135. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Secretary of State G. Shultz
- Gen. C. Powell
- Asst. Sec. R. Ridgway
- Dr. W. Hopkins (Interpreter)
- Minister E. Shevardnadze
- Dep. For. Min. A. Bessmertnykh
- Mr. P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
The discussion, a follow-on to an earlier conversation, concerned possible dates for the Moscow Summit. The interpretation was done in semi-simultaneous fashion, so no verbatim record was kept.
Secretary Shultz pointed out that the President and the General Secretary as well as he and Shevardnadze desired to put U.S.-Soviet relations on a constructive, stable course. He stressed the current U.S. administration’s desire to leave such a legacy. Consequently, he said, the upcoming Moscow Summit is an event of enormous significance.
Shultz said the schedule the President had in mind for the Summit was in many respects similar to the General Secretary’s during his U.S. visit. For example, the President might arrive in the U.S.S.R. on a Sunday evening, at which time according to Soviet protocol, there would be an official welcome. Monday would be a “working” day with official meetings. Tuesday would also be for official meetings as well as meetings with other groups, like those the General Secretary hosted in the U.S. There would be official dinners in the evenings. Wednesday would be a final meeting and perhaps a departure ceremony, etc. However, the President would probably not leave the U.S.S.R. until the following morning.
In an earlier conversation, apparently, Shevardnadze had stated that the Soviet Union could not host the Summit during the week beginning May 23, 1988. Despite that, Shultz again expressed the U.S. side’s preference to have the meeting during that week rather than the week of May 30, as had been suggested by the Soviet side. He explained that May 30 is a U.S. holiday, and that fact might distract the public’s attention from the Summit. Moreover, he explained that the President’s schedule for the weeks beginning May 16 and May 30, as well as for the entire month of June, was already very heavy, since it had been [Page 840] assumed by the U.S. side that the Summit would take place during the week of May 23.
Shevardnadze said that unfortunately a meeting of the Supreme Soviet had already been scheduled for May 25–26, 1988. Although those dates had not been officially announced, he insisted it would be impossible to change the planned meeting. He pressed for holding the Summit during the week of May 30.
When the U.S. side suggested that perhaps the presidential visit could overlap slightly with the meeting of the Supreme Soviet and the President could schedule other meetings during that time, as Gorbachev had done, Shevardnadze resisted the idea, maintaining that that would distract attention from both the meeting of the Supreme Soviet and the Summit. He pointed out that Gorbachev had set aside the week beginning May 30 to devote exclusively and entirely to the Summit. He said the Soviet side wanted the Summit to take place in “ideal” conditions, and he also suggested that beyond the official meetings the President might be interested in travel to other parts of the U.S.S.R.
The U.S. side, particularly General Powell, emphasized that the week of May 30 was almost totally impossible as an option, because of the President’s already tightly-booked schedule. Moreover, he pointed out that the President would not want to be out of the country on Memorial Day, May 30. Ordinarily, the President makes various appearances in connection with the holiday; however, Powell allowed for the possibility of perhaps beginning presidential travel on the evening of May 30.
Shultz expressed some displeasure at the fact that when the U.S. advance team visited the U.S.S.R. recently, its members had not been informed that it would be impossible for the Soviet Union to host the Summit during the week of May 23.
The idea of holding the Summit during the week of May 16 was discussed briefly. There seemed to be general agreement that that date was too early for the meeting, since it would shorten the available time at the Geneva negotiations by almost two working weeks.
Given all these factors, various scenarios were briefly discussed for each of the three possible time frames. The U.S. side emphasized again the undesirability of the May 16 and May 30 options. However, Powell agreed to get in touch with the President later that very evening to see if he would agree to some alternative under the May 16 or May 30 scenarios. The desirability of the May 23 option from the U.S. point of view was reemphasised.
Shevardnadze pressed for some U.S. compromise and for having Powell get in touch with the President about his schedule as quickly as possible, since he wanted to be in contact with Moscow about all [Page 841] these dates immediately, and it was necessary to factor in the 8-hour time difference.
It was left that Powell would check with the President about the May 16 and May 30 options. The U.S. preference for the week of May 23 was again stressed. From his side, Shevardnadze reiterated that for the Soviet Union it would be impossible to host the Summit during the week of May 23. He promised to inform Moscow about what had been discussed during the current conversation.
It was decided to address the subject again the next morning as the first item of business.2
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret. No drafting information was found on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Diplomatic Reception Rooms at the Department of State.↩
- See Document 137.↩