Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

237. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, March 22, 1985

PRIORITIES/OPPORTUNITIES FOR 1985

— This year we see ferment and diplomatic movement in a number of areas. This is very much a product of the strengthened US position in the world, and it presents us with opportunities in 1985 to shape events in accordance with our goals. We have tried to develop a game plan that sketches out how we will want to handle these issues over the rest of the year, including initiatives we may want to take and problems that are likely to confront us.

— The obvious major issues are US-Soviet relations, Central America, the Middle East, and Southern Africa.

US-Soviet Relations/Arms Control

— Gorbachev is bound to be more active and more formidable than his predecessors. He will present a superficial image of flexibility, as part of an aggressive strategy of wooing our allies and the Chinese while possibly confronting us boldly in Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Middle East, and even Central America. He may at the same time be willing to engage us and meet with you before the end of the year.

— We need a firm and imaginative strategy of our own to protect our interests [in] whatever course Gorbachev selects. Indeed, an effective US strategy can influence his basic decisions:

• We should make clear our willingness to deal constructively.
• We should make equally clear that we are prepared to resist Soviet challenges.

— The key to our success will be to maintain a solid base here and to keep the Alliance solidly together. We will need to be nimble in the negotiations—having defensible positions always on the table—in order to maintain this domestic and allied solidarity.

— Our game plan would be the following:

• We should take the initiative to use Dobrynin as a Presidential channel to Gorbachev, perhaps meeting with him in a White House setting.
• We should lay out for Dobrynin a schedule for progress over the coming year, aiming at a well-prepared summit.
• We will continue our all-out effort in the Congress to maintain support for the MX, SDI, and overall defense spending.
• Your trip to Europe in May will be a crucial event in Alliance management. We will have to blunt European concerns over SDI and use the other two Geneva arms control forums creatively. We want Bonn (and the NATO meetings that will follow in June) to be a powerful display of Western solidarity.²
• I will see Gromyko in Vienna in mid-May.³ If the Soviets have shown a willingness to engage us by then, we could use this to begin preparing for a summit.
• At the end of July is the 10th anniversary of CSCE in Helsinki.⁴ If all foreign ministers go to Helsinki—which I hope they won’t—Gromyko and I will be there.
• The Soviets may see the UNGA in September (and the 40th anniversary of the UN in October) as the right context for Gorbachev to come to the U.S. to meet with you. Or they may send Gromyko, and you may want to meet with him yourself to do preparatory work.
• Other events: Ottawa Human Rights Experts meeting (May 7);⁵ Baldrige visit to Moscow (May 20–21);⁶ decision point in our interim restraints/no-undercut policy re Trident sea trials (summer/fall):⁷ Decisions to be made in light of circumstances; opportunities to keep the pressure on the Soviets.

— Wild card: (Mid-summer:) Possible guilty verdict in Antonov papal assassination trial.⁸

Central America

— Our main task is to sustain our leverage over Nicaragua and the other main elements of our strategy (contras; military/economic/psychological pressures; Jackson plan; diplomatic efforts). Many of the key battles will be at home.

— Battle over contra funding is crucial. Setback will have damaging psychological/political effect, demoralizing our friends and emboldening the Sandinistas.

— You and I have already begun a public diplomacy campaign on behalf of the freedom fighters. This is having an impact on the public discussion, but it is probably not going to be enough to win the Congressional vote.

— A major Presidential effort will be needed, including a major speech to the nation or to the Congress.

— The centerpiece of the speech should be a new political initiative including a dramatic peace plan that can command widespread support. This would turn a vote for the contras into a vote for a peace plan, fundamentally altering the terms of the debate. The speech would include the following elements:

• Laying out the background of our policy, its main elements, and the successes we have achieved.
• Pointing to Nicaragua as the remaining problem, describing how we have tried to deal with it.
• Paramilitary action always poses a dilemma but it is wholly legitimate in this case; sometimes we need policy instruments that fall between diplomatic notes and US troops.
• Our preferred objective is a peaceful, negotiated solution. To unblock Contadora and restore peace, we would:

— Call on the Nicaraguan democratic opposition (Cruz, Robelo, Calero) to extend for 60 days their offer to engage in a direct dialogue with the Sandinistas on peace and pluralism. (Offer now due to expire April 20.)⁹

— Call on the Sandinistas to accept the Opposition offer;

— Call on the Nicaraguan Church (the Pope?) to preside over the dialogue;

— Call on Contadora and the OAS to lend their good offices.

