19. Memorandum From Richard Pipes
of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Allen)1
Washington, February 17, 1981
SUBJECT
I agree, in principle, with Carnes
Lord’s memorandum of February 13 (attached): it is difficult
to see how U.S.-Soviet accords of 1972–1973 could provide viable ground
rules for superpower relations. They may certainly be used to embarrass the
Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union is in a position to exploit much more
effectively this particular propaganda weapon by telling the Allies that
such a declaratory policy is merely camouflage to conceal American
unwillingness to engage in negotiations and fresh proof of U.S. lack of
constancy and serious purpose. That is, while we, by pursuing this line,
could tarnish the Soviet image, they could turn it into an effective means
of further splitting the Western alliance. (C)
One might more usefully divide general U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union
along the following lines:
1. Declare that a significant improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations requires Soviet adherence to the
accepted norms of international behavior of the kind that the Soviet
Government itself has formally subscribed to on numerous occasions,
including in the Helsinki Accords; but that
2. Specific agreements with the Soviet Union are
possible in any event provided that they are based on genuine
reciprocity and are capable of being implemented and verified. (C)
[Page 47]
I do not agree with Carnes Lord that
we must not condemn Soviet imperialism in the Third World out of concern
that we may be charged with “hypocrisy and double standards” in El Salvador.
In El Salvador we have neither troops nor secret services, as the Russians
do in South Yemen, Angola or Ethiopia: we are merely trying to prevent the
imposition, from the outside, of yet another dictatorial regime. This, in my
vocabulary, is anti-imperialism. (C)
Attachment
Memorandum From Carnes
Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)2
Washington, February 13, 1981
SUBJECT
Secretary Haig’s reported remarks
to Ambassador Dobrynin on linkage
of arms control and other agreements and Soviet international behavior
involve some fundamental policy issues and problems which require
attention.3 Unless the Secretary’s position is
suitably qualified and moderated, it could cause avoidable damage to
important U.S. interests. (C)
The Secretary’s position seems to be to hold the Soviets to a strict
interpretation of the Basic Principles of Relations statement of 1972
and the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973, and make any
kind of agreement in arms control or trade contingent on compliance with
them. Apparently, he would consider Soviet activities in Africa as well
as Afghanistan in violation of these agreements. There are several
issues here:
—Is it not desirable to distinguish between kinds of Soviet intervention
in the Third World? The invasion of Afghanistan is qualitatively more
serious than Soviet actions in Africa both by its magnitude and its
illegitimacy (ill-disguised invasion as distinct from assistance to real
governments). (C)
[Page 48]
—Is it not desirable to distinguish between kinds of agreements? Some
arms control agreements (particularly SALT but also MBFR) have
a large political dimension and are of necessity linked with the
international behavior of the parties; others are largely technical in
character, can be useful to the U.S. under almost any international
circumstances and have very low political salience (for example, the
nuclear accidents agreement of 1971 or a prospective anti-satellite
warfare agreement). (C)
—Is it not desirable to avoid reviving expectations that the Soviets will
ever agree to a code of international conduct forbidding all assistance
to “national liberation movements,” or that if they did agree (as in the
early 1970s) it would be worth anything? There may be some political
mileage to be gained from redefining “detente” in this way and using it
against the Soviets, but they have been much more adept than we in that
game, and it is arguably better simply to bury the idea. (C)
—A blanket rejection of negotiation with the Soviets unless they renounce
all activity in the Third World will cause considerable turmoil among
the West Europeans, and could accelerate the split between the U.S. and
its allies on defense, arms control and other East-West issues. (C)
—A blanket condemnation of Soviet intervention/interference in the Third
World is double-edged: it can be used to condemn U.S. involvement in El
Salvador, for example, and in general exposes the U.S. to charges of
hypocrisy and double standards. (C)
In general, undiscriminating opposition to Soviet imperial activities is
liable to weaken the U.S. case against any particular move by the
Russians. It seems especially important to stress the uniqueness of the
Afghan intervention: it is not business as usual for the Soviets—or for
the U.S. (the Vietnam analogy obscures the fact that we were invited in
by a real government). This suggests the thought that further arms
control negotiations (at any rate in the major areas) should be linked
to a resolution of the Afghan situation, but not to Soviet withdrawal
from Africa. The larger point is that the U.S. should concentrate its
fire on those cases where the Soviets are in flagrant violation of
international law and custom, while opposing other Soviet activities in
their own terms (i.e. counter-intervention in Africa, Latin America,
etc.). This course should be both more effective with third countries
and more difficult for the Soviets. (C)
