Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

175. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 23, 1988, 9 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Meeting with Shevardnadze—Third Small Group Meeting: Regional Issues, Gorbachev’s Krasnoyarsk Speech, Nuclear Testing, Conventional Arms Control, Krasnoyarsk Radar

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
  • Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President
  • Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State*
  • Richard Solomon, Director, Policy Planning Staff*
  • MGEN William Burns, Director, ACDA*
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
  • Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
  • Paul Robinson, U.S. Ambassador to the Nuclear Testing Talks*
  • Charles Thomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)*
  • Jay Castillo*
  • Alexander R. Vershbow, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs (notetaker)
  • William Hopkins (interpreter)

• USSR

  • Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Vladimir Polyakov, Head, Near East Department, MFA*
  • Viktor P. Karpov, Head, Arms Control & Disarmament Directorate, MFA*
  • Sergey Tarasenko, MFA
  • Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Igor Palenykh, Soviet Ambassador to the Nuclear Testing Talks*
  • Oleg Grinevskiy, Ambassador at Large, MFA*
  • Yevgeniy Zolotov, Soviet Embassy (notetaker)
  • Pavel Palazhchenko, MFA (interpreter)

* for portions of the meeting only

The meeting opened with an exchange of pleasantries about the ongoing Olympic Games. Shevardnadze commented that it was good the games were proceeding normally. The atmosphere was good. He knew the U.S. had had some concerns, but it seemed that order was being maintained and he hoped it would continue.

The Secretary suggested that the nuclear testing Ambassadors be summoned for discussion with the Ministers. He said he had also asked ACDA Director Burns and our verification expert Jay Castillo to talk with Ambassador Karpov about the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel problems. Ambassador Dubinin confirmed that they had already begun to talk. Shevardnadze reiterated that he had an interest in achieving real clarity on this question so that there was no misunderstanding. The Secretary remarked that we had great confidence in our people.

Shevardnadze asked whether they should wait for the explosives people to arrive or begin with regional issues. The Secretary noted that he had asked Under Secretary Armacost to join for the regional discussion. Shevardnadze sent for Ambassador Polyakov.

Shevardnadze said there was one question he had not covered the previous day. While he understood the U.S. was not very enthusiastic about it, at some point our countries would have to begin at least at the expert level to discuss the problem of naval activities. He knew this was not a simple problem for the U.S. but we would have to begin sooner or later.

GORBACHEV’S KRASNOYARSK SPEECH

The Secretary replied that he had read with interest Gorbachev’s speech at Krasnoyarsk. Some of the things that he had proposed were not interesting to the U.S. but some had potential. One issue on which Gorbachev had spoken was incidents at sea. In this area we had a good working relationship. Of course, we talked about problems on a worldwide basis, but the U.S. was ready to follow up on incidents-at-sea type issues in the context raised by Gorbachev. We supposed some of these talks would be between our military representatives; this could be very constructive.

A second subject in the Krasonarysk speech, the Secretary continued, were his comments about the Asian part of the Soviet Union and Soviet economic development. The U.S. had heard much about the opening up of the port of Vladivostok. He thought that Gorbachev had made some interesting comments. It was necessary to open that area up if Soviet economic relations with the U.S. and the Pacific countries were to expand. Gorbachev’s proposals were general ones so at some point in our ongoing discussions we would be interested in hearing more details. To the extent that his proposals offered a basis for economic interaction, we were certainly prepared to participate. The Secretary said he had raised this in part because the draft joint statement alluded to economic subjects; we now had created one.

Shevardnadze said that since the Secretary had mentioned it he would not list all of the points in Gorbachev’s Krasnoyarsk statement. He knew the U.S. side was giving attention to that speech. He would say only that the Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk statements were characterized by one important element: a desire to replace confrontation by cooperation in that region. Instead of confrontation and standoff the Soviet side wanted more cooperative relations. Of course, the U.S. and Soviet Union both had interests in that vast region. He believed we should begin a businesslike debate on how to cooperate. Until now our course has been quite different. One of the main questions to be addressed was how to reduce the level of military competition. Of course, in order to make progress we needed expert discussions and then large-scale political decisions and concrete actions. He had to say that there had been much response to the Soviet proposal in the region. The reactions varied but overall there was much interest.

The Secretary said he understood Assistant Secretary Sigur was scheduled to meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev in early November. This would provide an occasion to explore some of these issues, in addition to discussing the Cambodian and Korean situations.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to emphasize some important details. The Soviets believed it was quite realistic to discuss the question of a non-increase of nuclear weapons in that region. There were too many nuclear weapons over there. A second example was the proposal for consultations between the major naval powers on a non-increase in the levels of naval forces. The Soviets had been speaking a great deal about confidence-building measures. Shevardnadze asked why we could not discuss these on a multilateral basis: a lowering of tensions and confidence-building measures in the area where Soviet, American, Chinese and Korean interests converge. As for reducing military activity, Shevardnadze said he knew the U.S. position but believed the question had promise for the future.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to add that he agreed there should be discussions of the security of sea lines of communication, and that we should have multilateral consultations on preventing incidents at sea and in the air space over the open seas. We should not postpone such discussions since they were in the interest of all countries. We should also try to decide on an international conference on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. A conference on the subject was being prepared by the UN for 1990 and it would be good if we could find some common ground. Another point also suggested by Gorbachev concerned beginning discussions on such problems among the Soviets, the U.S. and the Chinese, as these were the permanent members of the Security Council with special responsibilities in the region.

The Secretary said he appreciated Shevardnadze’s comments. As he had said, some of the proposals Gorbachev had made were not of interest at the present time but others did hold some promise. What we should do is have our experts at the November talks sort things out. Thus far in our East Asia talks we have had largely stiff discussions about Cambodia and Korea. We should talk about more positive things. The same applied to the Korean peninsula. The General Secretary’s speech said things on this subject which would lend a different tone to our discussions. The U.S. was prepared to consider relations with North Korea after the Olympics. Beyond that, there were other positive comments which we would be prepared to discuss with respect to economic developments. Sigur would explore these in November.

