Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

90. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 3, 1982

SUBJECT

• Private Proposal for a “No First Use” Nuclear Weapons Doctrine

“The time has come for careful study of the ways and means of moving to a new (NATO) alliance policy and doctrine: that nuclear weapons will not be used unless an aggressor should use them first.” This proposal is argued in an article co-authored by former Secretary of Defense Bob McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan and Gerry Smith to be published in Foreign Affairs next Wednesday.² Given the simplicity of the concept, the standing of the authors in the national security community and the existence of an anti-nuclear movement which is in a position to promote the concept extremely well, the article provides a timely catalyst for sustaining criticism of Administration policies already well advanced under the nuclear freeze banner. It will also be extremely disruptive to allied cohesion, thus it is extremely important that we develop a prompt comprehensive strategy for dealing with this issue.

Background

Throughout the post-war period the Soviet Union has enjoyed conventional military superiority over NATO forces in Europe. The unwillingness of the West to field an adequate conventional deterrent force derives in part from economic considerations, but far more importantly from European perceptions that the most effective guarantor of their security—the most effective deterrent to conflict—reposed in the strategic nuclear power of the United States (ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers). The doctrinal and physical linkage to our strategic forces lay in the deployment of substantial U.S. conventional forces in Europe and in the presence of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe since the mid-1950’s.

The credibility of this doctrine began to be questioned in the mid-1970’s as United States strategic nuclear superiority eroded. For as long as the United States possessed clear strategic nuclear superiority, the question as to whether we would use it in response to an attack on Western Europe was relatively moot because the Soviets were unlikely to test it. Once that superiority was lost, however, penetrating questions began to be raised among our allies. These were attenuated by an explicit elaboration of the problem by former Secretary Kissinger in a speech given in Europe in September 1979.³

The simplistic answer to this question of credibility is that we and our allies should devote the necessary effort to establish effective deterrence at every conceivable level of attack. That is, that we should expand the current level of our conventional forces in Europe, of our theater nuclear forces and of our strategic arsenal to match the corresponding forces of the Soviet Union. As a practical matter, however, that is asking the impossible; again, for economic but more importantly for political reasons. In economic terms, if we have not been able during the past 30 years to develop an effective conventional deterrent, how much more unrealistic is it to expect to do so today in a time of far greater economic austerity. More importantly, however, to even suggest the idea would be to shatter the credibility of the generation-old U.S. pledge of its strategic nuclear arsenal as a deterrent to a Soviet attack on Western Europe. In the trade this is referred to as “decoupling” U.S. strategic nuclear forces from the defense of Europe.

Discussion

Setting aside for a moment the intellectual hypocrisy of such a proposal by men who were the authors of our current first-use doctrine, we must consider the near-term effects of it. In Europe any appearance of the Administration’s support for a “no first use” doctrine would have a catastrophic effect upon allied cohesion generally and the political stability of several governments in particular. For example, we have already had word from FRG Foreign Minister Genscher that U.S. support for a “no first use” doctrine would have an extremely divisive effect upon the political debate in West Germany.

With respect to the substance of the issue, your original decisions to restore the strength of both our strategic and conventional forces puts us well along toward assuring not only effective deterrence but of restoring allied confidence as well. Coming at a time in which the Soviet Union is under severe internal economic pressure, the prospects for strategic stability in the coming years are reasonably good. We and our allies share that view. This basic consensus among political leaders of the alliance, however, is susceptible to erosion if your European counterparts are forced to yield over time to a ground swell of public sentiment that could develop on a foundation of simplistic notions, such as the “freeze” and a “no first use” doctrine.

We believe that our strategy for dealing with this issue must be pre-emptive, comprehensive and sustained. In order to effectively pre-empt the McNamara/Bundy article, Al Haig will deliver a major Address on Tuesday designed to build public understanding of the historical effectiveness and intellectual defensibility of our current doctrine.⁴ Al’s speech must be buttressed by prompt reinforcement through White House statements, congressional statements and an aggressive program of public appearances by knowledgeable and effective spokesmen. Simultaneously, we must tend anxieties in Europe through prompt consultations with our allies. Finally, however, we must understand that this movement will not go away, and as a consequence, that the credibility of your policies must continue to be nurtured in thoughtful, persuasive public statements. We have separately submitted a strategy for speeches which we propose that you give over the course of the next three months.⁵

I will continue to work with Al, Cap and others to flesh out the strategy sketched above and will provide a fuller proposal next week.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Nuclear Freeze (03/28/1982–04/05/1982). Confidential. A notation at the top of the memorandum in an unknown hand indicates the President saw it on April 3. Another notation in an unknown hand reads: “5/24 WC said file.”
2. April 7. The article, which is attached but not printed, is entitled “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, LX, Spring 1982, pp. 735–768.
3. Kissinger took part in a 3-day conference on NATO’s future, organized by the Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in Brussels, September 1–3, 1979. In remarks made on September 1, Kissinger said: “‘Don’t you Europeans keep asking us to multiply assurances we cannot possibly mean and that if we do mean, we should not want to execute, and which if we execute, would destroy our civilization.’” (Paul Lewis, “U.S. Pledge to NATO To Use Nuclear Arms Criticized by Kissinger,” New York Times, September 2, 1979, p. 7) Kissinger, however, clarified his earlier statement at a September 3 news conference. According to the New York Times, “Kissinger said that he intended on Saturday [September 1] to convey his belief that America’s promise to defend its European allies is losing credibility as the Soviet arms buildup continues. However, he said today that the situation will not become critical ‘for another three or four years.’” (“Kissinger Tones Down Warning to NATO on U.S. Nuclear Pledges,” New York Times, September 4, 1979, p. A10) See also Joseph Fitchett, “Kissinger Says Europe Should Rely Less on U.S.” Washington Post, September 3, 1979, p. A26.
4. April 6. See Document 91.
5. Not found.