Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

247. Talking Points Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff¹

Washington, September 4, 1985

LOOKING AHEAD: GAME PLAN FOR THE NEXT YEAR

Overview

— The U.S. is probably in the best position internationally that it has been in some time. I want to think ahead² about how we exploit—and maintain—this advantageous position. I want to anticipate some problems that may hit us down the road.

— We’re like a football team that is ahead in the 3d quarter. We have stuck to our game plan, and it has worked. The question is, do we sit on our lead? Do we play very cautiously? Or will we have to be aggressive, and imaginative, in the face of a wily opponent who now has a fresh team on the field?

— My main worry is some looming problems that could do us serious harm if we are not alert and imaginative. We may have to take some risks in order to head them off. We don’t have the option of just sitting tight everywhere. We also have some big opportunities.

— Let’s take five issues: US-Soviet relations/arms control; Middle East; Southern Africa; Central America; and the Philippines.

US-Soviet Relations/Arms Control

— We are in the best bargaining position of any recent US administration vis-a-vis the Soviets. Our military buildup—and SDI—give us enormous leverage.

— The world won’t come to an end if we don’t reach an arms control agreement in your 2d term.³ Being patient is also part of our leverage. But we may face a growing problem of maintaining Congressional and allied support (e.g., defense budget cutback). Gorbachev is also a skillful and aggressive PR player; he won’t make it easy for us. We will have to be nimble on our feet in the arms control game, as we were in the 1st term.

— We may also face a historic opportunity to obtain an agreement on deep reductions in offensive weapons. This has always been our goal in START. It would be a historic vindication of our tough-minded approach to arms control, and an extraordinary achievement.

— So, precisely because of our strong bargaining position, we may be faced with some interesting decisions to make. In Geneva, the linkage between the various elements is now working in our favor: The Soviets may make increasingly forthcoming offers of offensive reductions in order to lure us into some trade on SDI.⁴ What happens if they make some real, specific offers of strategically significant reductions that meet all our criteria (e.g., throw weight, enhancing survivability, verifiability)—in exchange for something like reaffirming the ABM treaty?⁵ Not necessarily a bad position to be in—but we will have to choose.

Middle East Peace Process

— In the Middle East, too, we’ve been in a strong position. We have stood back, and the result has been some movement on the Arab side: King Hussein organizing the moderates, trying to rope the PLO into the political process.

— The problem now is that the King says he has gone about as far as he can go. He proposes that we help him move the PLO further toward moderation by a series of steps: Murphy meeting; PLO meets our conditions and we enter a dialogue with it; some kind of international supportive process; and then direct negotiations with Israel.

— This is a risky course for us. It means bringing the PLO into the game (even into the Murphy meeting) in exchange for nursing along a process that presumably changes the nature of the PLO. It may be that Jordan and the Palestinians simply cannot move any further without the PLO. Perhaps the U.S. would be risking the least by taking the lead this way. (Hussein may be risking his life otherwise and Peres can’t do anything now without risking his government).

— I am wrestling with this dilemma myself. There may be other options. But if we say no to the King’s scenario, it’ll be very messy. In other words, we’ve been coasting up to now, and there may be no cost-free course of action from this point on.

Southern Africa

— In South Africa, we have been right: There was a process of political change going on, or at least starting, though the SAG had not yet tackled the real issues of sharing political power. We are absolutely right to resist economic sanctions that would only exacerbate hardship and could fan the flames of violence. We are on the high moral ground: against violence and for political negotiations.

— The process of change in South Africa is irreversible; the only question is whether it comes through violent upheaval or through political accommodation. It may well be that the only way to avoid catastrophe is for the SAG to reform fast. I.e., if we sit back, the SAG will procrastinate and we could get the worst possible outcome: race war, a Communist-dominated radical upheaval. P.W. Botha’s speech of August 15 shows that the SAG may need to be pushed into the bold action that is their only hope for survival.⁶

Central America

— In Central America, we are on the right track. We have congressional support for the Contras;⁷ a Nicaraguan resistance alliance that is active politically (UNO); an effective government in El Salvador that has popular support (and also Congressional support); the Sandinistas are on the defensive.

