Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

23. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, undated

SOVIET MOTIVES

1. We believe the Soviets recognize that the Iceland package concept had run its course, that they had lost ground in trying to influence our Allies, and that the package concept made the Soviet Union appear to be the primary obstacle to progress in arms control. Thus, Gorbachev perceived a need for a new approach.

2. The Soviets probably calculate that encouraging progress on INF by demonstrating Soviet flexibility will increase the political pressure on the US Administration to move from INF to the main issues—that is, SDI and strategic forces. In this connection, the Soviets have long believed that an active arms control process itself works to their advantage because of the political pressures (external to the Executive Branch) it brings to bear in the United States to reduce the defense budget and to make concessions.

3. The Soviets anticipate that the agreement will contribute to friction between the United States and its Allies, who are nervous about decoupling. At minimum, they probably hope to thwart deployments in the Netherlands.

4. Gorbachev and his advisers know that the initiative would remove a significant US military threat to the USSR itself (and its command and control at the outset of conflict) while simultaneously rolling back a significant US political/security initiative in Europe.

5. Gorbachev undoubtedly also believes that this is a propitious moment for a new initiative because of his perception that the Administration is politically vulnerable.

6. The Soviets, and Gorbachev in particular—while uncertain whether an agreement can in fact be reached—almost certainly calculate that an agreement and summit with President Reagan in the run-up to the American Presidential election in 1988 could significantly influence the political debate in the US vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the election.

7. Gorbachev’s initiative probably is not attributable to his need at home for a political victory. While he is confronted with obstacles in his efforts to modernize the Soviet economy, he does not yet appear to have serious political difficulties in the Politburo or the Central Committee; indeed, the initiative itself makes clear that his colleagues still are allowing him considerable running room.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, The President (02/12/1987–04/28/1987). Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper. Reagan initialed the top-right corner of the document. Acting Director of Central Intelligence Gates sent the paper to Shultz, Weinberger, and Carlucci on March 13 under a covering memorandum. Carlucci sent the package to Reagan, who commented in the upper right-hand corner: “So let’s take advantage of this eagerness to put something over on us. RR.” On March 16, Carlucci sent the paper to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, and Howard Baker under cover of a memorandum that conveyed Reagan’s response. (Ibid.)