Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983

57. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation¹

Washington, May 23, 1981

PARTICIPANTS

• Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
• Senator Charles Percy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SUBJECT

• Senator Percy’s Luncheon with Ambassador Dobrynin on Saturday, May 23

Senator Percy called to fill me in on his luncheon at the Soviet Embassy with Ambassador Dobrynin May 23. I had previously given Percy some suggested themes and questions for the occasion, which he said he had used, adding a few points of his own. Percy and Dobrynin were accompanied by their wives.

Percy said he had begun the substantive conversation by expressing concern about Soviet rhetoric, particularly the personal charges made by the Soviets against the President and the Secretary. Percy expressed his hope that these Soviet charges could be stopped, adding that they could lead to no good. Dobrynin became emotional on this issue, remarking that the Reagan Administration itself had taken the initiative in launching personal attacks against the Soviet leaders; he particularly objected to charges that the Soviets supported international terrorism. Both Percy and Dobrynin agreed that it would be better to tone down the rhetoric on both sides, and both would do all they could to reduce verbal attacks.

Dobrynin remarked that most press accounts of the Brezhnev speech were inaccurate.² No conference specifically about Lebanon was mentioned by Brezhnev. The Soviets would like to participate in a conference on a number of issues, including the Middle East. Dobrynin added that U.S. policy towards the present Middle East situation is too heavily influenced by Israel, which makes things extraordinarily difficult. He said Begin’s bid for re-election has caused him to take rash actions.

Percy complained about Soviet media criticism of the Habib mission and asked why the Soviets had not been more helpful. Dobrynin seemed unsure of himself on this and had no good answer to this question. Percy felt that in reality Dobrynin understood the importance of Habib’s mission and wished him well.

With regard to an international conference, Percy asked why the Soviets did not concentrate more on Afghanistan. Afghanistan, Percy said, had so poisoned the atmosphere and harmed Moscow. Dobrynin answered by saying that the huge military build-up in the Persian Gulf area has hindered concentration on Afghanistan. He then said that after all, the Soviets had not yet built a long reaching airbase in Afghanistan that could reach throughout the Middle East. (Percy commented to me that he had seen the airbase built in Afghanistan at Kandahar with AID money years ago. There is no question, he said, but that it is susceptible to expansion.) Dobrynin said any international conference could begin with Afghanistan and the Gulf area. He repeated standard Soviet references to the need for stopping interference against Afghanistan from Pakistan.

Dobrynin said the West’s advantage over the Soviets in TNF was already 1½ to 1. Percy responded by saying that the proximity of the Soviet Union to Europe must be taken into account when speaking of any numbers. The U.S. and its allies must have a deterrent force in being, since reinforcements would be slow in coming compared with what the Soviets could bring in. Dobrynin remarked that TNF talks were desirable. He only wished more could be done between now and September and couldn’t see why we had to wait so long. The U.S., Dobrynin said, constantly hides behind the excuse that its position is still under review, but the problem has been there for years and the U.S. should be prepared to move now.

When Percy brought up the subject of a Brezhnev succession, Dobrynin became very guarded. Dobrynin did say that a successor might well not be as interested in arms limitation talks as Brezhnev. This is why Brezhnev constantly alludes to resumption of talks. He is personally devoted to and dedicated to arms limitation.

Dobrynin added that part of the problem of resumption of talks is that every time a problem comes up—like the Middle East situation—it is converted by the U.S. into a Soviet problem. This has hindered our sitting down to discuss matters seriously.

Dobrynin displayed uncertainty and frustration about the direction of the Reagan Administration. He was quite skeptical, adding that things will get worse before they get any better.

When asked by Percy whether the Brezhnev speech in Tbilisi included any new positions, Dobrynin said it was a further development of the 26th Party Congress. The most important point to remember is that it is crucial to take up matters relating to arms control now—time is of the essence.

Percy inquired about the proposal for a step-by-step withdrawal in Afghanistan, but Dobrynin had no specifics to add.

Percy stated that our desire for build-up in the Persian Gulf area would not be as great if there had been no Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and stepped-up Soviet loans and military aid to India. This has frightened the Pakistanis. We are doing all we can to restrain the Pakistanis from going ahead with their plans for nuclear development, but the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the refugee problem makes Pakistan nervous about its own security. Percy urged that the Soviets try to restrain the Indians from further nuclear testing. Another Indian nuclear explosion would be disastrous, leading the Pakistanis to take matters into their own hands. This problem between India and Pakistan is one of the things we should be talking about, he said.

While discussing the reciprocal extension of CBMs, Dobrynin said the Soviets made the proposal and are now waiting for the U.S. to come back with counter proposals. Percy got the impression that the Soviets are waiting for the actual CDE conference and don’t expect the U.S. to say much until then.

Dobrynin was very interested in the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR. When Percy asked what names Dobrynin had heard, Dobrynin mentioned Scowcroft, Kendall and Hartman. Dobrynin added that if the U.S. were looking for a professional, Hartman would be an “extremely good man.”

Dobrynin questioned Percy about General Rowny’s role in ACDA. Will he be part of ACDA or act independently? Percy said his own feeling was that Rowny would be part of a team and that this seemed to be working out. Percy further added that during the course of the confirmation hearings he would urge that the U.S. move soon to serious arms limitation discussions.

Dobrynin doubted the commitment of the Reagan Administration to arms control agreements, noting in particular the failure to push for ratification of the threshold treaties and the PNE treaty.

Reverting to U.S. plans for TNF modernization, Dobrynin reminded Percy that Europe was only four minutes from the Soviet Union. If the Soviets see a missile coming, Dobrynin remarked, they have only four minutes to decide what to do. He could not emphasize more strongly how the Soviet people felt about this. Irina Dobrynin joined in at this point, asking Percy whether he had any idea of the average Soviet perception of the American role. The Soviet people feel that the U.S. is bearing in on them and feel encircled by enemies. They also are concerned by the level of criticism of the Soviet Union in the U.S.

Dobrynin was vague about his long-range plans but said he planned to spend the summer in Moscow. His wife is leaving for Moscow next week. Dobrynin invited Percy to join him at the Soviet eastern shore estate for further discussions after Dobrynin’s return this fall, which led Percy to the conclusion that Dobrynin plans to be around for a while longer.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Walter Stoessel Files, Lot 82D307, Box 3, “P—Stoessel Classified Chron 1981 Jan–June.” Confidential. Drafted by Friedt; approved by Stoessel. Copies sent to Bremer, Eagleburger, and German.
2. On May 22, Brezhnev delivered a speech in Tbilisi, Georgia, which the New York Times reported as calling for an international conference on the Middle East. See Serge Schmemann, “Brezhnev Warns of Mideast Dangers,” New York Times, May 23, 1981, p. 4.