Shevardnadze said that the economic aspects of our cooperation did deserve discussion in the spirit of Gorbachev’s speech. The Soviets were ready to get together with their American colleagues and to include representatives of economic agencies. The proposals Gorbachev had made would be advantageous to people with an interest in developing economic cooperation. The Soviet side had more specific ideas about possible projects and would be ready to engage in such a discussion. The Secretary suggested that one of the things Sigur and Rogachev should try to do is work out how such an economic meeting would take place, how would it get itself organized. Shevardnadze agreed with this. The Secretary said he would ask Sigur to be ready to engage in such a discussion.

CAMBODIA

Shevardnadze said he thought we would be able to establish a rather useful dialogue on Cambodia. In the working group he understood there had been a good discussion the previous day.² One positive element was the fact that China had become involved. Whereas Beijing used to stand off at some distance, it now had decided to become more active. The Soviet and Chinese Deputy Foreign Ministers had had a useful meeting with rather fruitful results. Consultations between the U.S. and Soviet Union were also useful. Shevardnadze asked whether his side had anything specific to add.

Polyakov said that in the regional group they agreed that the involvement of China has been a positive new element. Shevardnadze asked whether there was a discussion of the possibility of convening an international conference on Cambodia. Polyakov said there had been an exchange of views on this subject. Shevardnadze said he had mentioned this because the four Khmer groups all were in favor of an international conference. Perhaps the Ministers should try to take a decision on this.

Secretary Shultz said that on the Cambodian problem he had had a considerable series of discussions in July with the ASEAN countries, Prince Sihanouk, and the Chinese. He had sent his thoughts to Shevardnadze after each meeting. Since that time there had been the Jakarta informal meeting, which had been all right, and the Soviet meeting with the Chinese on which we had several reports. Thus the Secretary thought things were moving along but certain ingredients still remained the key:

1. Vietnamese commitment to a withdrawal was the essential prerequisite. Shevardnadze himself had said that the Soviet Union would welcome this. The Vietnamese have made some comments and we had to press them to accept a front-end loaded timetable. This was as important an ingredient as it was in Afghanistan.

2. The U.S. shared with the Soviet Union an absolute unwillingness to take part in anything that would bring Pol Pot back into control. The U.S. had had very blunt talks with the Chinese on this and we believed they understood that point. It is a very important issue and involved China giving some assurance on cutting its support to the Khmer Rouge once the process was under way.

In the U.S. view, the Secretary explained, there were four different parties in Cambodia that would one way or another need to be involved: the democratic resistance, the Khmer Rouge, the current Hanoi regime, and Prince Sihanouk. Sihanouk was a figure around whom people were prepared to rally. This was something that was not present in Afghanistan. For everything necessary to occur there would need to be international involvement of some kind, the Secretary added. Whether or not this would take the form of an international conference or some other kind of international role on the ground we did not know. Obviously the UN would have to be the organizing point.

On U.S. relations with Vietnam, the Secretary said we would like to establish more normal relations but this would require getting the POW/MIA issue out of the way. This was a humanitarian issue. It seemed to go on and off the agenda; right now we were at a more progressive stage. We hoped this could continue so we could get the issue out of the way. And of course, in addition to the POW/MIA issue, Vietnam needed to come to grips with the Cambodian problem. If these issues could be dealt with satisfactorily we would be prepared to step up relations with Vietnam. We have said as much publicly as well as privately.

Returning to Cambodia, the Secretary said the Chinese had offered an interesting formula: none of the factions should have control and none should have in its leadership people objectionable to the others. This was their solution to dealing with the Pol Pot question, at least as expressed to the Secretary by Deng Xiao Ping. If we added some kind of international presence as well, this would not be a bad formula. Under Secretary Armacost added that this would be a procedural way of ensuring a coalition that would be broadly acceptable. The Secretary noted that this was an area where we shared a common view with the Chinese.

Shevardnadze said that on the question of a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, the Soviets had every reason to say that the Vietnamese were ready to act as they had promised. In fact, they were doing so in practice. He believed the Vietnamese supported a general dialogue among the Cambodian parties. He agreed with the Secretary that Sihanouk was an interesting person and, to a substantial degree, the key to a settlement. Sihanouk’s dialogue with Hun Sen was developing in a good way and this process did not exclude the participation of other forces. A very interesting element was the fact that the Chinese seemed to have decided on a way to build on their relations with the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot by, on the one hand, having relations with the grass roots of the group and, on the other hand, maintaining separate relations with the leader. There was more clarity in the Chinese approach than in the past.

But no matter how the Cambodian dialogue develops and regardless of the fact that in the final analysis the solution was up to the Cambodian people, Shevardnadze said the Soviet Union felt that international guarantees were necessary. This was why Moscow was pushing the idea of an international conference. The Soviets did not rule out the possibility of international guarantees by the UN Security Council and other forms of verification. Vietnam was a small country with big problems and therefore a settlement without some international assistance—especially by the UN and the five Permanent Representatives—would be difficult. These were the Soviets’ general suggestions. They believed a process was underway and it was good that the U.S. and the USSR were interacting.

As for U.S.-Vietnamese relations, Shevardnadze said he had recently spoken with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister and leadership. For their part they favored expanding relations with the U.S. They understood there was a special problem with the MIAs and were trying to give assistance. The Soviets and the Vietnamese believed the situation was ripe for progress. The Vietnamese were quite positive on this.

NUCLEAR TESTING

At this point the Ambassadors Robinson and Palenykh arrived. Shevardnadze said he hoped the Ambassadors would not explode the Ministers.

The Secretary, addressing his remarks to Ambassador Robinson, said that he and Shevardnadze had had the idea of asking each of the NTT Ambassadors to come and hear the Ministers’ conviction that it was definitely possible to get the protocols for the PNET and TTBT finished this year—indeed, the sooner the better. There was certainly plenty of time for President Reagan to submit these protocols to Congress before he leaves office. This should preferably take place in the fall. He understood that the sides were fairly close on the PNET and that considerable work had already been done on the TTBT. The principal thing, the Secretary said, was to impart to the Ambassadors the notion that problems should be solved.

