230. Memorandum From Richard Pipes
of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Clark)1
Washington, November 3, 1982
SUBJECT
-
Brezhnev’s Speech of October
272
Brezhnev’s speech has unleashed a
flood of paper. The controversial question is: did he say something really
new which presents a fresh threat to us, or did he merely reiterate old
themes? In the two attached memoranda (Tab I, November 2; and Tab II,
October 293), State reaffirms its view that the October 27 speech
did not represent a new departure and does not presage a major military effort. I concur with
State’s evaluation on the following grounds:
—Brezhnev did not promise his
military audience to increase defense spending but urged them to improve
their performance.
—He stressed the improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations which most
likely was meant to reassure his audience that the Soviet international
situation is better than it has been for some time.
—The day after Brezhnev had
delivered his speech, Chernenko,
his closest collaborator and apparent choice for successor, spoke in
Tiflis and downplayed the U.S. military threat.
State seems correct to me in arguing that the main thrust of Brezhnev’s talk was that the Soviet armed
forces must do better with what they have rather than count on more money
and resources.
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Tab I
Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Bremer)
to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Clark)4
Washington, November 2, 1982
SUBJECT
-
Brezhnev’s Address to
Military Leaders: Why All the Confusion?
U.S. media analyses of Brezhnev’s
October 27 speech to Soviet military leaders have distorted the
substance of Brezhnev’s remarks.
Some interpretations virtually ignore the actual content of the speech.
Few show awareness of the context in which the speech was delivered.
Subsequent developments in the USSR
seem to support our view that Brezhnev’s speech disclosed no fundamental policy shifts
and was in fact addressed primarily to Brezhnev’s immediate audience, the Soviet military
establishment. For example:
—Brezhnev’s speech preceded a
major address to the same audience by Defense Minister Ustinov on “the state of combat and
political training in the army and navy and tasks of its further
perfection.” The full text of Ustinov’s remarks has not been published, perhaps
because it was sharply critical of the military (Ustinov is reputed to be a
hard-driving perfectionist). However, the initial portion, as carried on
Soviet television, indicates that Brezhnev’s remarks were intended to set the stage for
Ustinov’s critique of Soviet
military preparedness.
—The day after Brezhnev’s speech,
Brezhnev’s protege Chernenko addressed an award ceremony
in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and was a little less harsh than his
mentor in discussing the United States. In particular, Chernenko did not dwell on U.S.
military preparations.
—And, in a related development, senior members of Arbatov’s USA Institute who are currently visiting Washington
commented privately that Brezhnev’s remarks about the U.S. were blunt because of the
audience he was addressing, not because of a basic change in Moscow’s
thinking.
In light of these developments, we believe Brezhnev’s unusually stark characterization of the U.S.
military threat was in the first instance crafted to underscore the
urgency of improving deficiencies in combat and political training in
the Soviet armed forces. It did not mark a
[Page 772]
fundamental change in Moscow’s current assessment
of U.S. policy, though Chernenko’s follow-up speech did hint at Soviet toughness in
arms control negotiations and implied that Moscow would not be
intimidated by any U.S. military programs. Similarly, we continue to be
skeptical that Brezhnev’s speech
broke new ground with regard to Soviet military spending. His basic
message here was that the Soviet military-industrial complex and the
armed forces must do better with sizable resources they are currently
provided, not that they are going to receive an
even larger slice of the resource pie.