He criticizes negotiations on “any one component” with “no connection to
others”—probably referring to bombers and cruise missiles—and claims that
the “substantial” reductions we propose would be substantial only for the
Soviet side. Brezhnev again called
for preserving “positive” achievements so far—meaning the essential elements
of
[Page 549]
SALT II. He also repeated his call for a
quantitative freeze on strategic arsenals and limiting modernization as soon
as START begins. This does not seem to be
a precondition for talks, but only to “create favorable conditions” for
them. Brezhnev agreed that the time
and venue for START be discussed in the
“near future” through diplomatic channels.
Tab A
Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan4
Dear Mr. President,
With regard to your message to me of May 7, 1982 I would like above all
to emphasize that the Soviet Union—the correspondence between us being a
clear testimony thereof—has been steadily and persistently calling on
the United States to agree on joint measures aimed at effectively
bridling the arms race, first of all, in nuclear weapons.
We have been proceeding from the premise that only by moving along this
path is it possible to achieve the objective of preventing a nuclear
war, which would become an irreparable tragedy for all mankind.
Life itself puts questions of limitation and reduction of strategic arms
in the center of Soviet-American relations. We have always favored
increasingly radical steps in this direction. And it is not our fault
that the strategic arms limitation process was interrupted for a long
period of time.5
References made to this or that event on the international scene cannot
justify the lack of readiness on the part of the U.S. to resolve the
issue which you yourself justly call one of critical importance for
[Page 550]
our two countries and the
world at large. And the special responsibility of our two countries and
their leaders in this respect is certainly not a thing that has emerged
today. That responsibility existed in equal measure one year ago, a year
and a half ago. On our part we always proceeded from this premise.6
If the U.S. side has now come to understand the need to resume
negotiations on the problem of strategic arms, that in itself is a
positive fact.
Our position of principle in favor of continuing such negotiations is
surely well known to you. I can reaffirm that it has not changed. We
agree that specific questions concerning the organizational aspect of
those negotiations, including the time and venue for holding them, be
discussed in the near future through diplomatic channels.
Speaking of the coming negotiations, one can be certain that a great deal
of effort will be required to recoup for the time lost and the
opportunities missed. But that must be done. Helpful in this respect can
be, first, the preservation of whatever positive has already been
achieved through the joint efforts of our two countries in the area of
strategic arms limitation and, second, a genuinely serious willingness
to seek a mutually acceptable agreement commensurate with the scope and
significance of the truly historic task that stands before us.
In other words it is important that the negotiations be set on the right
course from the very beginning, that they be conducted constructively
without one side attempting to gain advantage in them at the expense of
the other.
I deem it necessary to say it with all clarity, since the position with
which the U.S., judging by your speech of May 9, is approaching the
negotiations cannot but cause apprehension and even doubts as to the
seriousness of the intentions of the U.S. side.7
After all, it is obvious that to isolate just any one component out of
the totality of the strategic systems and to make it a subject of
negotiations with no connection to the others, as you suggest, would
inevitably lead to a distorted picture of the balance of forces between
the sides. Thus, the “substantial” reductions the U.S. side is talking
about on the basis of the picture it has itself presented would
naturally be substantial only for the Soviet side.8
[Page 551]
Only one thing would be the result of such a one-sided approach—an
upsetting of the existing balance of forces9 and a breach of that very stability which
the U.S. side is allegedly so anxious to ensure.
There should be no misunderstanding, Mr. President: this is not a
realistic position, not the path toward agreement. Besides, as you know,
we are not the only ones who hold such a view.
We believe it is difficult to argue against the fact that, when it comes
to matters touching upon national security, neither side can allow a
tilt to be made in favor of the other and to the detriment of its
legitimate interests. We are realists and do not expect that the United
States would accept that. To an equal degree, it cannot be expected of
the Soviet Union either. I consider it necessary to state this directly,
with nothing omitted.
In your letter you mention that a possible agreement should be
understandable and acceptable to the American people. But this does not
make any more convincing the arguments for such an approach which is
clearly unacceptable to the USSR, to
the Soviet people.
Taking this opportunity, I would like to say that I found it necessary
also to express publicly in my speech on May 18, 1982 at the Komsomol
Congress, our attitude toward such a one-sided approach and our opinion
regarding the principles on which a genuinely fair and equitable
agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms should be
based.
In doing so, I also stated the readiness of the Soviet Union to reach
agreement with the United States to the effect that right now, as soon
as the negotiations begin, the strategic nature of both countries be
frozen quantitatively and that their modernization be limited to the
utmost. Such agreement would, in our view, create favorable conditions
for the negotiations and facilitate achieving the objectives therein. I
would ask you, Mr. President, carefully to consider this proposal.10
I am convinced that the American people would understand and support an
agreement between the USSR and the
USA which would be based on the
principle of equality and equal security, and which would meet the
objective of mutual limitation and reduction of strategic arms, just as
they have supported the previously reached agreements that you cited.
Soviet people—and you can take my word for that—will resolutely support
such an agreement.11
[Page 552]
And the last point. In our correspondence I have already spoken about to
whom an appeal for restraint in international affairs should be
addressed. Since you raise that subject again, I shall only say, without
repeating myself, that it is precisely of the U.S. that we, and indeed
other countries, expect restraint and a constructive approach both to
issues of bilateral relations and to fundamental international problems,
above all to those related to limiting the arms race and strengthening
common security.
We, of course, are giving and will continue to give a proper evaluation
to unacceptable manifestations in U.S. policy as well as to the
incessant attacks made regarding the Soviet Union. But we, on our part,
have been seeking neither sharp polemics nor confrontation.
You may be assured, Mr. President, that a readiness to deal on an equal
basis, to respect the interests of each other, and to develop mutual
trust, will meet a most positive response on the part of the Soviet
Union.
We will, as before, continue to do all we can so that people can look
into the future with confidence and calm, without fearing for the threat
of war which is not needed equally—I repeat, equally—either by the
Soviet or the American people.
Sincerely,
