131. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Powell) to President
Reagan1
Washington, March 21, 1988
SUBJECT
- Secretary Shultz’s Overview of
Impending Shevardnadze
Visit
Secretary Shultz has sent you a memo
outlining his expectations and plans for the next ministerial with Shevardnadze (Tab A). The following are
brief comments on points George makes.
I agree with George that we can probably fix summit dates. We proposed 23 May
as the starting day; the Soviets want to start one week later to give more
time for completing arms agreements.
The Geneva talks on Afghanistan remain deadlocked over our demand for
“symmetry,” i.e., that the Soviets end aid to Kabul if we are to end aid to
the Mujahedin. The Soviets have refused this demand, and George expects
Shevardnadze to concentrate on
blaming us for the deadlock. There are signs, however, that the Soviets may
be able to live with some “off the record” commitment on this score. There
are many forms a Soviet aid cutoff pledge could take, but we will want it as
clear, explicit, and public as possible—and we should hold firm.
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The Soviets say they will pull out
without agreement in Geneva, so the pressure is not on us.
On other issues, Shevardnadze will
want to hear about the Shamir visit. Central America will loom larger than
previously expected, for obvious reasons. The Sandinistas are using Soviet
arms to subvert a peace process they signed up to. We should make clear that
this poisons the atmosphere of US-Soviet
relations.
Human Rights
George plans to cover the now-familiar themes and to present an updated list
of human rights cases of interest to us. I think we shall need to emphasize
the reform of Soviet laws and practices that underly Soviet abuses.
Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan
2
Washington, March 14, 1988
SUBJECT
Shevardnadze arrives in
Washington as preparations for your Moscow summit are reaching full
stride. We want to use the visit to review progress across our full
agenda and focus the work of both sides as we move into the final
stretch.
One concrete result of the visit will be the announcement of dates for
your Moscow trip. Shevardnadze
stated publicly when I was in Moscow last month that this was his
intent. We are thinking in terms of a White House joint announcement
following your Wednesday3 meeting and lunch with
Shevardnadze.
Substantively, arms control will have its usual strong claim on our
attention during the visit. Gorbachev’s response to your private message on START4
suggests he shares your view that our objective should be a good
treaty—a view you can underscore to Shevardnadze.
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The fact that Soviet negotiators tabled critical documentation in Geneva
last week, and the businesslike way they have recently been addressing
the issues, suggests their instructions are to go for an agreement.
Shevardnadze and I will review
in detail the joint draft texts on verification which our
START
negotiators will have pulled together, and can try to eliminate
some brackets. We may be able to put to bed the difficult question of a
counting rule for ALCM’s, disposing of
the Soviet demand for an 1,100 ALCM
sublimit in the process. I expect we will continue to disagree over how
to treat SLCM’s, but we may be able to
have a constructive discussion on mobile missiles and will make another
stab at nailing down ICBM sublimits.
On Defense and Space, we will press our case for
a separate agreement based on the Washington summit language, and share
further our ideas on a predictability package if it’s ready.
We will urge the Soviets to respond promptly—if they have not already
done so—to our protocols for improving verification of the two
unratified nuclear testing treaties. We need
agreement soon if you and Gorbachev are to exchange instruments of ratification on
this and a related treaty in Moscow, as Shevardnadze and I agreed to shoot for last month. We
will also be prepared to exchange views on chemical
and conventional weapons, but expect no major moves on either
side.
Regional issues will loom large. It is unlikely that agreement will have
been reached on an Afghanistan settlement, and
Shevardnadze will seek to
saddle us with the blame. We need to make him understand in unequivocal
terms that we cannot guarantee an agreement that has us cutting off aid
to the freedom fighters while Soviet arms continue to flow to Kabul. If
Moscow hangs tough on this point, they will indeed, as Gorbachev has said, have to make their
own arrangements.
Unless the Soviets have moved to honor their repeated assurances that
they will work with us on a second Gulf resolution, our discussion on
the Iran-Iraq war will also have to be sharp. We
can make the point that their efforts to play all sides against the
middle at the U.N. raise questions in our mind as to how they could play
a constructive role in any Middle East peace
process. Dick Murphy will have
personally briefed Shevardnadze
on my Middle East trip, and, in the wake of Shamir’s visit, I will
outline our views of how, precisely, Moscow could make a positive
contribution to bringing peace to the region. We can also continue our
exchange of views on Southern Africa, Asia, and
Central America—where we will want to lay down a firm marker on
Soviet/Cuban meddling in Panama.
Our human rights strategy will require little fine
tuning. You and I can lead off our discussions with Shevardnadze by stressing the
importance of progress in such areas as emigration and release of
prisoners of conscience to sustainable movement in other parts of our
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agenda. We should also
press for resolution of the 16 cases we have identified as of particular
interest to us. This month we will hold the first of a series of
high-level U.S.-Soviet “roundtables” on
such issues as psychiatric abuse, demonstrating graphically how far our
dialogue has come in an area the Soviets once said was none of our
business. We would prefer that the roundtable be completed before the
Ministerial, but it may have to be held while Shevardnadze is here.
Shevardnadze’s visit will be an
opportunity to take stock of progress on bilateral
issues which could figure in a Moscow summit. Charlie Wick has asked that you and I
make a strong pitch for agreement in principle on the establishment of
cultural centers in Washington and Moscow. We
have long supported this, and it makes sense to take advantage of Soviet
interest in a successful summit to go for it now.