Shevardnadze said he agreed with what the Secretary had said. What the two Ministers were interested in was the time factor. The previous day they had spoken of the desirability of work being completed to end the Vienna meeting. This was also realistic. When the Ministers meet in Vienna they could be able to assess and report what had been accomplished on nuclear testing. The Secretary reiterated that the pressure was on, although we must get a good agreement.

Ambassador Robinson said that he and his Soviet counterpart could feel the pressure. They arrived at the ministerial with nine unresolved issues in the PNET protocol. They had been able immediately to resolve three of the most longstanding questions and had done preparatory work which he believed reduced the areas of disagreement to one or possibly two issues. Perhaps they could reduce this to zero although it depended on work that would take place that afternoon.

The Secretary commented that it would be good if they could reflect this progress in the joint statement: that all basic issues had been resolved.

Ambassador Palenykh said that a great deal of work had been done on the text of the PNET protocol. The previous day the working group had removed many brackets in the draft agreement and Ambassador Robinson was correct that most of the principal questions will be resolved. The one question remaining was that of the yield threshold at which the right to conduct on-site inspections would begin. The U.S. proposed 25 kilotons, the Soviet Union 50 kilotons. The Soviet proposal was based on ideas the U.S. had previously raised in the last round. However, the U.S. had injected a new element and this had created a sticking point. If this could be resolved, work on the PNET could be finished soon.

With respect to the TTBT, Palenykh said, the Soviets were now analyzing the results of the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE). Experts were working hard on the data and would compare notes beginning in mid-October. With these results it would be possible to draft specific language for the TTBT protocol. Nonetheless, despite this need for study, if work were conducted intensively they should be able to meet the deadline set by Secretary Shultz.

Shevardnadze asked how many weeks after mid-October would be required. Palenykh replied that 4 to 6 weeks of hard work would probably be enough. The experts, however, had to analyze the results of the JVE before this could begin. As Ambassador Robinson had said, a great deal of work on the legal aspects had already been done. Now the important thing was to get the technical issues resolved and find the right mix of seismic and hydrodynamic measures. So with further work the TTBT could be finished. The PNET could be finished in one month.

Shevardnadze asked whether the TTBT could be finished before the end of the year. Palenykh said it was possible if the sides pushed hard. Shevardnadze said the sides should accelerate work on both protocols. There should not be any insurmountable obstacles.

Palenykh said he did not think there were any such obstacles; we just needed to bring our positions a little closer. Although our scientists sometimes had different views, solutions should be found. The JVE showed that we could resolve difficult technical questions together and this same result should show up in the protocols. For the purposes of the joint statement, Palenykh added, the sides could note that both expressed satisfaction over the successful conduct of the JVE; that they were close to completion of work on the PNET protocol; and that Ministers had instructed their delegations to intensify work on the TTBT protocol.

Shevardnadze commented that he didn’t like such words as “maximize” and “intensify.” Palenykh said that they could set a firm date for completing the PNET, but in the case of the TTBT they could only say it could be finished before the end of the year. Shevardnadze said the end of November would be even better. Palenykh said the scientists might object to this.

The Secretary said that if the teams reconvened in mid-October, they should try to reduce the amount of further work from six to four weeks. Palenykh said they needed four weeks for the PNET, but the TTBT would require more work and analysis. Shevardnadze commented that there were three months from now to November. General Powell suggested setting the goal of Thanksgiving and the Secretary added: “And don’t deliver us a turkey.” Palenykh said that the date of the second JVE was a driving consideration. We now needed weeks and months to absorb the data, but he agreed it was desirable to set some deadlines.

The Secretary said he hoped the Ambassadors felt the fact that at the political level their leaders would like to see them finish the job. Therefore, if the Ambassadors ran into problems and needed to refer back to capitals they should know they would find people there ready to resolve disputes quickly. Robinson said he did not disagree on the bottom line. He wanted to add some comment on the outstanding issue in the PNET protocol. The Soviet proposal had previously been to allow hydrodynamic measurement for any PNE, whereas the U.S. had earlier proposed hydrodynamic measurements only for tests over 50 kilotons. After considering the Soviet proposal we saw some value in having inspections below 50 kilotons in order to plug some loopholes, and came up with a 25 kiloton trigger. We thought this would be readily acceptable, but then the Soviets returned to the original U.S. position of 50 kilotons as the trigger for all inspections. In other words, some time in the summer our trains passed. Palenykh said that Robinson had not made clear that the on-site inspections proposed by the U.S. were different from those the Soviets had first proposed. They included a large set of elements that did not represent simple acceptance of the Soviet position but a much broader set of procedures. The Soviets did not believe these were necessary in the area between 25 and 50 kilotons, but they were looking for a way out.

Robinson said that with respect to the TTBT the negotiating record showed that this had initially been negotiated very quickly, whereas the PNET had taken longer and thus provided a better basis on which the sides could now build. The protocol that we had negotiated was even better than the 1976 protocol of the PNET. The outstanding question was how quickly we could establish acceptable conditions for the operation of one another’s experts at our test sites. This was an area where governments could help the negotiators.

Secretary Shultz concluded this portion of the discussion by urging the Ambassadors to get back to work and find a solution to the 25/50 problem. Shevardnadze said he was in full solidarity with Secretary Shultz. He suggested that the negotiators give the Ministers a list of what they wanted governments to resolve. As in the Olympics, they should go for the gold medal. The Secretary said there were two gold medals waiting.

KOREAN PENINSULA

Shevardnadze said he wanted to add a few words on Korea. We had seen certain trends emerging that pointed toward a better dialogue between the North and South. We believed the Olympics were contributing to that process. There had been some interesting suggestions by the North. Moscow also believed that South Korean ideas deserve special attention. The Soviets supported contacts that had already been initiated such as meetings between parliaments and at other levels. In addition to North-South contacts, the North Korean leadership has been expressing a readiness to engage in a dialogue with the United States. They had asked the Soviets to pass this to Washington; it could be that conditions have ripened for an improvement in U.S.–DPRK relations.