— Here, I would only suggest that we stay alert to prevent things that could unravel our policy:

• A failure to fund the Jackson Plan adequately could weaken the economic prospects of all our friends in the region;
• The Contadora process could fall apart, leaving us with no diplomatic program to keep the Congress on board; or it could suddenly produce a draft treaty, which would present us with some tough choices.

The Philippines

— This could be the sleeper issue of your 2d term. We all know how vital those bases are.

— The war against the Communist NPA is going badly, partly because the military are corrupt, politicized, and incompetent. The economy is a wreck, largely because Marcos’s cronies are maintaining inefficient monopolies and choking off the productive forces of the free market. Moderate anti-Communist political forces that could be rallying to defend the system (church, business, honest politicians in Marcos’s own party as well as in moderate opposition parties) are alienated and frustrated by Marcos’s one-man rule.

— Here, too, the status quo may be heading us toward disaster. Marcos may be more a liability than an asset—unless he makes a sharp turn toward military, economic, and political reform. The only way to avoid catastrophe may be to reform fast.

— Marcos needs to hear from you—whom he trusts—that he really has a problem. I will shortly be coming to you with some concrete proposals.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons 9/1–30/85. Secret; Sensitive. Attached to a covering note written in an unknown hand, dated September 4, that reads “Looking Ahead, Spec. Paper for Charlie Hill.” In an August 20 memorandum to all S/P staff, entitled “Looking Ahead: Possible Diplomatic Initiatives,” Rodman indicated that Shultz had “tasked the Policy Planning Staff and the regional bureaus to look ahead to see in what areas of foreign policy we might make progress between now and Christmas if we chose to engage ourselves more.” (Reagan Library, Peter Rodman Files, Department of State Chronological File, Chron 08/09/1985–08/31/1985)
2. The “I” is in reference to Shultz.
3. The “your” is in reference to the President.
4. Reference to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva on strategic, intermediate-range, and space and defensive weapons, which Shultz and Gromyko agreed to during their January 6–8 meetings in Geneva. The first round of talks took place in Geneva, March 12–April 23, and the second round took place, May 30–July 16. The third round was scheduled to resume on September 19.
5. See footnote 9, Document 91.
6. On August 15, Botha addressed the provincial congress of the ruling National Party. See Glenn Frankel, “Botha Bars Major Change In Segregationist Policy,” Washington Post, August 16, 1985, pp. A1, A26. In an August 16 address before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, Crocker noted Botha’s remarks, stating: “We consider yesterday’s speech to be an important statement in that it discussed some issues that are at the core of the problem of apartheid. At the same time, the speech—written in the code language of a foreign culture within a polarized society—is not easily interpreted and raises many questions. We have repeatedly called for negotiations among South Africans and can only reaffirm our appeal that every avenue to possible reconciliation and dialogue be explored. What must be emphasized is that a speech such as this is but an element of an ongoing process. It does not, in itself, constitute change. That can only come from concrete implementing actions that follow up in tangible ways on the principles that have been outlined. We will look for clarifications and implementation of those principles through negotiation between that government and leaders of South Africa’s other communities.” (Department of State Bulletin, October 1985, p. 6)
7. Presumable reference to the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (S. 960; P.L. 99–83; 99 Stat. 190), which the President signed into law on August 8. For FY 1986 it authorized $27 million in aid to the Contras, but prohibited the Department of Defense or the Central Intelligence Agency from administering the aid. (Congress and the Nation, vol. VII, 1985–1988, p. 173) In his personal diary entry for August 8, the President wrote: “A signing ceremony for Foreign Assistance Authorization bill. The 1st one I’ve had since 1981. This is one where I wanted more money than they allowed. They just wont recognize this is part of our nat. security. Security assistance for example to Turkey—a Turkish soldier only costs $6,000 a year. If we have to replace him with an American it’s $90,000.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 490)