Agreement on the Joint Communique between the United States and China
marks the beginning of a new phase in US-China relations.2 This will not permit, however, a simple
resumption of the US-China relationship as it existed before these
negotiations began. In the interim, Chinese policy has undergone
significant changes. In the last year Beijing has moved to distance
itself from the US, and has become more openly critical of US positions
internationally.
Despite the Communique (and in some ways because of it) the Taiwan
question will continue to be a major irritant in US-China relations.
Beijing clearly does not accept our interpretation of the Communique,
and can be expected to sustain its pressure for an early termination to
Taiwan arms sales and for an implicit right to consultation whenever
future sales are made.
Under these circumstances, a close alliance or association with the
Chinese is likely to be out of reach. It will be important, therefore,
that future US initiatives be premised on balance and reciprocity in the
relationship. If not, the Chinese may perceive us as suitors and,
paradoxically, feel greater liberty to adopt a standoffish posture. We
share many of the points of view of EA
on this subject. But we favor a more cautious strategy, one which sets
very modest expectations for the relationship. We might, for example, 1)
pursue a consciously low-key
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policy, the pace of which is measured by the degree of positive interest
which Beijing itself demonstrates in the US relationship; or 2) pursue a
more forward-leaning—but still carefully modulated—policy aimed at
extending incentives in return for concrete benefits.
I have attached as Tab A a more detailed elaboration of this issue and of
possible policy alternatives. After reading it, you may wish to schedule
a short discussion with John
Holdridge, Jon
Howe, Vernon
Walters, Larry, Ken3 and myself. Once we adopt a basic style
in the new relationship, we will have to live with it for a while.
Tab A
Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff4
Washington, undated
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA POLICY
The recent agreement to a joint communique opens the door for the
resumption of a more positive U.S.-China relationship. Nevertheless a
simple return to the relationship we enjoyed one year ago is
improbable. The last year has been a sobering experience in
U.S.-China relations. The
Chinese have shown themselves to be hard bargainers, with a strong
sense of their own interests and how to project them. Those
interests often differ from our own. We can expect in the coming
year and beyond that the Chinese will continue to take a tough line
with the U.S., particularly on
Taiwan matters, and will continue to act more from concrete
self-interest than from a conceptual commitment to the benefits of
cooperation.
Momentum to Where?
We will need to be no less hard-headed. If, as EA has pointed out, it is important to
establish a sense of “momentum” and “steady growth” in the
relationship, it will be no less important to identify from an early point the
limits and the potential of that relationship and the goal that
we want to establish momentum toward. This kind of analysis
will be necessary if we are to properly determine the extent and
limits of the investment in our Chinese ties.
In partial answer to that question, I believe that China—because of
its size, location, and anti-Soviet orientation—offers a range of
potential strategic benefits, both globally and regionally. It is
also in
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our interest to
encourage a stable China, constructively tied to the West and to the
world community, since a hostile or instable China could move closer
toward the USSR, and could
threaten U.S. friends and interests
in Asia.
We must, nevertheless, be cautious in our
evaluation of the possible extent of “strategic cooperation”
with the PRC. Already the basis
for strategic cooperation has begun to contract. This is
evidenced in part by the significantly curtailed nature of the
strategic portion of our joint communique, and by the Chinese desire
during the later stages of the negotiations to further restrict or
to eliminate it entirely. Beijing has recently
moved to publicly distance itself from the U.S., and has become more
openly critical of U.S. positions
internationally. In part, this was a reaction to the uncertainty of
the Taiwan arms negotiations. More broadly, though, the PRC now appears to be moving away from
a perceived partnership with the U.S. against the USSR, and toward a position less identified with
uncompromising anti-Sovietism. Efforts are
accelerating to cultivate Third World nations and even radical states close to the Soviets.
While near-term detente between Beijing and Moscow remains unlikely,
and while China will continue to oppose Soviet “hegemonism,” some relaxation of Sino-Soviet relations in the
political, cultural and economic fields
has already begun and can be expected to continue.
Communist Party Chairman Hu Yaobang’s recent speech to the Twelfth
Party Congress stands as only the latest indicator of the changing
nature of the U.S.-China
relationship.5 Based on this
realignment, we can expect that Beijing will seek
to avoid the appearance of either alliance or alignment with the
United States, and while continuing to pursue policies
“parallel” to our own, will in the future follow an increasingly
independent policy.
A Modulated Policy
Overall, these developments indicate the need for a
U.S. policy which is
positive and cordial, but less expensive and more at arm’s
length than was once anticipated. We should continue to
encourage the pursuit and coordination of parallel interests
wherever possible, but with a more limited set of expectations than
in the past regarding the prospects for true cooperation. In
particular, much greater attention must be given
to the need to modulate future U.S. initiatives to the constructiveness of actual Chinese
behavior. This will be necessary to ensure a proper balance
in the relationship, and to avoid a situation in which the U.S. is cast in the role of suitor. The
perception of a United States which is overly anxious to build a
close relationship could serve to encourage those in the PRC who are inclined to leverage us on
issues where differences
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still remain, and, paradoxically, those inclined to distance
themselves from us in order to maintain an independent image. This
suggests, among other things, the need to maintain appropriate
restraint on the pacing and timing of future initiatives toward
Beijing, including near-term high-level visits.