Secretary Shultz said he agreed the Olympics were so far moving forward without disruption. He was sure Moscow had helped in influencing the North Koreans to this end. The U.S. viewed the statement by South Korean President Noh Tae Woo of July 7 as very important—a shift of gears in its statement of readiness for new flexibility on North-South contacts and contacts with the North by other countries. He agreed with Shevardnadze that encouraging a direct North-South dialogue was a good idea. In his speech at Krasnoyarsk, Gorbachev had spoken of greater trade with South Korea and this was a very interesting point. On the other side of the coin we saw that Moscow was still supplying sophisticated new weaponry to North Korea and this was a major problem. We were, however, pleased with the compromise reached on the inscription item for the ROK on the occasion of its 40th anniversary. The ROK’s proposal to speak at the UN was designed to further the ongoing positive developments and not to promote confrontation. The Soviet Union had played a constructive role in this.

Regarding U.S. relations with North Korea, the Secretary said we were prepared to review our policy after the Olympics. The key things that would influence our decisions were: (1) toning down of the vitriolic anti-U.S. propaganda by the North; (2) return of the remains of five U.S. soldiers that had been held by the DPRK; and (3) creating a more fruitful tone for the discussions on military CBMs at Panmunjom. As Shevardnadze knew, the U.S. had started down the road of improving contacts a few years ago, but after the sabotage of a Korean airliner—which we believed was carried out by North Korea³—we broke off the process. Now we were ready to review things again. But he stressed that, as in so many areas, the Korean peninsula was an example of the more promising regional dialogue we have developed. He supposed Soviet influence was in part responsible for the favorable developments there.

Shevardnadze replied that the Secretary’s comments provided a good basis for businesslike discussions. He would talk to his friends in North Korea in order to give them an idea of what had been said.

AFGHANISTAN

Shevardnadze said that the signing of the Geneva accords had been an extraordinary event. He thought it would be correct to say that after the signing, a complicated and difficult process had begun, but one which was aimed at moving toward a solution. Today, however, the Geneva accords were threatened. We were in a situation in which one side was complying faithfully with all provisions while the other ignored them.

Shevardnadze said he did not want to build up a tense atmosphere in this meeting, but there were many facts that he could cite. The Soviets had completed the first stage of their withdrawal and had honestly complied with all aspects of the agreement. There could not be any serious accusations against the Afghan side. Some allegations had been made by Pakistan but the Soviets had checked, as had international observers, and none of these violations had been confirmed; this was only natural because the Afghans had an interest in complying with the accords. The Soviets were prepared to continue carrying out the schedule of withdrawals and to help in the process of forming a coalition government. But the other side was acting unscrupulously. The Pakistanis were violating all provisions of the Geneva accord. The Soviets had cleared many of the routes of mines, only to see these being used for the supply of arms. Whole caravans of weapons were moving along the roads and the conditions for the Afghan people were becoming worse.

Shevardnadze said his second concern was the fact that camps in Pakistan continued to exist without change, serving as training grounds for armed groups. A so-called transitional government was functioning on Pakistani territory and issuing openly anti-Afghan propaganda. So nothing had changed. If anything, the situation was now more grave. This was the policy advocated by the former Pakistani President, and it seemed the current leadership was unable to change direction.

Shevardnadze said the Soviet Union, for its part, wanted to honestly comply with all its obligations, but if interference continued the Soviets might be forced to review this policy. This would not be a desirable development. The Soviets knew their responsibility and how significant it would be to change course with respect to their own interests and the cause of promoting regional settlements in general. “But look at the other side,” he said: Pakistan was a friend of the U.S. Under Secretary Armacost had met with Pak leaders. Perhaps they should consider the possibility that the Soviet Union might revise its schedule of withdrawal. Soviet withdrawal, after all, was what the Pakistanis wanted most. So how would a delay affect their own internal situation, which was rather complicated at present? Shevardnadze said he was suggesting that some way be found to exert influence on the Pakistani leadership to make them comply with the Geneva Accords. He would be meeting with Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan in New York and intended to have a very principled discussion with him. It would be good if the U.S. exerted its influence as well.

Continuing, Shevardnadze said that the Soviets had a real interest in establishing dialogue among the Afghan parties. But any attempt to ignore the PDPA was inadmissible. They represented a significant force, with armed strength of 250,000 men. The domestic opposition as well as the internal and external resistance had many problems. The regime, in comparison, represented the most organized force. At the same time, Shevardnadze said, the Soviets did not want the PDPA to preserve a monopoly of power. Moscow wanted to see a real coalition government. Together the U.S. and the USSR could help establish a dialogue.

For its part, Shevardnadze explained, the PDPA was ready to talk even to Hekmatyar,⁴ the most extreme resistance leader, to Khalis, as well as to the moderates with whom they were already able to deal. The Afghan regime was also ready to negotiate with the leaders of the internal opposition. He noted that 18 provincial leaders were former members of the opposition who had once been engaged in armed struggle. This showed that a coalition government was not just a matter of words but something that was being done in practice. The cabinet also showed this fact with 19 of 30 ministers from the opposition or non-party members. Shevardnadze said the RA Prime Minister, who had just visited Moscow, was a very interesting politician who had a broad mind; he used to work for Zaher Shah. Other Afghan figures were also ready for true power-sharing. So the Soviets felt it was very important that we work together and try to push for a settlement of the Afghan problem.

It was one thing to sign an accord and another to get the problem resolved, Shevardnadze asserted. He repeated that the Afghans are ready to negotiate with Zaher Shah and believed that he should accept some post in the government; which post this would be was something to be negotiated. There were also some important figures now living in the U.S. who should participate. The Foreign Minister added that Cordovez’s proposals were very interesting and should form the basis for an internal dialogue.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets had lodged very serious complaints against Pakistan for practices amounting to state terrorism. When a country encourages mass bombings of peaceful towns with explosions all the time, there was nothing to compare it with; this was unprecedented behavior. While we might be outraged by events on the West Bank, they were nothing compared to what was happening in Afghanistan. Shevardnadze described a recent incident in which a car packed with 1.5 tons of explosives had been found in the center of Kabul. Thousands of people could have been killed if it had not been detected. The Soviets had spoken to the Pakistanis about this.

