Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

100. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 24, 1987, 10:20 a.m.–1:05 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• Summit schedule, INF

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • NSC Advisor Powell
  • Asst. Sec. Ridgway
  • Amb. Matlock
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (notetaker)
  • Mr. Zarechnak (interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Dep. FornMin Adamishin
  • Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko
  • Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov
  • Unidentified Soviet notetaker
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by noting that most of the program for General Secretary Gorbachev’s Washington visit had been agreed the day before. As for Mrs. Gorbachev, she would participate in all events in the official program, with the exception of the General Secretary’s meetings with the President. The Soviet side understood that Mrs. Reagan would also offer tea to Mrs. Gorbachev. Also possible were a visit to the Library of Congress, the National Gallery of Art, perhaps a trade center. Mrs. Gorbachev also expected to take a tour of the city. Specific times for such events could be determined later.

THE SECRETARY said this all sounded good. He noted that Ridgway had just reminded him that a Soviet exhibition would be in Washington at the time under the General Exchanges agreement. Mrs. Gorbachev might be interested in visiting the site. SHEVARDNADZE said he would make a note of this, but pointed out that time was limited.

In any case, he continued, the Soviet advance team would return to Washington about November 27. It might include Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, who would have final Soviet suggestions for the program. THE SECRETARY said in that case the U.S. side would await his arrival before proceeding with planning for Mrs. Gorbachev’s schedule. SHEVARDNADZE agreed that this was the best approach.

As for the question of contacts with Congress, Shevardnadze recalled that the U.S. had ruled out what he called the “first option”—an address to a joint session of Congress. As far as the Soviet side was concerned, the “second option” suggested by the Secretary the day before was not satisfactory.

Perhaps there was a third option: the ministers could agree that the General Secretary would have contacts with Congress, but the form and venue for those contacts could be considered at a later date. Perhaps, for example, the General Secretary might invite Congressional leaders to visit him at the Soviet Embassy, as would the Vice President. Shevardnadze thought such an arrangement would not be inappropriate, particularly in view of the precedent established for the Vice President. It would, moreover, eliminate a number of problems of concern to both sides.

To prevent the usual wave of speculation, however, both sides would have to stick to a common line with respect to the Congressional side of Gorbachev’s program. Shevardnadze proposed that they simply say that the rest of his program was very full, that there was little time available, and that his five meetings with the President were the main focus of the visit. Again, the Vice President’s breakfast at the Soviet Embassy would help establish a precedent for any meetings there which Gorbachev might have with Congressional leaders.

Emphasizing that the idea he had just elaborated was his own, and had, he said, occurred to him that very morning, Shevardnadze suggested that, for the moment, the two sides inform the press that there would be contacts, and that the form of those contacts would be determined later. That was all that needed to be said.

THE SECRETARY asked if his understanding was correct that Shevardnadze’s idea did not yet reflect a hard preference. SHEVARDNADZE said it reflected his preference.

THE SECRETARY commented that the sooner the matter could be clarified, the better. Any lack of clarity would lead to speculation. If this was the way the Soviet side wanted to handle the matter, it should be brought to the attention of Congress and the press.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if the Secretary believed that Congress might feel that the executive branch was making the decision for them were the Secretary to accept such an approach.

THE SECRETARY said that that was not the way it would happen. He would have to tell Congress that Gorbachev had decided he did not wish to accept Congress’s invitation to come to the Hill, but rather wished to extend an invitation of his own to the leadership. The Secretary could not accept such an invitation for the leadership. It would be their call. He was sure they would come, but also sure that they would be disappointed that the General Secretary had not accepted their invitation.

The Secretary recalled that, in seeking to structure a Congressional program satisfactory to Gorbachev, the U.S. side had had three objectives: to give him a chance to meet with the leaders of both houses; to give him a chance to meet with Senators who were members of committees relevant to the ratification of the INF treaty; and to expose him to a wider range of the membership of both houses by means of a televised address. The Secretary did not see how the final objective could be accomplished under the scenario Shevardnadze had described. Perhaps it would be possible to achieve some of these objectives by combining some of the events the Secretary had earlier proposed: perhaps Gorbachev could first meet with the leadership of both houses on the Hill and then invite certain key Senators to the Soviet Embassy.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought it best for both sides to limit themselves at this time to confirming that there would be contacts, leaving the form to be determined later. There should be a “full stop” after that statement.

