151. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin March 16
I met with Dobrynin late yesterday evening at his request, and he gave me a copy of Brezhnev’s March 15 speech2 and made some points [Page 503] with reference to the topics we discussed March 3.3 I let the speech lie on the table; the points were more interesting.
He began with the general point that the Soviets agree with us about the importance of reciprocity, restraint and willingness to engage in “joint and parallel efforts” to resolve “pressing international problems”. But he insisted we must move forward simultaneously on various issues and not pick and choose issues critical to only one side, and complained I had left out strategic arms limitation and reduction, the Middle East and continuing the Helsinki process. We have wasted a whole year, he said. I agreed emphatically, and urged the Soviets to stop making trouble close to us, noting we could do the same if we wished. At that point he sweetened and did what he could to demonstrate flexibility on the basically rigid points he had been given.
On Poland, he complained about pressure, deadlines and conditions, but then argued that progress is being made in each of the three condition areas and that the Polish leadership intends to go farther, though at a pace only they can decide. I urged release of Walesa and scoffed when he claimed in reply they do not control that decision.
On arms control, Dobrynin commented only that he could see no chance for progress on INF until it was paired with START.
On Afghanistan he repeated that the Soviets are willing to talk but had nothing new to offer on substance. On Cuba and Southern Africa, he also stuck to Soviet positions “of principle”. On the other hand, with regard to both he claimed the Soviets would not interfere with whatever we can work out (including on the question of arms shipments to Cuba), and on Southern Africa he said the Soviet “understanding” is that a basis for mutual action exists.
On balance, this response and Dobrynin’s evident desire to appear flexible despite a tough-sounding brief leave me not unhopeful. The fact that Poland is an obstacle to good discussion in a variety of areas appears to be sinking even further in, and we should keep talking on selected topics to put their professions of flexibility to the test and thus keep the pressure on.
- Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, 1983–1989, Haig, Secretary of State (5). Secret. Simons’s draft memorandum of conversation for Haig’s March 16 meeting with Dobrynin is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box 71, March 16, 1982.↩
- See Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Dismisses Brezhnev Plan As Propaganda,” New York Times, March 17, 1982, p. A1.↩
- See Document 148.↩