Shevardnadze said that as a result of Soviet exchanges with the U.S., Moscow had tried to tone down its statements toward Pakistan in the interest of promoting a final settlement. In U.S.-Soviet relations, Afghanistan was and remains the central problem among the regional issues. The Ministers’ exchanges have been very useful, as have Soviet meetings with Under Secretary Armacost. But the Soviets felt that we should proceed from consultations to more specific things. He had recently met with the new Pakistani Ambassador to Moscow, Abdul Sattar (a very solid diplomat) and he had told the Soviets that Armacost was urging him to find common ground. If this were true, the Soviets could only welcome it.

Shevardnadze recalled that Gorbachev had told the President that Afghanistan was the touchstone in our relations. The Soviets had made a hard political decision that was in the U.S. as well as Soviet interest. Movement had begun toward a settlement; let us now join our efforts to achieve a final settlement. The Soviets did not want to look for other options such as revising the Geneva accords. This was possible, but not desirable.

Shevardnadze added that it was noteworthy that India was now speaking out for the progressive forces in Afghanistan, while also supporting a coalition government. Many groups within Afghanistan were also for a progressive regime. The Chinese had substantially altered their view because they understood just what Islamic fundamentalism would mean. Recently there had been changes in the Iranian attitude. In sum, the attitudes of Afghanistan’s neighbors were evolving in favor of a solid and substantial settlement.

Secretary Shultz replied that he appreciated Shevardnadze’s comments. The U.S. wanted to be a constructive force. He wanted to lay out how the U.S. saw the current situation. First of all, the goal we wanted to reach was an Afghanistan that was governed according to the wishes of its own people and was neutral and non-aligned. Our behavior was guided by that overarching objective. Shevardnadze interjected to say the Soviets also wanted a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan.

The Secretary, continuing, said that at the time of the signing of the Geneva Accords we had made clear that we did not recognize the current regime as a legitimate one and that we considered ourselves free to support those we have been supporting; the Geneva agreement would not affect this. We had had lots of discussions in this room on the subject. We agreed that in order for our shared objective to be achieved, Soviet withdrawal was essential. Shevardnadze had told him this was the Soviet intention some time ago—that the Soviets expected to be out before the end of 1988, although the deadline was February 15, 1989. It was obvious that Soviet withdrawal is the key condition to a settlement in Afghanistan.

Regarding Pakistan, the Secretary said that as far as we knew UNGOMAP, having investigated Soviet and RA allegation, had no real criticisms of Pakistani behavior. The major reason was that the military forces inside Afghanistan were already well supplied and did not need additional weapons. Moreover, they had been very successful in capturing stockpiles of weapons from the Afghan Army and had built themselves up into a formidable fighting force, as well as developing strong popular backing. The Secretary said the U.S. had concerns about Soviet and PDPA activity. We saw military options in support of the regime rather than being confined to self-defense of withdrawing Soviet troops (which Gorbachev had said was the Soviet intention). We saw cross-border air raids and had concrete evidence, including one captured pilot who had subsequently been returned. We saw evidence of high-altitude bombings, including bombings from Soviet airfields, and we continued to be deeply concerned about new mine-laying and difficulties in clearing existing minefields such as by failing to provide maps to the UN. The Secretary reiterated that the U.S. commitment to the security of Pakistan was very deep. Any intrusions into Pakistani territory were of great concern to us.

With respect to our own actions, the Secretary said we had urged the resistance to exercise the maximum restraint and not to make it difficult for the Soviets to withdraw. There were still three million refugees in Pakistan and two million in Iran; we would like to see them returned. If there was going to be an Afghan government that reflected the wishes of the Afghan people, those outside the country should be brought back; their presence would probably be a stabilizing force.

The Secretary reiterated that mines remained a great inhibition to the return of refugees. He believed that more could be done to remove existing mines and stop further mine-laying. To the extent that the Mujahidin were laying mines we had expressed our views to them. He urged the Soviets to clear the mines and support Prince Sadruddin’s efforts in mine awareness and mine-clearing. As for economic and humanitarian aid, the Secretary said we understood the Soviets were committed to giving multilateral assistance through the UN. Half of U.S. humanitarian assistance was going to multilateral programs (about $70 million). Another $70 million were being provided on a direct basis. We intended to continue our bilateral programs but expected to move in the direction of more multilateral aid, whereby more mileage could be obtained. We would be interested in hearing about Soviet aid plans. We thought that efforts to improve the quality of life inside Afghanistan would improve the overall atmosphere.

With respect to a political settlement and a transitional government, the Secretary said we thought it would be desirable to construct such a government; we supported Pakistani efforts and those of Cordovez to bring this about. Perhaps Shevardnadze should discuss this subject further with Yaqub Khan, who we understood might have some further thoughts. Any proposal for a coalition government had to meet one simple test: Will it get support from organized groups inside Afghanistan? This was not something the U.S. or Soviet Union could impose; he was only offering an analytical statement. Any accord that took place under the auspices of the PDPA would not be supported by the Mujahidin. Different auspices needed to emerge and the U.S. was ready to be part of the solution.

The Secretary reiterated that we had always urged that, as Soviet troops withdrew, there should be a transitional government. It was desirable to put such a process in motion, but hard to bring about in practical terms. The U.S. believed that steps which encouraged the refugees to return and the Afghans to think about their own future would have a positive impact. Multilateral humanitarian aid would help in this regard. The Secretary said he too would be meeting with Yaqub Khan, as would President Reagan. We would share our analysis and inform Yakub of what Shevardnadze had said. We thought that the Geneva Accords, even with our current differences, represented a major achievement.

Armacost noted that there were many ideas on an interim government floating around right now. Yaqub Khan had some ideas he wanted to test with Shevardnadze. Zaher Shah had others, but he wanted to underscore what Secretary Shultz had said: The test of whether a proposal was viable was not whether we liked it, but whether the Afghan people would support it.

Shevardnadze said he agreed with this. The U.S. and USSR could contribute to the dialogue and encourage it along, but they could not form the transitional government. Nevertheless, without a dialogue with the current regime on the part of Zaher Shah and the Peshawar Seven, there would not be an interim government. So this was the basis on which to proceed: encouraging a dialogue.