In this context, we need to ask not only how we can
advance our China relationship by actions designed to meet
Chinese demands or expectations, but also what concretely we
ourselves want or expect to gain from the Chinese. While,
as some have suggested, it may be desirable to loosen controls on
technology exports to the PRC or to
go forward in the area of peaceful nuclear cooperation (an enhanced
focus on economic development, China’s principal national objective,
may in fact be our best strategy for the moment), these actions
should not occur in a vacuum. Instead they should be related to a
clearly demonstrated Chinese desire for constructive cooperation.
We should not give something for nothing.
As outlined below, this could be measured by concrete indicia. In
addition, we should also consider the possible negative sanctions
available (such as the withholding of technology) should Beijing
again threaten a retrogression or should Chinese policies turn in a
direction decidedly hostile to U.S.
interests.
Pressure and Firmness on Taiwan
We should, in addition, avoid focusing excessive
attention on those areas where the U.S. and the PRC
continue to disagree. Such a focus would detract from our
objective of rebuilding a positive, broad-based relationship. The
immediate issue remains Taiwan. Despite the
communique, the Chinese have told us directly they do not
consider this the end of the issue, and that they reserve
the right to scrutinize our future sales. Since our agreement to the
communique, we have continued to be pressured on this score.
According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the communique “only
marks a beginning of the settlement of this issue,” and a through
resolution “is indispensable to the maintenance and development of
Sino-U.S. relations.” We have
been told privately that Beijing expects that reductions in arms
sales to Taiwan will not be “dollar-a-year,” but rather will be
rapid and will lead to an early termination. We are currently being
pressed for data on past sales levels, and it is clear that Beijing
will attempt to use language in paragraph 9 of the communique
calling for “appropriate consultations” to support their claim to a
voice in our future arms decisions. China has publicly rejected the
fundamental linkage between our willingness to reduce future sales
and the PRC’s commitment to a
peaceful resolution of the issue (Xinhua,
August 29). Beijing has also continued to heavily criticize the
Taiwan Relations Act, suggesting it will remain a specific target of
Chinese policy. An authoritative editorial in the People’s Daily has predicted that the
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U.S.-China relationship will face a
crisis if U.S. policymakers insist
on adhering to this “internal law.”6
I do not believe these objections to U.S. policy are “pro forma.”
Instead, it seems clear that even if these statements are made to
some extent for internal consumption, they are no less indicative of
the true Chinese position. While some are hopeful that the
communique will allow us to put the Taiwan issue on the “back
burner” for one or more years, if experience is any indication our
respite will be short. Under these circumstances, we must be prepared to be very firm in adhering to the
President’s desire to sell Taiwan the arms it needs for its
legitimate self-defense, and must strongly resist pressure from
Beijing to explicitly or implicitly accept a Chinese role in
determining the pace of our movement on this score. Such
pressure should be met, I suggest, not with discussion of the merits
of proposed arms sales, but rather should be deflected by general
reassurances of our commitment to the terms of the communique as we
interpret it.
Implications
The analysis above suggests that the United States might move in a
number of directions.
(a) Pursue a positive but low-keyed
relationship. The U.S. can
go forward with its relationship with China on a reserved basis,
based on the judgment that current Chinese attitudes may restrain
for the foreseeable future the extent of Sino-American cooperation.
Under this strategy, U.S.
initiatives should be undertaken at a measured pace related directly
to the degree of reciprocity demonstrated by the Chinese. Specific
steps might include initial restraint in near-term high-level visits
(e.g., postponement of some high-level visits to Beijing until early
1983, or waiting for Zhao
Ziyang to visit Washington before sending a
delegation of comparable seniority), and shifting the primary focus
of the relationship, if this should be necessary, in the direction
of economic and commercial relations (e.g., enhanced technology
transfer and credit extension).
(b) Expand the relationship, if possible, as a
means toward achieving specific objectives. Pursue a more
aggressive policy, aimed at achieving concrete benefits. Under this
approach, we would seek to move the Chinese forward by offering up
special incentives that may be of interest. Should Beijing prove
unwilling to offer concrete, reciprocal benefits, we would need to
fall back to a more restrained policy. Specific inducements the
United States could offer might include stepped up
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technology transfer and the sale of
selected defensive arms (consistent with the interests of China’s
non-communist neighbors). Specific objectives the United States
might hope to pursue (and concrete measures of Chinese interest in
constructive cooperation) could include Chinese support or
neutrality on third world issues in which we have an interest, a
forthcoming position on Southwest Asian problems (such as support
for Pakistan), aid to the non-communist resistance in Kampuchea,
access to military facilities in China, port calls for US naval
vessels, and restraint of Chinese criticism on Taiwan. Though far
from certain, this approach could have the added benefit of drawing
the Chinese closer to the U.S.
strategic network.
In either event, S/P does not
recommend an immediate acceleration of the China relationship in the
absence of more clearly articulated planning for long-term strategy
toward both China and Taiwan.
