Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

245. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 20, 1985

SUBJECT

• SDI and the Allies

Summary

The transatlantic debate over SDI is less acrimonious than it was a few months ago. Nonetheless, SDI in all its dimensions—strategic, technological and political—will remain a profoundly difficult issue for the Alliance for years to come. Keeping our political objectives to the fore—even at cost to economic efficiency—and publicly endorsing cooperative European efforts can help alleviate these tensions.

The Strategic Dimension

Though temporarily in abeyance, strategic concerns about SDI—particularly its alleged deviation from traditional nuclear deterrence—remain at the heart of our problem with the Allies. Although their reaction is overlaid with a characteristic European resistance to change, the Europeans are genuinely uneasy at what they see as another unilateral American change in NATO strategic doctrine which advertises their dependence; and they fear that its strategic implications will weaken public support for the British and French nuclear deterrents. They also see a prolonged negotiating stalemate in Geneva over SDI as producing political complications for them. These concerns are real even if we are right on the merits.

In recent months, Paul Nitze’s speeches,² the Camp David points³ and NSDD 172⁴ have put our SDI objectives in perspective and provided reassurance on certain key points. Most Allies—always reluctant to challenge the US frontally on security issues—have been happy to endorse SDI research as a prudent hedge. An implausible Soviet position in Geneva has muted pressures for arms control. However, several developments—for example, our testing of ABM components or a more plausible Soviet negotiating position—could reopen the debate.

The Technological Dimension

With the strategic debate momentarily on a back burner, the Weinberger offer of Allied participation in SDI research has moved the technological and economic implications of SDI to the forefront of Alliance discussion. Unless we put our political objectives up front, this aspect of SDI could compound rather than alleviate our differences with the Europeans.

Part of the problem stems from the unrealistic expectations entertained by the Europeans themselves—the Germans especially. The Weinberger offer was thus initially perceived as a kind of high-tech Marshall plan which would allow the Europeans simultaneously to overcome years of technological lag, to be more positive about SDI and to influence our eventual decisions on SDI deployment. However, it has become apparent that the opportunities for European participation will be extremely limited—primarily because of predictable built-in constraints: superior and more numerous US research and development capabilities, congressional and OSD preferences for having work done in the US, security controls which—quite apart from the technology transfer problem—will place large areas of SDI research off limits to the Allies, etc.

Moreover, even in those areas where the Europeans have research capabilities relevant to SDI—and there are several of interest to SDIO—the terms of European participation present problems. Our programmatic need to make maximum progress as rapidly as possible on SDI research is to some degree in conflict with our political objective of using Allied participation to give them a stake in SDI. Thus, SDIO’s preference would be to use European scientists or consortia or industries selectively, plugging them into our program as appropriate—that is, in precisely the subcontractor role to which Mitterrand so objected. The Europeans are apprehensive of such arrangements, which, in their view, could result in a brain drain of their best scientific talent in precisely those fields where they are the most advanced; at the same time, controls on technology transfer would severely restrict the flow of derived technology back to Europe and its civil sector. In sum, they now perceive—as Kohl has said—risks as well as opportunities. These concerns have increased the attractiveness of EUREKA and other European options—though not to the exclusion of bilateral cooperation.

Our SDI program should not be run to accommodate the Europeans. At the same time, it is not in our interest that the Weinberger offer be perceived as a device to exploit Europe’s meager technological resources. Given that the Allied contribution to our SDI objectives will be marginal, we should keep our political objectives to the fore—even if this means some loss of efficiency. We should continue to accommodate their preferences, and not rule out some form of multilateral European effort if this is what they prefer.

The Political Dimension

SDI—in particular the debate over European participation in SDI research—has exacerbated political divisions not only between the US and Europeans but among the Europeans themselves, and in some cases, within individual countries. These strains have been particularly acute for Germany, stretching Bonn between its increasingly valued relationship with France and its more important relationship with the US. It has accentuated differences between Kohl, Genscher, and Strauss, while creating a new rallying point for the SPD. While the private sector has been generally enthusiastic about participating in research, the defense and foreign ministries have been more cautious about the implications of participation on the ultimate question of deploying strategic defenses. The result has been a series of positions that can only be described as schizophrenic. Similar though less acute divisions exist in the UK; even for Britain, SDI has created a tension between the “special relationship” and its new-found post-Fontainebleau European vocation.

The resulting disarray has been a galling reminder to the Europeans of how easily US policies can evoke European responses that reinforce perceptions in this country of a weak, carping and greedy Europe. Paradoxically, SDI has also provided a strong impulse to formulate coordinated European positions—though a single unified position is not within reach. Indeed it is hard to think of a recent security issue where the Europeans have so clearly and unanimously felt the need to coordinate their responses to a US initiative.

We should encourage this trend. Though it is often easier to deal with the Europeans individually, it is hard to argue that the intra-European divisions have increased support for SDI, have silenced the doubters, or have isolated the French. More generally, further divisions within Europe would work against our long-term interest in a strong and self-confident Europe with the Franco-German relationship at its core. It is increasingly evident that the Germans will not take a position that does not have some degree of French acquiescence. When Bonn is faced with a choice between ourselves and the French, nobody wins. A situation which puts such strains on Germany’s special vulnerabilities is also not in the long-term Western interest. In the defense field, U.S. and European interests are essentially parallel—more so, at least, than in the economic field where we have long supported European unity as a matter of principle.

In my view, therefore, encouraging greater European initiative and self-reliance in a defense-related field is in our interest. Admittedly the European record is not impressive. EUREKA still lacks concrete content, primarily because of intra-European differences rather than US opposition. Nonetheless, the Europeans remain acutely sensitive to our views on joint European efforts and a publicly forthcoming attitude could somewhat ease the strains. Finally, our political strategy must take account of the reality that France will play a central role.

Steps We Can Take

While our basic differences with the Europeans over SDI cannot be resolved at the present time, there are some steps we can take—and to some extent are taking—that will help:

— Our public statements should continue to emphasize the present importance of nuclear deterrence, as well as assurances that SDI will also protect Allied security. We should also focus more sharply on how we would deal with the European conventional imbalance in a non-nuclear world. Conceivably, we should make the elimination of nuclear weapons conditional on the elimination of the conventional threat.

— We should take a hard look—and soon—at the potential merits of anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs). (PM and EUR will be sending a memo to you shortly.) At first glance, they have much to recommend them: they could offer the Europeans a stake in SDI directly relevant to their own security, and permit a joint European effort—conceivably even bringing along the French. Further study may reveal serious disadvantages for the US in European leadership in ATBM research. But the study should get underway rapidly.

— Although a strategy for Allied participation in SDI research has proved elusive, in part because of the numerous institutions and interests involved, we should establish, as a matter of policy, the primacy of our political objectives. Such a strategy should be aimed at encouraging coordinated European efforts—EUREKA or the creation of various consortia—rather than at dividing the Europeans.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons 7/1–31/85. Confidential. Drafted by Bohlen and Lowenkron.
2. For a representative sample, see Nitze’s March 28 address before the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and his May 1 address before the National Press Club. The texts of the addresses are in Department of State Bulletin, May 1985, pp. 57–63, and Department of State Bulletin, July 1985, pp. 44–47, respectively.
3. Reference is to a December 22, 1984, meeting between the President and Prime Minister Thatcher that took place at Camp David. The memorandum of conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 337, and is also scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VII, Western Europe, 1981–1984.
4. NSDD 172, “Presenting the Strategic Defense Initiative,” issued on May 30, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 2, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.