• If the Nicaraguans go to dialogue, we would be ready to respond by:

— resuming Manzanillo¹⁰ to see if a Contadora treaty is attainable,

— not obligating new contra funds for 60 days (but insist that Congress remove the restrictions) while we give the Sandinistas a chance to think over our offer, and

— cancelling maneuvers of over 500 men in Central America during the 60-day period.

• You would appeal to Nicaragua to live up to its OAS promises and accept this offer. You would call on Congress not to undercut your effort.

— The speech would be accompanied by vigorous public diplomacy, demarches in capitals, etc.

— Best timing would be:

• Go to Congress with Nicaragua report on or about April 15,
• Speech before April 20 expiry date of present Opposition offer,
• Vote on or about April 30.

Middle East Peace Process

— Developments are forcing this to the front burner in 1985, whether or not they ultimately lead to a breakthrough. Our task is to nurture progress and seize the opportunity if it presents itself; to deflect pressures and manage events if Hussein’s effort runs out of steam.

— Arabs are on the verge of turning to us with a request for some US move (procedure or substance) that they will say is crucial for success of Hussein’s effort: E.g., meeting with Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, or commitment to “self-determination,” as prelude to further steps to woo PLO to accept 242.

— Our strategy must be to keep the ball in their court, stressing our stake in King Hussein (not the PLO), insisting that burden is on PLO to accept 242, emphasizing that bottom-line is to get a negotiation started with Israel (not the U.S.).

— Game plan if progress continues:

• Mid-April: Murphy trip to explore workability of various ideas being discussed.¹¹
• April: Israeli-Egyptian package deal (Taba, etc.) agreed upon, resulting in date certain for Peres-Mubarak summit.
• April: US-Egypt-Jordan/Palestinian meeting, presupposing Hussein’s agreement to date certain for inclusion of Israelis.
• Early May: US-Egypt-Israel meeting to symbolize engagement of Israelis and to promote progress of Egyptian-Israeli package deal.
• May: Perhaps secret Israeli-Jordanian-US meeting.
• Mid-May: Peres-Mubarak summit, coinciding with announcement of Taba arbitration and return of Egyptian ambassador.
• Late May: Hussein visit to Washington.¹²
• Summer: Israel completes withdrawal from Lebanon.

• Fall: PLO accepts 242 and Israel’s right to exist;

  US makes statement on self-determination;

  US opens dialogue with PLO;

  Hussein declares entry with agreed joint delegation.

  OR

  US makes statement on self-determination;

  Hussein declares entry on basis of 242;

  Arafat makes public statement of support.

  OR

  Hussein declares entry even without PLO support.

• By Oct. 31: US-Egypt-Israel-Jordan/Palestinian meeting.

— Negotiations begin.

— If Hussein does come forward, US would be obligated to protect him against Syrian pressures (working with Saudis, Israelis, allies; Congressional action on arms sales for Jordan; crisis contingency planning, etc.).

Southern Africa

— Our aim is to push hard so that this promising diplomatic effort might produce an agreement in 1985. The key to success will be to show staying power, so that the parties know they cannot evade decisions. At home, we will need to deflect pressures from both left and right that will try to knock us off course.

— The key decision/action points will be as follows:

• March: Presentation of “synthesis” paper to Angola and South Africa.¹³
• April–June: Seek to resolve differences over Cuban troop withdrawal; if appropriate, tabling a US proposal. If consensus eludes us, negotiations are likely to stagnate through rest of 1985; allied, African, and domestic pressures will mount.
• May–June: Press South Africa to wrap up remaining issues on UNSC 435 terms for Namibian independence.
• Once CTW agreement reached, open diplomatic mission in Luanda and observer mission in Windhoek; possible Vice Presidential meeting with dos Santos; work for Congressional funding for UN implementation in Namibia.
• Possible visits by Savimbi and P.W. Botha.