Shevardnadze stated that the information possessed by the U.S. about alleged Afghan violations was inaccurate. It would be illogical for them to engage in such raids. The Soviets had made a sincere proposal in asking Pakistan for specific proof; but they didn’t have any proof. It was possible for planes accidentally to stray over the border into Pakistani territory but there had been no raids. As for mines, Shevardnadze said the Soviets were presenting maps of minefields to the UN. The real problem, he added, was that the opposition was out of control. After roads that had been mined had been cleared, convoys of rebel troops were moving along them. The return of the refugees was underway with 250,000 already back, and these people were getting Soviet assistance. He said Soviet contributions to the international fund were twice that of the U.S. and urged the U.S. to help in international channels as well.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to suggest that the Foreign Ministers of the four signatories to the Geneva Accords meet in New York to assess the situation, perhaps with the presence of the Secretary General. Such a meeting would not be a forum to complain, but a place to evaluate the situation and perhaps make decisions on how to deepen the process of implementing the accord. If the Secretary was not prepared to answer this proposal today perhaps he could do so tomorrow. The Soviets had in mind a short meeting of 1 to 1½ hours to review further implementation of the Geneva Accords.

The Secretary asked which four Foreign Ministers Shevardnadze had in mind, U.S., USSR, Pakistan, and China? Shevardnadze replied that he meant the Afghans not the Chinese. The Secretary rejoined that we do not recognize the Kabul regime. He recalled that the signing procedure in Geneva had been a very strange one.

Shevardnadze said he remembered this well, but he thought the U.S. could make a similar statement after the meeting as it had in Geneva. He again urged that the Secretary think about it. It would be useful to show that those who had signed the Geneva Accords were ready to complete the work.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. was ready to try to be a part of the solution and was not interested in creating more problems. We were on the side of greater stability.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to emphasize again the Soviet position and the Soviet interest. As he had said clearly, the Soviets want to deal with a neutral Afghanistan. The USSR had excellent relations with Finland, with good neighborly cooperation. Future Soviet-Afghan relations could be at the same level as Soviet-Finnish relations, and Moscow expected the U.S. would have relations in the future with a neutral Afghanistan. He urged the Secretary again to think about the proposal for a meeting in New York of the four signatories of the Geneva Accords.

Shevardnadze then suggested that the Ministers bring in their conventional arms control experts. The Secretary agreed but said that he first wanted to say a few words about other regional issues.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

The Secretary said there had been a lot of progress on a Namibia/Angola accord. The Soviet role had been constructive and this was a good example of cooperative efforts aimed at achieving concrete results. Another round of talks was about to take place. The key question now was to get a front-loaded withdrawal schedule and to bring about national reconciliation talks between UNITA and the MPLA. The U.S. had the feeling the Soviets were trying to help, and there was a major head of steam building up among African leaders. The Secretary assured Shevardnadze that Savimbi was ready to come to the table and be a reasonable interlocutor.

Shevardnadze said he did not have much comment to offer. The Soviets noted the importance of the process of achieving a settlement and reconciliation in southern Africa and also noted the active work of U.S. representatives. The USSR was only an observer but was trying to do what it could. The Soviets welcomed the U.S. role in the process and would try to contribute to the further developments. The Soviets understood that the key problem was the timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal. This, he said, would have to be resolved in the negotiations. As for Moscow exerting its influence toward reducing the length of the timetable, Soviet possibilities were limited.

Shevardnadze added that with respect to internal reconciliation inside Angola, this was a very sensitive issue and any activity on the part of the Soviet Union could have a negative impact. The Soviets had been pushing the Afghans toward national reconciliation but there was a different kind of situation in Angola; Moscow did not want to interfere. The Angolans first needed to get more ripe for national reconciliation. The Soviet Union wanted to be actively involved but in the final analysis it was up to the parties themselves. Shevardnadze added that he did not rule out the possibility of a further meeting with the Angolan leadership in the near future. On that occasion, the Soviets would discuss all problems in an effort to resolve the conflict.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

On the Middle East, the Secretary said the situation was very dangerous and it was hard to bring the parties to a realistic appraisal of their own positions. He had recently given a speech which he had sent to Shevardnadze; that statement was designed to be brutally frank with everyone. Israel had to face up to certain things, as did the Palestinians. The U.S. believed it was essential to keep the notion of the peace process alive. We had discussed the general lines of a settlement. It seemed that U.S. and Soviet views on an international conference—both its immediate and longer-term role—were coming closer. In any case, if we could keep the process alive, there might be something to discuss after the Israeli elections.

Shevardnadze said he also believed our two countries were cooperating constructively on the Middle East. He appreciated the importance of the Secretary’s Middle East missions and knew this was a very difficult effort. At the same time, the situation was getting very complicated with the rebellion in the West Bank and the Israeli response. In the wake of King Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank, progress depended on a political program being presented by the Palestinians and on how Israel would behave. In that context, some new possibilities were opening up in addition to an international conference (which the Soviets had long supported and which had realistic prospects). Shevardnadze proposed that we study the possibility of a direct Palestinian-Israeli dialogue by arranging a meeting between Israeli Foreign Minister Peres and Yassir Arafat. The Soviet Union would like to consult with the U.S. on this. Moscow had seen signals on both sides in favor of such a meeting. The Soviets understood there were problems on the Israeli side with respect to the Prime Minister, but a meeting between Arafat and Peres could be promising. Perhaps sure a meeting could be arranged with the participation of the Secretary General and the five permanent UNSC members, without excluding the participation of other involved parties.

The Secretary asked whether Shevardnadze meant other Arab countries and Israel. Shevardnadze said this was correct; perhaps this could be arranged, although the main participants would be Arafat and Peres. He added that this was one possibility; it might not be a realistic one, but Soviet representatives were searching for something. Why didn’t we have preliminary consultations? Shevardnadze said he was planning to have meetings in New York with Arafat and Peres.

The Secretary expressed puzzlement. He did not believe Arafat was coming to New York. Polyakov corrected his Minister, explaining that he would be meeting with Kaddumi and not Arafat. Shevardnadze said perhaps we could invite Arafat to New York. In any case, he said, more realism was now becoming evident on the part of the Palestinians.

