Derek Leebaert dropped by this afternoon and left this fuller version of his
talk with Arbatov.2 It
reinforces my feeling that Arbatov is
deeply frustrated by his inability to communicate with U.S. Government
officials, which is his stock in trade, while his arch-rival Dobrynin has contacts. He pretends to speak
for the Soviet Government whereas he really speaks on his own behalf. His
advice to Leebaert to use KGB channels in
the Soviet Embassy rather than Dobrynin’s is amusing. So is his uncertainty whether you are
quite as hard-line as I. (C)
Attachment
Report Prepared by Derek Leebaert3
This is a rough draft report of specific conversation in Moscow with
G. Arbatov. A detailed essay
that covers the entire trip is now being prepared.
[Page 130]
This is a report of a two hour talk with Georgy Arbatov on Friday 17
April. 12:00 through 2:00 had originally been set aside for a second
one-on-one conversation with Bogdanov. We had spent approximately four and half hours
the preceeding Wednesday talking together.
After delivering a morning lecture at the USA Institute on the 17th, I was told by Bogdanov that something “extremely
important” would take place instead. He and I then went into Arbatov’s office. I had been told on my
arrival (Tuesday 14th April) that I “might” meet the Institute director
later in my eight day visit. By 17 April I was told that Arbatov had been back for 3 days.
The details of the conversation with Arbatov are related below. There were no more than six
one-sentence interjections by Bogdanov during these two hours; he was nervous and
fidgety throughout. Arbatov
stressed from the beginning that I was the first visitor with
Administration contacts and a Republican identification to visit the
Soviet Union since the inauguration. He said that he knew that I was
visiting the Institute in a private capacity and that I was not a part
of the Administration. Nevertheless, he emphasized strongly this part of
“being the first” and of being representative of both a new sort of
policy-maker in Washington and of a new foreign policy perspective. He
said that he understood that I knew his son from the United States and
that I would be seeing him in Moscow.
The discussion followed with only one interruption for tea to be
delivered. After Bogdanov and I
left the office together, he took me aside in the hallway and again said
how “extremely important” the conversation with Arbatov had been. He said that he would
explain why in his office in an hour and forty-five minutes later when I
returned from my lunch with Sergey Plekhanov (head of general studies of
U.S. domestic politics).
Arbatov’s themes concerned the
potential consequences of what the highest Soviet officials see as
undiluted personal insults, irresponsible new U.S. political actors, and
the termination of all channels of communication. The Soviet leadership,
he argued, cannot bear this indefinitely. What many of them perceive is
entirely new U.S. political/military direction of which intemperate
statements from Washington are only a small part. Major Soviet foreign
policy decisions have to be made, and their formulations cannot help but
be affected by this nearly unprecedented U.S.-Soviet environment.
He emphasized that this was not time to quarrel over the bureaucratic
politics of how influential his Institute may be or what personal policy
influence he has on the highest leadership. The problem is that the
leadership is under great pressure to reply forcefully. It is not simply
that the leadership is running out of patience (there are reserves
left), but rather that Moscow is far less unitary than Washington thinks
[Page 131]
and that the pressures are
increasing. They need a signal—any at all—that there are possibilities
of working with the new Administration. They need some light.
A signal is needed because of those already conveyed by Moscow. Does
Washington not understand the Percy visit or the 26th Party Congress speech, he asked.
It would have been far easier for Brezhnev to make a strident “tighten the belt” speech in
February. The Secretary could have been more popular had he done this
because such a speech would have both addressed foreign policy and would
have helped explain the domestic problems that were acknowledged
frankly. Arbatov apparently
advised him not to reply in kind because Brezhnev would be playing into the hands of those people
in Washington with whom the Soviet Union cannot do business. There are
some people who one cannot deal with and will stab you in the back.
Allen, Weinberger, Pipes, Perle (responsible for the worst of the Jackson policies), and Lehman were
cited as examples although Arbatov acknowledged that he was uncertain whether the
first two were as close-minded as the others.
He said that the leadership obviously recognizes that there have been
U.S. officials with whom it could deal. Kissinger and Hyland were mentioned and he asked about the influence
of Sonnenfeldt. But the criticism
of the new U.S. security policy officials continued. He said that he
told the leadership that he had never seen such a low intellectual level
in Washington. There is an obvious understanding that U.S. leaders have
to pay off political debts by giving people positions but this was going
too far (although some extremists had admittedly been excluded). But how
long can the current situation continue, and what will be the results?
