—The Soviets described national reconcilitation as a process that is well underway, and urged us to encourage the Mujahidin in Peshawar to get on board. The Soviet game plan is not entirely clear, but they seem to be exploring several tracks.
• At one level they are encouraging political accommodations at the grass roots. For example, they claim that Afghan authorities are prepared to recognize resistance elements as self-defense units under the leadership of locally elected commanders, if they end their rebellion; these units would not be required to disarm and would be recognized as local authorities.
• At the same time efforts have been intensified to broaden Najib’s government, and senior Soviet officials speak as though they anticipate its transformation into a coalition. They deny that Najib intends to monopolize power; and affirm he is prepared to share it; Vorontsov even allowed the inference that at the end of the process Najib might no longer be in charge.
—On the other hand they did not display much interest in Yaqub’s idea of inviting former King Zahir Shah to form an interim government. [Page 96] The Soviets were firm in rejecting any suggestion that the current Kabul authorities be left on the sidelines. They dashed any hint that they might take leading members of the PDPA party back to Russia with their troops. Shevardnadze discounted the ability of a neutral figure or figures to manage things, claiming they would be unable to command the loyalty of the army, bureaucracy, and party structure. Whatever misgivings the Soviets have about Najib, they claimed he is making headway in coopting the Mujahidin resistance leaders, luring refugees back home, and bringing new blood into the regime. (Either Soviet intelligence is lousy or our own is deficient; I suspect Moscow is indulging wishful thinking.)
—Although the Russians showed little daylight between themselves and Najib, they acknowledged they had their lines out to former King Zahir Shah. And they seemed to hope that discussions can be initiated among Afghans in Kabul, Peshawar, and Rome to advance the process of national reconciliation.
—The Russian leadership continued to assert an interest in a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan. But they did not appear interested in discussing neutralization arrangements—at least with us.
—The Soviets again and again portrayed the Mujahidin Alliance in Peshawar as out of step with the effort to find a peaceful solution to the Afghan conflict. They attributed this to our weapons, our money, and our advice. (Vorontsov, incidentally, conceded that Soviet aircraft losses are up and he registered concern with reports of additional Stinger deliveries.)
—I was quite blunt with my opposite numbers on the Afghan issue. I told them their 18 month timetable provided no basis for a settlement; that their concept of national reconciliation was flawed; that they were on the wrong side of the nationalist issue, and should stop throwing good money after bad; that if they chose to prolong their involvement, we will obviously not abandon our friends; and that they should get their troops out of Afghanistan promptly if they are serious about promoting real change in East-West relations. I took a direct hit in their press as the “coordinator” of our interference in Afghanistan, but the Soviet government described the talks as useful. I believe you should go after them again on this during your April visit.2
3. Other Regional Issues
The discussion of other regional issues tended to be more perfunctory.
[Page 97]—Middle East. The Russians stuck to their procedural proposals (international conference and preparatory committee), and plowed no new ground. They appeared somewhat smug about the development of their contacts with Israel, and were obviously buoyed by the enthusiasm of Europeans for an international conference. I am not sure there is much to be done on this issue when you are in Moscow. If the Soviets raise it, you should brace them to modify their positions on substantive issues, e.g., their tendency to indulge the rejectionist Arab countries, to endorse “maximalist” positions, etc.
—Southern Africa. Adamishin was travelling, and Vasev, a rigid and unimaginative technician, did the talking. He had nothing new to say. He did confirm Angolan interest in exploring the idea of opening the Benguela railway, but did not disclose Soviet thinking about the project. If Chet3 gets anywhere with the Angolans in early April, there may be an opening for raising this issue again. Otherwise I see little purpose in devoting much time to this with Shevardnadze, though a passing reference to our contacts with the ANC, our developing relationship with Mozambique, and renewed interests by Luanda in talks with us may be useful to keep the Soviets off balance.
—Central America. The Soviets enjoy posturing on this issue, offering gratuitous criticism and advice. I would not indulge them in your talks.
—Iran-Iraq War. The Soviets share our concerns about the war, but do not fear an imminent Iraqi collapse. They are persuaded Iranian intransigence will persist as long as Khomeini is on the scene, and harbor doubts about the efficacy of an arms embargo. They want to continue consulting in New York, but unless there is some break in the situation on the ground, I doubt that possibilities for joint or parallel action will emerge in time to warrant devoting much time to this during your visit.
—India-Pak Nuclear Competition. We share obvious interests in this area, but Moscow claims it is already urging restraint on India, and is counting on us to hold the Pakistanis back. So long as India expects that Congress will impose aid cuts or new certification requirements on Pakistan, the Indians have little incentive to cooperate in joining a regional dialogue with Islamabad. Under these circumstances the Russians will remain reluctant to expend political capital in Delhi. If the Congressional picture changes by mid-April, it could be timely for you to put in another word on the subject.
—Cambodia. I sense that Shevardnadze was somewhat uneasy about the situation in Indochina. He has just had a first-hand dose of [Page 98] ASEAN’s distrust of Moscow’s intentions. There are reports that he pressed Hanoi unsuccessfully to exhibit more flexibility. We should keep the pressure on them, focusing on the parallels between the Cambodian and Afghan situations. This is worth mentioning during your visit.
—Korea. The Soviets are not prepared to lean on Pyongyang for fear of jeopardizing their privileged access. Beijing is prepared to play a more helpful role. Still there may be some useful things for you to mention to Shevardnadze depending on where North and South Korean haggling over the terms of reengagement in the North-South dialogue stands when you get to Moscow.
4. Future Regional Talks
I tabled a suggested schedule for the next round of regional experts talks while I was in Moscow. EUR should follow up with the Soviets so that agreement on these exchanges can be announced at the end of your trip. In addition, they want to add consultations on UN-related issues of mutual concern prior to the UNGA. This would be useful, and agreement on such consultations could also be announced.
- Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1987 March 20 Mtg. w/the PRES. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it. Talking points for Shultz’s meeting with Reagan, based on Armacost’s trip, are ibid. The same day, Shultz met with the President, Carlucci, and Baker in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary, March 20, 1987) According to Carlucci’s meeting notes, which mistakenly identify the date as March 21, Shultz reported on Armacost’s trip: “sense we have is that things in motion on Afghanistan. [The Soviets] don’t want us to be the agents for getting this done. . . . [Soviet] papers saying their withdrawal will be defeat for US (U.S. wants them there to be bloodied).” (Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (03/13/87–04/15/87)↩
- Shultz met with Soviet officials April 13–15. See Documents 38–47.↩
- Chester Crocker.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears his typed signature.↩