Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

176. Draft Memorandum From Frederick Wettering and Constantine Menges of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 30, 1983

SUBJECT

• Proposed Foreign Policy Grand Strategy: “The Violet Plan”

A frequent criticism of this Administration is that we have no foreign policy; that we react to events rather than have strategic goals. While this is belied by over 100 NSDDs and a number of other policy documents, nonetheless, this accusation is difficult to refute in public without a confusing and lengthy listing of policy documents, many of which cannot be made public. (S)

Frankly, there is some merit in this criticism, which is levied by solid conservatives as well as liberals. We propose the adoption of a strategy, which we whimsically name the “Violet Plan” (violet is the opposite end of the spectrum from red), which we believe can be made public, can garner domestic support from both conservatives and liberals, and which makes sense. The strategy builds upon the momentum which we have developed as a result of the Grenada initiative,² and incorporates a number of existing ad hoc and disconnected initiatives that have been undertaken in recent months and years and provides a conceptual and policy framework for these efforts. Briefly stated, the policy proposal is as follows:

To take advantage of objective conditions in the developing world in order to reverse the spread of Marxist-Leninist form of government and societal organization that has arisen in recent years and the associated expansion of Soviet/surrogate influence by selectively using economic, military, training and other inducements and pressures to induce developing national governments to adopt political, economic and societal measures which lead toward the growth of the private economic sector, political pluralism and political liberties, religious freedom, and disassociation with the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Soviet surrogates. (S)

The very expansion of the number of Marxist-Leninist regimes oriented towards Moscow in recent years has in fact created major vulnerabilities for both the Soviets and for the popularity of the ideology. The world economic crisis, the Soviet inability to provide economic assistance of consequence, the Soviet tendency towards penuriousness and debt-collecting, the patent inefficiencies and political liabilities of Marxism-Leninism, all have created real conditions for advancement of vital US interests. Several of these Marxist-Leninist regimes have made serious approaches to us in recent months, seeking economic assistance and professing willingness to alter and amend basic policies. (S)

(These developments lend validity to a proto-strategy articulated in late 1981 by Henry Nau and Fred Wettering which argued for a two-stage approach to Third World Marxist regimes: rusticate or cut them off completely from US and Western support until they indicate a willingness to change;³ and then openly reward positive changes when they occur. This was never adopted in the NSDD sense as a national policy, however). (S)

To a large degree the inertia of the bureaucracy precludes us from acting and reacting to positive developments without some overriding policy authority. The budget process makes it extremely difficult to find funds to reward positive steps. There remains a clear lack of consensus on disincentive or pressure measures to be applied to Marxist-Leninist regimes susceptible to such pressures. (S)

To an unfortunately large degree, we have been insensitive to positive developments that have already occurred prior to the Grenada effort (a case in point being Equatorial Guinea, which, in 1979 overthrew the Cuban and Soviet-supported Macias regime,⁴ reoriented toward the West and US, expelled Cubans and Soviets, begged for [less than 1 line not declassified] US support, represented a treasure-trove of psychological exploitation (the first Third World Marxist regime to “defect” in recent years), and yet received—and continues to receive—de minimus attention and aid). In Africa, we have received serious overtures from Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, all of which fit the model. Only in the Mozambique case are we moving cautiously ahead, and there we are meeting resistance from Congressional conservatives due to our inability to cite a grand strategy. (S)

Under this proposed policy several other Administration policy initiatives could be directly related—the support for the indigenous private sector and the democracy program, for example. There would seem to be numerous candidate regimes which might qualify under such a strategy where it seems we have some real prospects for advancing our interests at the direct expense of the Soviet Union—Suriname, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique. Like Grenada, none of them is individually of vital strategic importance, but we would argue that if we could deepen the momentum engendered by the Grenada success it could lead to more important successes. Nicaragua comes to mind, as does South Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, . . . . The Soviets place immense credence and importance in the correlation of forces, and it was Soviet successes in the Third World in the 1970s (Angola, Ethiopia) that led Leonid Brezhnev to proclaim publicly that the correlation of forces had decisively shifted in favor of the Soviet Union and communism. (S)

We would further argue that such a strategy, publicly articulated and with demonstrable results, would be understandable to the American public and Congress. (S)

Bureaucratically, the policy should encompass the creation of a SIG-level group which could examine possibilities world-wide and have the authority to examine existing financial allocations and make recommendations which could result in a quick reallocation of resources (this will of course meet with massive bureaucratic resistance). (S)

RECOMMENDATION: You may wish to bounce this off Shultz/Eagleburger. If you agree, there should be a restricted, hand-picked group brought together to put this in the form of an NSDD proposal).

1. Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, Policy Planning (Second Term) I: 01/01/1984–06/12/1984. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Planning Papers and Participants.” Wettering sent the memorandum to Fortier under a January 26, 1984, note indicating that it “is a copy of a think piece which I drafted but will probably never see the light of day this year.”
2. Reference is to the U.S. invasion of Grenada on October 25 after the overthrow and murder of Prime Minister Bishop (see footnote 2, Document 173). In an October 27 address to the nation regarding the events in both Lebanon and Grenada, the President explained that six members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, in addition to Jamaica and Barbados, had asked the United States to “join them in a military operation to restore order and democracy to Grenada.” He continued, “These small, peaceful nations needed our help. Three of them don’t have armies at all, and the others have very limited forces. The legitimacy of their request, plus my own concern for our citizens, dictated my decision. I believe our government has a responsibility to go to the aid of its citizens, if their right to life and liberty is threatened. The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book II, p. 1521) Documentation on the invasion is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVII, Part 2, Eastern Caribbean.
3. Not found.
4. Macias was overthrown on August 3, 1979.