117. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)1
SUBJECT
- Gorbachev, Ligachev, and Implications for Us
I am encouraged that the attached article caught the President’s attention.2 We need constantly to factor a troubled and uncertain Moscow political scene into our plans for the next six months or so.
The Washington Times piece is one of the more extreme depictions that I have seen of Ligachev’s challenge to Gorbachev; most analysts would say it exaggerates. There is little doubt now, however, that there is such a challenge, that its exact character is very important, and that our inability to establish its exact character is a measure of how little we really know about Kremlin politics . . . despite glasnost.
The best insider reports I have heard (from the Moscow correspondent of L’Unita) jibe with most intelligence and public information: Gorbachev, tutored by his ideological advisor and Politburo colleague Yakovlev, is for “radical”, systemic, and even political reform. What kind of reform exactly remains to be defined; but it’s scaring the hell out of the Party. Ligachev, on the other hand, wants a more limited reform of economic administration such as Kosygin tried unsuccessfully in the 1960s, but without the glasnost and diffusion of political authority that the Gorbachev approach seems to portend. The bureaucrats and party hacks want no reform, but are probably lining up with Ligachev as a tactical expedient. The Yeltsin affair was one skirmish in a mounting struggle. Gorbachev lost—not power so much as policy momentum; Ligachev gained.
This said, there are important countervailing points to be made. Gorbachev and Ligachev agree that some reform is needed, and they know they must overcome the resistance of Neanderthal bureaucrats and a resentful population to make anything work. They also agree that the USSR needs Detente Two from the US to make any reform formula work for the next ten years. Finally, they are capable of working together, as indicated by the fact that Gorbachev chairs the Politburo [Page 684] and Ligachev chairs the Secretariat, apparently a pattern that started when Brezhnev was ill. Gorbachev’s own willingness to compromise in the conservative direction has been demonstrated.
The next six months are going to be a very critical phase. In June Gorbachev will chair an unusual CPSU Conference—like a Congress only bigger and not a regular gathering—to debate the scope of reform, especially as it affects the role and the make up (cadres) of the Party. The run up and the meeting will show whether the “radical reforms” Gorbachev has touted are back on track or stalled, and how his own efforts to build a power base are faring.
How does this affect us?
First, we have to be mentally and politically ready to accept real uncertainty about the future of Soviet politics. This means, for example, a high likelihood of puzzling twists and turns over the next six months. More seriously, it means that the United States cannot gamble on what it believes to be Gorbachev’s policies continuing indefinitely into the future. This has a bearing on INF ratification: No one can really be certain that the USSR will fully and diligently implement the very unusual inspection provisions in the years ahead. That’s no reason to vote against ratification. It is an added reason to plan programs to enforce implementation and react to non-compliance. It also should encourage us to gain some practical experience with the INF verification regime before trying to apply it to START.
Second, troubled domestic politics give Gorbachev added incentives to pursue inexpensive successes in foreign policy. That’s one reason why he was happy with a soft-ball summit in December. He probably wants another successful summit on the eve of his critical party conference in June. This should—but not necessarily will—deter him from an all-or-nothing rush to a START agreement this spring. He wants a START agreement to cap this summit and definitively to usher in Detente Two with all its political effects in the US and Europe. This would make it very hard for any successor to the President to continue his hard-line policies. At the same time, a ratifiable START agreement will be very hard—I personally believe impossible—to negotiate in six months. Gorbachev is not in political shape to make large concessions to speed the process. My worry is that a crash effort to achieve the nearly impossible could lead either to an unratifiable treaty or to a crack-up failure that polarizes the 1988 election debate over who screwed up Detente Two.
Were Gorbachev’s domestic situation fully under control, he might favor the latter outcome. In fact, as recently as a year ago, the Intelligence Community judged he was aiming for this as one tolerable outcome to his policy toward the Reagan Administration. Now I’m less sure he can take the risks involved: A possible swerve of US politics [Page 685] back to the Right, or, more likely, a long hiatus in the politics of arms control as the next president, of either party, sorts through the debris left by failure to achieve a ratifiable START agreement in early 1988.
This means, it seems to me, that Gorbachev has an interest in maximizing continuity and steadiness which we ought to encourage. We should work for a START agreement with all deliberate speed, but take the greatest care on both sides that what we do achieve, even though short of a final agreement, will survive our elections and Soviet politics, and be there to pick up in 1989.3
- Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Chron Files, January-February 1988 (1). Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Rodman, Rostow, Linhard, and Ledsky. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Powell saw it.↩
- Attached but not printed is an article by Martin Sieff, “Ideologist Appears Ready to Challenge Gorbachev,” (Washington Times, December 21, 1987, p. A8)↩
- On January 5, the President received a national security briefing in the White House Oval Office that included Powell, Negroponte, Ermarth, Howard Baker, and Duberstein. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) In his diary entry, Reagan wrote: “Colin brought in our expert on Soviet U. He sees a split developing between Gorbachev & Ligachev. We’ll soon see an Ec. plan to make Soviet enterprises self supporting. In June the once in every 4 yr’s. Soviet Cong. will meet. There should be some hint as to division in Soviet U. under the Glasnost plans.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Vol. II, November 1985–1989, p. 821) On January 6, Reagan met with Shultz, Howard Baker, Duberstein, and Powell from 1:04 to 1:36 p.m. According to Powell’s handwritten notes, the basic thrust of the conversation was that the “next 6–8 months can be very fruitful,” but that the administration should avoid “détente.” (Reagan Library, Powell Files, George Shultz (Sec. State)(1))↩