As far as the Soviets side was concerned, the most appropriate format would be for Congressional leaders to come to the Soviet Embassy to see Gorbachev, as the Vice President would do. The main purpose of the General Secretary’s visit, after all, was not to have an exchange with Congress, but to meet with the President, sign the INF Treaty, and chart a course for the future. There was no need to overdramatize things if certain elements of the schedule did not work out; this happened all the time in preparing for high-level visits. As for the concerns the Secretary had expressed with respect to ratification of the INF Treaty, that was a matter between Congress and the executive branch.

THE SECRETARY observed that, for planning purposes, the U.S. side needed to be working this problem with Congress. When he returned to Washington, therefore, the Secretary would tell the Congressional leadership that he had presented to Shevardnadze the idea which had been developed with them. He would report that Gorbachev did not feel that that approach was suitable, but still wanted contacts with Congress, and wanted to invite leaders to the Embassy. The Secretary would solicit the leadership’s reactions. He cautioned that it would be better, as the problem worked itself out, were the Soviet side not in direct contact with the Hill.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviets would not be in touch with Congress. Noting that we would, THE SECRETARY said it would be well to have the clearest possible understanding of what the Soviet side considered feasible options. SHEVARDNADZE said he had given the Secretary his own preference, for contacts at the Soviet Embassy.

THE SECRETARY urged that, as Moscow considered the matter further, that it consider how attractive Congress might find the proposition of first hosting Gorbachev and then being his guest at the Soviet Embassy. The reciprocity angle could be important, and the Secretary was not certain that the Vice President’s precedent would be compelling on the Hill. SHEVARDNADZE said he doubted that such a two-tracked approach would work—there was too little time.

THE SECRETARY described a range of options which the Soviets might consider in inviting Congressional leaders to the Embassy. There was the “leadership” itself, comprising perhaps 10–12 persons from each house. There was a larger number of Senators and, in a different way, some House members, who had a special interest in arms control and related matters. And then there was the concept of having the “leaders,” supplemented by ranking members of the most important Senate committees. This would be an even larger number—35 or so persons.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would not invite so large a group. He had in mind just the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate. In response to a question from THE SECRETARY, SHEVARDNADZE confirmed that he was thinking in terms of only 2 persons. There would be plenty of opportunities to meet other members of the two houses. Symbolically, Gorbachev would pay his respects to Congress by meeting with its two most senior representatives. A similar formula could be used when the President came to Moscow—the President could meet with the leaders of, respectively, the Council of Nationalities and the Council of Soviets.

Describing briefly the interplay between party affiliation, seniority and committee structure in Congress, [the Secretary] pointed out that, in the House, a minimum of five Representatives (the Speaker, majority and minority leaders, and their whips) constituted the “leadership.” There was a similar structure on the Senate side, with the exception that there was no speaker. So, if the Soviets side limited Gorbachev’s contact to two, it would cut out seven persons properly considered part of the Congressional “leadership.” When the President met with the “joint leadership,” he normally met with about 20 people.

SHEVARDNADZE observed that he was not interested in the party structure of the Congress.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged this, but pointed out that, if Gorbachev wished to meet with the Congressional leadership, that meant a certain group. The Secretary would not speak for them. But if Gorbachev invited only Democrats, he might well find that they would consider it inappropriate to accept the invitation on grounds that it could be considered a partisan gesture. The Soviet side could do what it liked. The Secretary was only giving his best advice. But he needed a clear idea of what Moscow wanted in order to convey it to the Hill. The Congressional leadership would make the final decision. Were Gorbachev to seek a meeting only with Democrats, it would make a very “interesting” political statement.

SHEVARDNADZE said it was no more of interest to him whether a member of Congress was a Republican or Democrat than it was for the Secretary whether or not a Soviet legislative leader belonged to the CPSU. The Soviet side had a perfectly legitimate interest in inviting the Speaker of the House. Had not the Secretary himself said yesterday that—Heaven forbid the thought—if something happened to the President and Vice President, the Speaker would be next in succession.