Shevardnadze then said he wanted to set forth the basis on which the Soviets believed the dialogue should be conducted:

—An international legal basis for a Palestinian state provided in UN resolution 181.⁵

—Acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338.⁶

—Solution of the problem of refugees on the basis of relevant UN decisions.

—Granting the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and establishment of their own independent state.

—Establishment of a confederative union of that state with Jordan.

—Recognition of the right of Israel to exist.

—Renunciation of terror or violence in the spirit of the Cairo declaration.

—Convening of an international conference to be attended by all parties concerned, including the PLO and the five permanent representatives of the UN.

These elements take into account suggestions the Secretary had made, Shevardnadze explained. They also incorporated ideas proposed by Peres and those proposed by the Palestinian leadership. The Soviets would not say these points provided a universally acceptable basis, but they were a solid point of departure.

Shevardnadze said that previous Soviet comments on the convening of an international conference remained valid, but Moscow was dissatisfied on one point. The Soviets had spoken in the past of creating a preparatory committee and they thought it unfortunate that the U.S. had not supported this. If American support had been available, things would have already begun to move. He suggested, however, that the platform he had described above could be the basis for work, asking whether we should otherwise negate all this.

The Secretary agreed we needed to keep working but the basic points Shevardnadze had laid out were not all realistic. Resolution 181 envisaged a territorial arrangement that was out of the question today. The facts on the ground precluded such a solution, just as they precluded a return to 1967 borders. Moreover we could not negotiate as if the only issue was the structure of a Palestinian state that has already been agreed upon. There were many who did not agree on the desirability of a Palestinian state, including the U.S. and perhaps every Arab country, if their leaders were asked privately. Self-determination was a good principle, but tricky in its application. What it had come to mean in the Middle East was an independent Palestinian state and nothing else, so it was not a principle we could support for that reason.

The Secretary added that he personally believed that the right course for now was to do things that maintain the spirit of the peace process and the image that we were discussing issues constructively. But for the near term he thought the Israelis would look at any new idea strictly in terms of how it would affect their election. A meeting between Arafat and Peres before the election would be out of the question. Moreover the PLO must agree to other points on Shevardnadze’s list starting with a statement that they are ready to negotiate. The position they take in negotiations is up to them—they could advocate an independent Palestinian state if they wished—and this would become an issue that the negotiating process needed to address. But first they had to accept the necessary conditions to begin the negotiations.

Shevardnadze said, “all right, but we should continue to think about the problem.” We needed to consider the fact that after King Hussein’s statement, the PLO was acquiring a new status. Many things were changing and already had changed. If these developments were to be ignored it would be hard to find a common denominator.

The Secretary replied that the PLO had acquired a new opportunity, but whether it acquired new status would depend on what it did with that opportunity. The history of the Middle East was one of missed opportunities. This was why he thought the task now was to hold open the opportunities and to recognize that, one month before a key election in Israel, it would be very difficult to get Israeli politicians to do anything bold. He noted that Peres had called explicitly for Israel to trade land for peace. This was very bold in Israeli political terms, although there was the obvious question of what land would be traded.

Shevardnadze agreed the situation was very complex. The Secretary added that it was also explosive.

Shevardnadze concurred: it was more explosive and potentially more troublesome than Iran-Iraq, Cambodia and other regional conflicts. He noted that he and the Secretary had spoken the previous day about ballistic missile technology; the spread of this technology created a dangerous situation in the Middle East. Pushing the peace process forward was very difficult but postponing decisions was very dangerous. He suggested that the ministers note in their joint statement that they were in favor of convening an international conference and for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East dispute.

The Secretary reminded Shevardnadze that what he favored was direct negotiations among the parties. We supported a conference only if it was a helpful way of getting to direct talks.

Shevardnadze said this was what he meant.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

At this point Ambassador Grinevskiy and Mr. Thomas joined the discussion to discuss conventional arms control. Grinevskiy reported that at their working group he and Thomas had discussed a broad range of issues, in accordance with his minister’s instructions. The sides had given particular attention to the problem of excluding fighter aircraft from the mandate of the new conventional arms talks. Normally the sides had been able to report some mutual understanding, but unfortunately on this occasion they had not been able to reach agreement. In effect, Grinevskiy said, he could only report an impasse. The Soviets had presented the following arguments for excluding fighter aircraft:

—Such aircraft were not part of the potential for surprise attack, prevention of which was an agreed objective of the future negotiations;

—Fighter aircraft were a counterbalance to those elements of NATO forces that were not covered, such as carrier-based aircraft.

Grinevskiy said the U.S. had objected to the exclusion of fighter aircraft by presenting the following three arguments: that fighter aircraft also had a powerful offensive potential and could not be distinguished from strike aircraft; that the issue had been injected by the Soviet Union at the final stage of the mandate talks and was a delaying tatic; and that exclusion of fighter aircraft from the mandate would not prevent the Soviet Union from raising the exclusion of such aircraft in the negotiations themselves.

Shevardnadze commented that his representative had complied with his instructions. Thomas commented that Grinevskiy had accurately described the U.S. position on the exclusion of fighter aircraft. He wanted to underscore that if the Soviets insisted on including this phrase in the mandate, it would ensure that there would be no way to finish the mandate in a reasonable time. This was normally the kind of question that was not addressed in the mandate discussions, since it was a counting rule problem best addressed in the negotiations themselves. If the Soviets dropped their language there would be no impediment in the mandate to raising fighter aircraft exclusion in the negotiations themselves. The U.S. would not agree with this, but it could be discussed. He reiterated that if the Soviets dropped the language they would lose nothing and would speed up the process of completing the Vienna meeting. Thomas added that the West had accepted the proposal that had been made by Karpov to Genscher during his recent visit to Moscow and, in doing so, we had been extremely forthcoming. He repeated that unless the issue were dropped it probably could not be settled for a long time, if at all, since we could not discriminate between fighter aircraft and other aircraft.

Shevardnadze said the Soviet Union had taken on board the argument that they could raise this issue at the negotiations themselves. This made it possible to look for a way out of the impasse. He said the Soviet Union perhaps could accept no direct mention of fighter aircraft exclusion in the mandate. To this end, it had the previous day composed a new text. A paper was handed over to the U.S. representatives (attached).⁷

After the U.S. side had reviewed the text, Thomas said that it appeared that there was a possibility to work out an agreement on the basis of the new Soviet proposal, but some items needed to be discussed at length. Perhaps he and Grinevskiy should get together again.