— Mozambique: Essential to fight for MAP/IMET in Congress (March); diplomatic efforts to hold Nkomati together (March–June); Machel visit (December).¹⁴

— South Africa: Congressional battle over sanctions legislation (March- ); speech by the Secretary (spring).¹⁵

— Wild cards: Mozambique internal instability; US and South African domestic controversy over apartheid spilling over to complicate our regional diplomacy.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons 3/1–31/85. Secret; Sensitive. Shultz’s stamped initials appear at the top of the memorandum. Rodman sent the memorandum to Shultz under a March 22 typewritten covering note: “Attached is a ‘game plan’ paper covering the four main issues: US-Soviet, Central America, Middle East, and Southern Africa. Attached also are copies of the papers done by EUR, ARA, NEA, and AF, which I drew upon in doing the ‘game plan’ paper.” Shultz’s stamped initials appear on the covering note; Quinn initialed the covering note and wrote “3/22.” (Ibid.) The attached papers to which Rodman referred in his covering note are an undated paper “Soviet and Alliance Talking Points,” an undated action memorandum from Motley to Shultz, a March 22 paper “Notional Scenario,” an undated paper “Israeli-Jordanian Secret Talks with U.S. Participation,” and a March 6 information memorandum from Wisner to Armacost; all are ibid. A March 8 draft of Rodman’s paper, which Platt sent to Shultz under a March 8 covering memorandum, is in the Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, Foreign Policy.
2. See footnote 2, Document 235. The NATO meeting was scheduled to take place in Brussels, June 6–7.
3. Shultz was scheduled to attend ceremonies in Vienna commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty (see footnote 12, Document 8), May 13–15. Shultz met with Gromyko on May 14. For the text of Shultz’s May 15 remarks while in Vienna, see Department of State Bulletin, July 1985, pp. 37–38. Documentation on Shultz’s Vienna meeting with Gromyko is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 28–30.
4. Scheduled to take place from July 29 to August 1. For Shultz’s address delivered at the ceremonies on July 30, see Department of State Bulletin, October 1985, pp. 30–33. While in Helsinki, Shultz met with Shevardnadze. Documentation is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 71 and 72.
5. Reference is to the CSCE Human Rights Experts Meeting scheduled to take place in Ottawa during May and June.
6. Documentation on the Baldrige visit is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 32.
7. Documentation on the Trident sea trials is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 2, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.
8. See footnote 11, Document 172.
9. In a March 2 statement, the Nicaraguan opposition “issued an ultimatum to the Sandinistas, giving the government until April 20 to agree to a ‘national dialogue’ under the sponsorship of Nicaragua’s Catholic Bishops Conference. The group warned that failure to reach an agreement would preclude the ‘possibility for a peaceful resolution of the national crisis.’” (George D. Moffett III, “Nicaraguan rebels press US for more funds,” Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 1985, p. 3)
10. Reference is to the Mexican Pacific coast resort town where the bilateral talks between the United States and Nicaragua, conducted by Shlaudeman and Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco, had taken place. The first of nine rounds of talks began June 25–26, 1984. In January 1985, the Reagan administration made the decision not to schedule any further meetings at Manzanillo.
11. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 4, Murphy explained the purpose of his April trip to the Middle East: “To go over the discussions we have had with each individual leader, to compare notes on how the other parties see it possible to move, to stimulate new thinking, further thinking. We do not think, do not consider that all of the ideas are in hand as yet.” (Developments in the Middle East, April 1985: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, April 4, 1985 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 6) Documentation on Murphy’s trip is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
12. Hussein visited Washington, May 28–31. Documentation on his meetings with U.S. officials is scheduled for publication ibid.
13. In telegram 637 from Cape Town, March 22, Crocker provided a summary of his March 21 meeting with Botha and South African officials, noting: “On Namibia/Angola, as I had done earlier in the week with the Angolans at Cape Verde, I tabled our synthesis framework for a settlement. Unlike the MPLA who cautiously welcomed the paper, the Boers were more suspicious, observing accurately that it was designed to force decisions here as well as in Luanda. Pik [Botha] gave us some predictable commentary about the calendario for Cuban troop withdrawal; at one point he termed it ‘a deviation’ from our understandings in 1981. Generally, he carefully stuck to questions of interpretation and clarification and resisted any suggestion of which way the SAG would come out. He promised us, however, that the paper would get serious SAG consideration. He hoped we would look first for a MPLA answer; I noted the MPLA would feel the same way. We both agreed it was important to get UNITA’s comments.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])
14. Machel visited Washington, September 17–21.
15. Omission is in the original. On April 16, Shultz discussed South Africa in an address delivered before the National Press Club; see Document 238.