THE SECRETARY said he withdrew. He had tried earlier to give Amb. Dubinin advice. The Ambassador had chosen not to take it. The Secretary was trying to give Shevardnadze advice. Shevardnadze was choosing not to take it. So be it.

For scheduling purposes, however, the U.S. needed to know how much time the Soviet side wished to allot to a Congressional contact. The Soviets could invite whom they wished. Congress would decide how to respond. For his part, the Secretary would simply report to the Congressional leadership that the General Secretary had not accepted the invitation they had issued, and would be in touch on his plans.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that the idea of a joint session did not originally come from Moscow. It had come from some members of Congress. Had it not become an issue of principle, the variant that the Secretary had suggested would have been fine. In explaining to Congress what had happened, the Secretary would have to make clear—and if he didn’t, the Soviets would—why the idea of a joint session had not worked out. The Soviets, for their part, would be prepared to describe why they had not been able to accept Secretary Shultz’s second variant. But such a debate could go on forever. That was why he was proposing that both sides simply say at this point that there would be contacts with Congress, with the format to be determined.

Moreover, Shevardnadze continued, if in explaining its decision on a joint session, the justification were offered that no communist leader had ever addressed Congress in joint session, it would appear somewhat strange. As for the problem of maintaining order in the chamber, such an explanation would also do little good for the common cause.

THE SECRETARY noted for the record that Ambassador Dubinin had approached him before the arrival of the Soviet advance team and indicated he had instructions to raise the issue of a joint session of Congress. The Secretary had said at that time that this would be a sensitive issue, and that the Secretary should be allowed to work the problem quietly so that, if some other format appeared to be preferable, no one would be embarrassed. The issue had nonetheless burst into the public domain, with much speculation as to whether the White House or Congress had first asked for a joint session.

That created the situation Shevardnadze was reacting to, and the Secretary understood his reaction. The U.S. had offered an alternative which, as Shevardnadze had said, the Soviet side would have found attractive had not the issue of a joint session been raised. Now, the Soviets seemed to feel it necessary to reject that alternative, and instead invite two or more people from Congress to the Embassy as a substitute. That was the General Secretary’s decision; he could invite whom he wished. Congress would decide. The Secretary’s only suggestion was that the Soviets not overreact, and that they take into account that there was something called “the leadership” which they might want to invite beyond the two Shevardnadze had mentioned.

SHEVARDNADZE repeated that, based on his two conversations the day before with Moscow, he could affirm that the Soviet leadership deemed the “second variant” suggested by the Secretary to be unsuitable. That decision had been made against the backdrop of the situation created in the U.S. with respect to a joint session. Shevardnadze said that the ideas he had shared with the Secretary about a “third variant” had been his own. He did not know how the General Secretary would react to them. That was why he had proposed a flexible formula for describing what might take place: there would be contacts with Congress, the format for those contacts would be determined later. Shevardnadze would consult with Moscow and might be in a position to confirm his proposal to the Secretary later in the day or the following morning.

THE SECRETARY asked if he was correct in assuming that, whatever the ultimate form of Gorbachev’s contacts with Congress, the Soviet side had agreed that he would meet with the President at 10:30 Wednesday morning.² SHEVARDNADZE confirmed this.

Shifting the focus a bit, THE SECRETARY noted that the ministers still needed to discuss how to order subjects for discussion by leaders, and how to organize any work they might generate. While final decisions would be made by the leaders, the Secretary offered a few suggestions.

He felt it would be good for the two leaders to start with a one-on-one. That format could, of course, be employed at the beginning of any of the five scheduled meetings. But experience had proved that it was generally preferable for the leaders to be joined by at least their foreign ministers, who could then organize any follow-up efforts. The Secretary also recalled that the format followed for several of the Geneva meetings, where there had been about six on a side, had also been productive. It would be particularly important to have present for certain discussions those who would be expected to head working groups on the subject under discussion.

SHEVARDNADZE commented that the leaders would no doubt decide how best to structure their meetings, including what role ministers should play. Certainly, when security issues were discussed, the appropriate people—Akhromeyev on the Soviet side—should be present in order to head their working groups. Other members of the delegations could also participate as necessary, depending on the leaders’ desires. But probably one plenary meeting of entire delegations would be a good thing, at either the beginning or end of the visit. In response to THE SECRETARY’s suggestion that there be both opening and closing plenaries, SHEVARDNADZE agreed that advance teams could consider this idea.