Shevardnadze replied that he wanted to say frankly that all U.S. arguments and concerns had been taken into account to the maximum extent possible. This was the most that could be done; all elements of NATO language were incorporated.

Thomas replied that one element was missing: that nuclear weapons would not be a subject of the negotiation.

Shevardnadze replied that it was, in fact, in the text. It was then discovered that the Soviet courtesy translation had omitted this sentence.

The Secretary said the Soviet proposal was very encouraging. Thomas said he needed to remind the Soviet side that these issues were under discussion in a multilateral negotiation in Vienna and that the U.S. could not speak unilaterally for its allies. We already had an agreed proposal based on the Karpov-Genscher formula; it would be easier if we could return to that without any change, since our allies had already accepted it.

Grinevskiy replied that this new proposal was based in practice on what was given to Genscher with very few changes.

The Secretary suggested the experts seek to minimize the differences. He noted that he would be meeting with key allies the following week in New York and perhaps on the basis of this new proposal we could bring the Vienna meeting into focus.

Shevardnadze said he would be having informal meetings with his own allies and with some U.S. allies. He would be having very specific discussions with Genscher, Dumas and Howe and he thought a central element of these talks would be the mandate. It would be good to have a U.S.-Soviet agreement in principle going into that week of discussions; without U.S.-Soviet agreement there could be no agreement in Vienna. He reiterated that the new Soviet proposal was a very good basis for agreement. He agreed that the experts should work on the text and if they failed to reach agreement, they should both be expelled from the country.

BERLIN INITIATIVE

The Secretary then suggested that they return to the question of the Krasnoyarsk radar now that Ambassador Karpov had returned. He asked for General Burns and Mr. Castillo to join the discussions as well. While waiting, the Secretary said he wanted to express U.S. disappointment that the Soviets did not see fit to move favorably on the President’s Berlin initiative.

KRASNOYARSK RADAR

Burns and Castillo joined the discussion. General Burns reported that he had discussed the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel issues at length with Ambassador Karpov. They agreed that the Krasnoyarsk problem needed to be resolved, but they disagreed on the extent of dismantlement and destruction that would be required. The Soviets argued that only the transmitter antenna had to be dismantled; they claimed the building could be retained and only the face of the antenna destroyed. The Soviet side also agreed that the Gomel issue could be resolved in the context of a solution to Krasnoyarsk, although the sides were unable to agree on words to reflect their present positions.

Ambassador Karpov said he would like to add that the Soviets had taken into account in their proposal the concerns expressed by Burns. The main difference was in the scope of the possible dismantling of the LPAR at Krasnoyarsk. The Soviets believed these questions should be given to experts for further consideration. Based on the mission of the future space research center, they could determine what should be done to the radar. To write into the text of the joint statement today the scope of the future dismantlement effort would not be possible.

The Secretary replied that he accepted that this might be the case, but that he believed our experts would need clear instructions. Part of their guidance should specify what space research activities would be allowed; and they should also have negative guidance, that is instructions specifying the kinds of equipment that could not be present at Krasnoyarsk when it was converted to a space research center. In short, the experts could not have an entirely free hand but rather needed instructions on the negative and the positive side.

Karpov said the Soviets had suggested language to the effect that their side was ready to have experts meet to develop specific measures to ensure that the Krasnoyarsk radar would be converted to an international space research center; that this would include dismantlement and destruction of specific devices there, including elements of the phased array and of the structures, along with the introduction of other equipment. This language would make clear that the only difference between the sides was the exact scope of the future dismantlement. The Soviets believed it was desirable for the experts to look at the complex aspects.

The Secretary said that perhaps some different language would offer a way out of the problem. Burns said that the sides had already discussed language and it seemed unwise to provide so general an instruction to the experts. Some rather fundamental decisions had to be made. We needed agreement that the LPAR as it currently existed—with a transmitter and a receiver—needed to be dismantled. At the same time, the U.S. had no objection to the removal of the electronics for other uses.

The Secretary asked whether language could be devised which spoke of dismantling those elements which lend themselves to the long lead-time problem.

Burns replied that there were a number of structures at Krasnoyarsk that were suitable for use as a space research center; only two structures were of concern, the transmitter and receiver. By eliminating these structures all advantages for ABM breakout would be removed. If these were not eliminated, on the other hand, there would still be some ABM potential. The Soviet side, Burns explained, had suggested two things: that the transmitter be eliminated and the receiver maintained. This would preserve the less egregious half of the LPAR, but would not eliminate the whole threat. If the structure were eliminated, on the other hand, it would restore more of the lead time. In sum, there was no way the problem could be resolved if the structure were not affected in some major way.

The Secretary asked whether Burns meant to say that any language agreed had to make clear it was a particular structure which had to be dealt with. Burns replied that this was correct: there was only one structure involved; we were not talking about the power plants, offices or any other building that might be useful for scientific purposes.

The Secretary suggested that the sides reflect on this. The Ministers now needed to break to have lunch and return for the working group reports.

Shevardnadze said that the ministers should clarify the general approach. The Soviet side had expressed a readiness to work closely so that all elements and components would be rendered exclusively for the use of the international space research center. If the sides could not agree on language for the joint statement, they could not mention the subject at all.

The Secretary said the words we are looking for should state that Krasnoyarsk would not be available as a phased array radar. Shevardnadze urged that the sides look for more general language. The Secretary responded that we understood that the Soviets wanted a positive twist and we were not afraid of that. That was what we should try to achieve.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Ridgway. Vershbow initialed for Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz’s office at the Department of State.
2. Memoranda of conversations from the regional working group meetings are in Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Political Subject and Chronological Files, Lot 00D471, September ’88 Ministerial.
3. See footnote 8, Document 123.
4. See footnote 4, Document 123.
5. UNGA Resolution of 181 of November 29, 1947, also known as the Partition Plan of Palestine.
6. See footnote 4, Document 44.
7. Not found attached.