Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

67. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Wolfowitz) to Secretary of State Haig¹

Washington, October 16, 1981

SUBJECT

• The Near Term Need for a Comprehensive Middle East Policy Speech²

Credible reports are reaching us from the Hill to suggest that we are in danger of losing the critical “battle of perceptions” on Middle East policy. It is not surprising, of course, that self-serving, partisan complaints continue to abound. What is disturbing, however, is that many of those whose support we need profess to doubts about whether we really do have a viable and coherent “political strategy” for the region.³

Our friends on the Hill are said to wonder about our concrete plan for the peace process, and in fact suggest that the apparent absence of such a plan (or at least of highly visible U.S. involvement) undercuts efforts to gain support for the Sinai MFO.⁴ They wonder if we really do have the resources to back up a proliferating series of commitments— the individual importance of which they do not dispute. They wonder what we will do if AWACS fails, or equally important, if it wins.⁵ They remain skeptical about the wisdom of other crucial initiatives like aid to Pakistan,⁶ and ignorant of other vital facts, such as the importance of Turkish aid to our Persian Gulf plans. Finally, they wonder why the White House has not yet mobilized Republican leadership support for the Foreign Assistance package,⁷ if that package is as vital as we say it is to our regional strategy.

We are working with Bud to devise ways to engage critical members and Hill staffers in a more sustained and deeper policy level dialogue on the reinforcing dimensions of our strategy. Genuine long term support will depend on our effectiveness in finding ways to enable Hill leaders to put their imprint on and develop a personal stake in our policy. We cannot expect dividends from this effort overnight. For the near term, a comprehensive Middle East speech could help to restore confidence in our general approach.⁸ If it were possible to orchestrate closely sequenced, mutually-reinforcing speeches by yourself and the President, we could take a good deal of the steam out of the “no policy” criticism.

To achieve maximum effect, such a speech should come after the AWACS vote, and either prior to—or in concert with—the announcement of any new initiatives. As important as your Hill AWACS statements were in providing a context for that issue, they—by themselves—do not constitute the kind of complete policy address which is now required—an address which would serve to break new ground and also prevent old ground from eroding.⁹

What is especially critical is that the speech provide an organized framework for explaining the relevance, interrelationship, and essential continuity of the various new initiatives—peace process plans; emergency security assistance supplemental; possible Libyan oil embargo; force deployments in region—now under consideration. Indeed it would be highly desirable to formally announce such new measures as we are prepared to take in the speech itself. In this way, we can a) help to dramatize the fact that these actions are part of a well-considered whole—not just hasty, isolated improvisions; b) better control the terms in which the initiatives are debated; c) demonstrate that both the peace and security discussion of our policy are backed up by concrete actions, and not just more rhetoric. Nothing could be more fatal than to announce a series of new initiatives randomly and without simultaneously attempting to revive confidence in the basic strategy from which any new actions spring.

We should think about hard news that such a speech might generate so as to underscore both the peace and security dimensions of our policy. In my opinion, you should consider using such a speech to announce initiatives on:

1. The Peace Process: Perhaps an announcement about your personal participation in the autonomy negotiations or the announcement of a special negotiator;

2. Opposing Soviet Proxies: A dramatic announcement on some action on Libya, perhaps the announcement of an oil embargo, would be a good way to underscore this theme.¹⁰