As for the sequence in which issues should be taken up, Shevardnadze proposed that the initial session be devoted to a discussion of the general state of the world in the wake of the Geneva and Reykjavik meetings. It would be important to assess the prospects opened up by the conclusion of the INF Treaty in Europe and in the world. With the elimination of INF conventional arms and the prevention of a new arms race in Europe [verification] became more important, as did the problems of tactical nuclear and conventional weapons. It would be well for the leaders to discuss these issues. Moreover, if the President were interested, the General Secretary would be prepared to engage in a discussion of military doctrine and the philosophical aspects of security in Europe and elsewhere. Without clarity of viewpoints on these kinds of issues, it would be difficult to reach agreements on conventional and chemical weapons.

At a second meeting, Shevardnadze continued, it might be possible to explore compliance problems, particularly as regards the ABM Treaty. Compliance assumed greater importance in the context of an INF Treaty ratification debate and progress on a START Treaty, and both sides could take steps to end the compliance debate. Some attention should also be given to nuclear testing, where there was now a basis for a more promising dialogue.

A third meeting could address regional, human rights and humanitarian concerns of both sides. Shevardnadze believed that there were grounds for a constructive discussion by the leaders of Afghanistan, Central America, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. Differences existed between the U.S. and Soviet approach to each of these areas, and they would continue, but bilateral exchanges of views to date had established that it was possible to arrive at mutually acceptable formulas in some cases.

Bilateral issues could also be covered at the summit. Good results had been achieved in a number of areas: space cooperation; environmental protection; maritime navigation; transportation; communications; people-to-people exchanges, including youth exchanges. So there was plenty of experience to build on.

As for the situations of the two sides’ Embassies, Shevardnadze and the Secretary had already agreed to have their Ambassadors meet during the General Secretary’s visit. The leaders should not have to take up these concerns.

Finally, for the final session, there should be some review of results during the visit. The result of such a review might be a joint statement of some sort. But, even if there were no statement, a review would be necessary. There should also be a discussion of a post-summit work program. There would be little time before the President’s visit to Moscow. There were many START issues to be resolved. So it would be important to have some agreement on how the ministers and their experts could expedite the process. Shevardnadze had said the day before that the ministers’ four meetings in three months had been a record. He was certain that they would break that record after the Washington visit. There might also be contacts between Defense Ministers during this period.

In sum, Shevardnadze concluded, these were his tentative suggestions, subject to approval by leaders. He thought, however, that they might provide useful reference points for planning purposes.

THE SECRETARY said that he agreed that it was important to have a sense of how the issues might flow to guide preparations. The subjects which Shevardnadze had laid out corresponded to the U.S. view of what the agenda should be.

As to the order in which the issues should be addressed, the Secretary believed that the guiding principle should be to allow the leaders to generate work which could be undertaken during the visit on a more or less continuous basis. That suggested that strategic arms and ABM issues should be addressed no later than Tuesday³ afternoon. (SHEVARDNADZE said, “of course.”)

Some subjects, THE SECRETARY pointed out, could be quickly dealt with by leaders, and then reflected in a joint statement or review of the results of the visit. He would put nuclear testing and nuclear non-proliferation in that category. (SHEVARDNADZE shook his head affirmatively.) THE SECRETARY noted that there was a history of good common work on NPT, and said he understood a statement on the subject was being worked up. On nuclear testing, he pointed out that impressive progress had already been achieved in the newly opened negotiations in Geneva, and expressed the view that it would be good to have presented two pending nuclear testing treaties to the Senate by the time of a Moscow summit. Perhaps Bessmertnykh could explore this with U.S. interlocutors when he was in Washington. (SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed.)

On human rights, THE SECRETARY recalled that he had made some positive public statements about the more systematic, comprehensive dialogue which was developing. But the purpose of that dialogue was results. There had been some positive results, but there was also more to be done. As Adamishin and Deputy Secretary Whitehead had just been over the relevant material, so the Secretary would not belabor it. He only wanted to emphasize that, the more the Soviets did “for their own reasons,” and the prompter, the better. The Secretary said he suspected that, as in the past, the President would want to take up human rights issues in a private setting with Gorbachev.

