Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

173. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 25, 1983

SUBJECT

• The President’s Speech

Your instinct to work toward a speech that puts Lebanon and Grenada in a broader context is right on the mark.² I don’t mean to encourage insubordination, but I hope it may still be possible to steer the draft back somewhat more in this direction. I spoke to Al Myer about this, and I think he pretty much agrees.

The reason for this is obvious. An already shell-shocked public may soon see, in rapid succession, American involvement in an escalating Gulf war; dramatic American retaliation for the slaughter of our Marines in Beirut; continuing controversy over our role in Lebanon and legislative rancor over the JLP; and, finally, the unveiling of a new relationship with Israel. We have to give people a better framework for making sense out of these individual developments. Yes, we also have to answer the gut questions on people’s minds; but our objectives—and our sacrifices—will only be fully intelligible when put in a context of an integrated strategy.

Two quick additional observations:

— The public is confused about the objective of our forces in Lebanon, but the broader problem, I think, is their uncertainty about how we get from where we are today to the achievement of those objectives. Our game plan simply isn’t understood, in part, of course, because decisions needed to give life to our game plan are still in train.

— In Grenada, in Chad and in Lebanon we continue to run up against the same problem, namely, the perception that it is somehow wrong to use our strength to curtail the lawlessness of our weaker adversaries. This of course only ensures that our antagonists will continue to strengthen themselves under the sanctuary we provide them, forcing us to confront far worse choices with time. The introduction that I did to this morning’s draft of the President’s speech is designed to confront this issue directly. I still think it is important.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, Middle East Policy Development 10/18/1983–11/04/1983. Secret. Sent for information.
2. References are to the October 23 attack in Beirut (see footnote 2, Document 170) and the U.S. invasion of Grenada on October 25 after the overthrow and murder of Prime Minister Bishop. The President addressed the nation on October 27 regarding both events. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book II, pp. 1517–1522)