What would happen if the Yom Kippur War occurred today? He said that he
had a real fear of the consequences at this moment of any confrontation
in the third world.
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union like all states is made in day to
day decisions which this environment is affecting. Moreover, he
repeated, there are pressures for less restraint. (When asked to be
specific he spoke of replies in kind, that SALT could not just lie, and that decisions would have to
be made.) At what he called the most basic level, Arbatov showed a file of supposedly
indignant letters he had received from readers because of his moderate
writings in Pravda. He still says that he
believes that the Administration has not yet reached any policy,
although this is an optimistic view. But what will happen in the
meantime? There are people in the Soviet Union who are talking about
fascist influences in Washington.
The lack of U.S.-Soviet communication resulting from the current climate
arose throughout. He spoke of an obvious recognition of new political
actors “such as you” as opposed to the others that the Soviet
[Page 132]
Union had been dealing with.
He had chosen not to communicate with them until recently (the Kintner discussion in December had some
positive results) and now there are no formal or informal contacts with
the Administration. They were surprised by comments from Weinberger, but hope that Meese and Bush who do not yet seem to have such views will be
influential. All channels have been cut off, and this includes not even
going to Geneva. The absence of a U.S. Ambassador was noted and that,
after all, it is the United States that chooses to deal with Dobrynin because he is so competent.
With some few exceptions, the U.S. Ambassadors have not been valuable or
very bright. What is happening with Scowcroft?
Random points were included in the conversation either as illustrations
or as asides. They included: The U.S. is going to lift the grain embargo
anyway (although Arbatov would
tell the leadership to make it clear that they could get along without
it); the Soviet Union got along well for sixteen years without U.S.
diplomatic relations and could do without them now; the stridency of
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were noted, and he said that Voice
of America is important; Arbatov
would like to advise the Soviet leaders to let the U.S. proceed with
TNF because it will tear the
Alliance apart; any recent stridency from Tass is blamed on inadequate
night editing of the wire reports; and the danger of combining U.S.
weapon developments with the existing rhetoric. And the cheap public
diplomacy of the parking garage space and of the visa extension are
minor events that were seen as public humiliations of the Soviet
Union.
Arbatov presented the common view
of an encircled Soviet Union facing not only the U.S. but two of its
nuclear allies as well as another ally with an army that is better than
that of the U.S. TNF was addressed
briefly and reference was made to the moratorium proposal. It was
implied that once talks started and Soviet deployments had halted, the
U.S. could then begin introducing some of its own weaponry without
Soviet resumption. But it was reemphasized that they could do more with
defense, by pleas for national sacrifice as they have done in the
past.
There is considerable anxiety that Soviet signals and the difficulties of
restraint are not seen in Washington because people are preoccupied with
other concerns, are simply too inexperienced, or already have closed
minds on how to proceed.
Arbatov asked that the contents
of this discussion be relayed to the highest U.S. officials (Meese and Bush were implied) and not just turned over to Allen and Pipes. (Haig was
not stressed, and it seemed that Arbatov was uncertain about his influence and tenure.)
Arbatov said that “we do not
want to use Dobrynin for this”
and that there are no ways to communicate. I was asked to reply through
Soviet diplo
[Page 133]
matic pouch about
the response to this discussion. I was asked to do this as soon as
possible and that no one would need to know of such a communication.
Two hours later I met with Bogdanov in his office. He said that Arbatov had met with Secretary
Brezhnev that morning and
that Brezhnev had been personally
reading Arbatov’s cables from the
U.S. Bogdanov reemphasized the
“extreme importance of what just happened” (e.g. the talk with Arbatov), saying that it was by far the
most important point of the visit. He said that official channels with
the U.S. cannot be used for this.
Bogdanov said that after the
lunch he and I had two days previously, he had spoken with several
important people in the government. He said that it is the highest level
of the Soviet government that knows of this first quasi-official visit
and of presumed contacts with the Administration. He made it explicit
that the highest level wanted to establish a channel of communication,
and that this is more important than ever. He said that they cannot use
the Soviet embassy for this and that a reply is hoped for through
pouch.