In the regional area, it appeared that Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and Southern Africa had emerged as potentially the most fruitful areas for discussion. Other areas should also be addressed in some measure by the leaders or foreign ministers. Before moving on to bilateral issues, the Secretary said that he wanted to return in more detail to Afghanistan and the Gulf War.

With respect to bilateral affairs, considerable progress had been made on issues which might be referred to in any joint statement. The U.S. had in mind: renewal of the World Ocean Agreement; announcement of intention to conclude negotiations at the earliest possible time on a Basic Sciences agreement and of a global climate and environmental change initiative; a reference to progress in quadripartite cooperation in the design of a fusion test reactor and to the two sides intention to hold exploratory talks on a transportation accord in January; and a review of people-to-people and cultural exchange activities. The Secretary also indicated our willingness to hold another round of talks in Washington the first week of December, observing that, if sufficient progress could be made, it might also figure in a final statement.

The Secretary proposed that USIA Director Wick meet during the summit with an appropriate Soviet interlocutor for a discussion of media access and related questions. SHEVARDNADZE said that Yakovlev should meet with Wick, as he had in Reykjavik.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed with Shevardnadze that it would be well at the summit to map out a work program for their own efforts. They both had busy schedules, and it would be a good thing to know when they would be getting together.

[At this point (12:15), Nitze and Akhromeyev entered and asked to interrupt the ministers’ meeting to make a report.]

SHEVARDNADZE, after indicating that he would first like to make a few points in response to the Secretary’s intervention, indicated that he saw no differences between his and the Secretary’s views on the sequencing and agenda of discussions during the visit.

THE SECRETARY replied that there might be a few differences of nuance. For example, we would want to explore further what the Soviet side had in mind in proposing a discussion of military doctrine. The Secretary recalled that he had read an article of Gorbachev’s on the subject in September, and pointed out that the two sides had been exchanging ideas on the offense-defense relationship over the previous year. Perhaps this could serve as the basis for a discussion at the summit.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed that this was the key question, and one which required clarity at the highest political and military levels. He emphasized the importance of Gorbachev’s concept of “sufficiency” in any attempt to end the arms race, and reiterated that the General Secretary would be prepared to address these “fundamental issues” at the summit.

As to the Secretary’s comments on the bilateral agenda, Shevardnadze noted that they agreed completely with the materials that had been prepared for his use—even the order of subjects was the same. It was clear that the many meetings which had occurred in recent months had produced results. He wondered if Akhromeyev and Nitze would be able to report the same.

On the question of a possible joint statement, Shevardnadze said he could tell the Secretary a secret—a great deal of work was being done in Moscow to prepare language covering all of the areas the Secretary had mentioned: arms control; confidence building measures; bilateral issues. Regional issues were also being carefully examined to come up with language which would be acceptable not only to the U.S. and Soviet Union, but to third countries as well. When Bessmertnykh arrived with the Soviet advance party, he would have proposals to share. ADAMISHIN added that, through the good efforts of the U.S. side, Soviet representatives had a good sense of what the U.S. felt would be appropriate. SHEVARDNADZE suggested that it might prove desirable to organize working groups in Washington, as had been done in Geneva and Reykjavik, to prepare language on specific issues. Shevardnadze would suggest groups on political-military issues, regional affairs, and perhaps humanitarian questions.

THE SECRETARY said that any preparatory work on a joint statement should be done quietly, so that the document could, as in the past, appear to flow in form and in reality from the decisions of the leaders. This was the way the Geneva joint statement had emerged; we seemed to be on a similar track for Washington.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed with the Secretary with respect to the need to schedule more precisely their future meetings. Both had busy schedules, and Shevardnadze was already hearing complaints from other foreign ministers—most of them U.S. allies—that he was never available. It would be good to have a framework for any meetings after the Washington visit.

Shevardnadze then asked Akhromeyev and Nitze to report.

At Akhromeyev’s suggestion, Nitze led off by noting that good, solid progress had been achieved during the course of the morning. Treaty language was being worked in detail. All the data had not yet been received, but the Soviet side had promised it by well before the summit.