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 10/11–20/81. Secret. Drafted by Fortier. Haig’s stamped initials appear in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: “Woody tasked Paul W. on this on 10/18/81.” Bremer initialed the memorandum at the top and wrote “10/16”. McManaway returned the memorandum to Wolfowitz and Veliotes under an October 19 covering memorandum, indicating that Haig had agreed with the speech proposal: “The Secretary has indicated a desire to make such a speech before the AWACS vote and has requested a draft outline with the latest on the MFO by COB Tuesday [October 20].” (Ibid.) Under an October 24 memorandum, Wolfowitz sent Haig a “second draft” of the proposed speech. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 10/21–31/81) Roche sent Wolfowitz, in Korea, a third draft in telegram 291709 to Seoul, October 31. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810517–0080)
2. Haig drew a line from the subject line to the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and wrote: “Agree Paul-Nick see me—why not before AWACS vote? get draft outline w/MFO—news by next Tues. [October 27] PM.”
3. Haig underlined “coherent ‘political strategy’ for the region” and at the end of the sentence wrote: “Agree!”
4. Haig drew a line from the end of this sentence to the upper margin and wrote: “we have this now!” The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty called for the presence of a peacekeeping force and observers to ensure that the terms of the treaty were met and perform functions to enhance “mutual confidence” of the parties. On August 3, 1981, Evron and Gorbal signed the protocol for the establishment of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers organization; Haig signed as a witness. The text of Haig’s identical August 3 letters to Shamir and Ali and the protocol and its annex and appendix are printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 1981, pp. 44–50. On October 7, the Senate approved S. Rept. 97–197, which authorized U.S. participation in the peacekeeping force. Subsequently, the House adopted H.J. Res. 349 (H. Rept. 97–310) on November 19, which placed limits on the number of U.S. soldiers participating in the peacekeeping force and also authorized U.S. expenditures. On December 16, both houses cleared a joint resolution (S.J. Res. 100), which permitted the President to send 1,200 U.S. military personnel and spend $125 million during FY 1982. (Congress and the Nation, vol. VI, 1981–1984, pp. 140–141) The President signed P.L. 97–132 into law on December 29. For the text of his statement made at the signing ceremony, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, p. 1208.
5. On October 7, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved H. Con. Res. 194 (H. Rept. 97–268) disapproving the AWACS package. The full House, on October 14, voted 301–111 to adopt the Committee’s resolution. The next day, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved S. Con. Res. 37 (S. Rept. 97–249) disapproving the package. (Congress and the Nation, vol. VI, 1981–1984, p. 131) The full Senate vote on the package was scheduled to take place on October 28.
6. See footnote 15, Document 55. The proposed economic and military aid package for Pakistan, including the proposed F–16 sale, was part of the broader 1981 foreign aid authorization bill—the International Security and Development Cooperation Act—then pending in the Senate. Subsequently, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee rejected veto resolutions (S. Con. Res. 48 and H. Con. Res. 211) on November 17 and 19, respectively. See Don Oberdorfer, “Votes Stall Effort to Block Sale: Hill Panels Back F16s for Pakistan,” November 18, 1981, p. A28, and “House Committee Votes Approval For Sale of F16 Jets to Pakistan,” November 20, 1981, p. A4; both Washington Post.
7. Presumable reference to the International Security and Development Cooperation Act (S.1196; P.L. 97–113; 95 Stat. 1519; 22 U.S.C. 2151), which authorized appropriations for FY 1982 and 1983 for security and development assistance programs or the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act (H.R. 4559; P.L. 97–121; 95 Stat. 1647), which made appropriations for FY 1982 foreign assistance and related programs. The President signed both acts into law on December 29. For the text of his statement made at the signing ceremony, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, pp. 1202–1204.
8. Haig drew a line from the end of this sentence to the margin below and wrote: “Right.”
9. See Document 62. Haig also testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 1 and October 5. For the texts of his statements, see Arms Sales Package to Saudi Arabia: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, on The AWACS and F–15 Enhancements Arms Sales Package to Saudi Arabia, Part 1, October 1, 5, 6, 14, and 15, 1981 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 10–14 and 184–186.
10. Haig did not make a major speech on the Middle East before the Senate voted 52 to 48 on October 28 to reject the veto proposal, which would have prevented the AWACS sale. (John M. Goshko, “Vote of 52 to 48 Is Major Victory,” Washington Post, October 29, 1981, pp. A1, A8) On October 29, Haig offered comments and took part in a question and answer session at the Department with the attendees of the National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters. During his introductory remarks, Haig reiterated that the President “does, indeed, have a foreign policy, and, like any sound foreign policy, it is built on a bedrock of American values and ideas.” Later, he discussed the AWACS sale, noting: “We are, as you know, very gratified by the outcome of that vote. I want to emphasize, however, that this was an issue in which serious people differed—serious, well-motivated people differed. It is an issue which is now behind us, and I think in a constructive way, because it will inevitably contribute to the stability and peace process in the region.” (Department of State Bulletin, December 1981, pp. 29–30)