Four issues, Nitze explained, had remained outstanding prior to the morning’s session:

—On non-production of ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM’s), there was agreement on the continuous portal method, but disagreement over the location of site which could be monitored by the Soviets in the U.S. The Soviet side wanted the Hercules, Utah plant; the U.S. had selected the Longhorn, Texas facility from the Soviet list.

—On non-production of ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM’s) launchers, there had been agreement on locations (Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union; and General Dynamics in San Diego); but there had been disagreement on methods. The U.S. could accept only non-continuous monitoring by onsite inspections; the Soviets insisted on continuous monitoring.

—On GLBM range, the U.S. insisted on use of the maximum tested range plus 10%; the Soviets on the maximum tested range alone.

—On inspection of SS–25 bases other than SS–20 bases converted after November 1, the U.S. sought enhanced use of national technical means (NTM); the Soviets were not prepared to enhance.

As a result of the morning’s discussions, two of these four items had been agreed: the Soviet side had agreed to non-continuous monitoring of GLCM launcher non-production; the U.S. had accepted the Soviet approach to GLCM range determination.

In the fourth area—inspection of SS–25 bases—the U.S. had offered a number of modifications to its position designed to move it toward that of the Soviet side. It had reduced the number of inspections required and shortened the period in which they would occur. The Soviet side had clung to the position that enhanced NTM was unacceptable in principle, making a solution to the problem impossible.

On the first issue—GLBM non-production, the Soviet side had urged that the U.S. substitute for the Longhorn plant a facility capable of producing GLBM boosters.

AKHROMEYEV said he would not repeat what Nitze had said. All issues had been resolved but two: enhanced NTM verification of SS–25 bases where no SS–20’s had ever been deployed; and a Soviet right to monitor a U.S. facility capable of producing Pershing II stages or boosters.

Akhromeyev said he nonetheless felt that the discussion had opened up some possibilities. Before exploring them further, the delegations had decided to seek guidance from their ministers. Thus, Akhromeyev proposed separate fifteen minute caucuses, after which the working groups might reconvene and, hopefully, reach agreement.

After a brief discussion, it was decided that the Soviet delegation would caucus, and advise the U.S. side of its decisions. The U.S. delegation would then return to its own mission to meet, and negotiations could resume after lunch.

[At 1:00, the Soviet participants, plus Akhromeyev returned to the conference room, where original U.S. participants were joined by Kampelman, Glitman, and Nitze.]

AKHROMEYEV proposed the following proposal to resolve the two questions which Nitze and he had earlier identified as not agreed:

—With respect to SS–25 bases where SS–20’s had not been previously deployed, the Soviet side was prepared to agree to enhanced NTM as the U.S. had proposed for three years—the period in which INF missiles would be eliminated—or less, if a START agreement were signed and ratified. The number of such inspections would be no more than 6 per year, for a total of 18 inspections over three years. The inspecting side would designate the bases to be inspected.

—On GLBM production facilities, the U.S. was aware of Soviet views with respect to the facility in Utah. If, however, it was not possible to satisfy Soviet desires in this respect, the Soviet Union could accept the site in Orlando.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that Disney World was located there. AKHROMEYEV said the inspectors could check it out. He was not interested.

NITZE asked Akhromeyev to clarify that the Soviet position referred to the Martin Marietta plant near Orlando. AKHROMEYEV did so. NITZE pointed out that all the machinery relevant to the production of P–2 boosters had been removed from that plant. Did this fact have any impact on the Soviet position?

AKHROMEYEV suggested that perhaps in that case the U.S. would prefer to agree to Hercules.

NITZE noted that inspection of the Martin Marietta facility would demonstrate that no P–2 motors were being produced. But he wanted to be sure that Akhromeyev understood the situation there. POWELL said that the equipment might still be in place, but production had ceased.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the meeting break for lunch.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, but in closing emphasized that the proposal Akhromeyev had just made was the maximum the Soviet side could accept. As it was, he and the Marshal might have to seek political asylum in Switzerland.

THE SECRETARY suggested he seek it in Orlando instead.

The meeting concluded on that note.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Geneva—11/23–24/87. Secret. Drafted by Parris. All brackets, except those that indicate the omission of material, and blank underscores are in the original. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission.
2. December 9.
3. December 8.