75. Memorandum From Gregory Treverton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1
SUBJECT
- Meeting on USIA and CU, Thursday, June 30, 11:30 a.m.
Wellford will chair the meeting. If things continue on their current track, there are really five issues to be discussed:
—timing of a decision. Can the question of USIA/CU organization be put to the President soon, or should it be deferred for further study? Deferral is not taken to be a serious possibility, with Vance pressing his proposal2 and the Administration on record to Congress with the promise of a plan. If you want to try to put the horse before the cart, it will take a major effort, probably a memo to the President arguing that reorganization should not be pulled out of the air but rather follow a careful look at what the U.S. wants to do, and why.
—should USIA and CU be merged. On that there is general agreement.
—can we build a searching review of programs into the reorganization. Consolidation will not address your concerns about the quality and imaginativeness of USIA programs; indeed it might distract attention from them. If you choose not to hold up decisions on organization, at a minimum, I recommend that as part of any consolidation we secure agreement to an ongoing process of outside review, carried on by an NSC/State/OMB/USIA group.
—how will a consolidated USIA/CU relate to the State Department. Here the lines are clearly drawn: Vance would like an AID-relationship; most others prefer something akin to USIA’s current status—independence with special links to the White House; an ACDA-style relationship to State is another possibility.
—how much independence for VOA. There is general agreement that VOA should not—and probably cannot, due to Congress—be an independent agency. But people differ on other possibilities. Vance’s memo [Page 222] has hard words for VOA’s lack of responsiveness to policy guidelines, and by leaving VOA within USIA but bringing the latter into State, his proposal clearly intends to increase the control over VOA. Others argue that the current situation is about the best that can be done, that some tension between VOA’s desires and the comfort of State desk officers is inevitable and not all bad. Still others would like to go further in declaring VOA’s editorial independence.
(BIB and RFE/RL are issues with some relation to the USIA/CU question. But I strongly believe they should be kept apart; nothing is lost by considering BIB separately later on.)
Vance Proposal
Vance concludes that the “optimum solution” is to consolidate “our public diplomacy resources.” He would place the consolidated foreign information-cultural organization (including the VOA) in an AID-like relationship to the Department of State, on the following argument:
a) to maintain the status quo would cause us to lose an opportunity to correct a longstanding organizational defect and to improve foreign policy guidance in our information programs;
b) consolidation would simplify communication and facilitate broad program operations involving both exchange of persons and media products;
c) the various information activities complement one another, and to fragment them would result in weakened programs and less effective coordination;
d) an independent VOA would make difficult effective guidance by State and would “aggravate” the present tendency of VOA to act outside of established policy;
e) in an AID-like relationship it would be easier to integrate the conduct of public diplomacy with traditional diplomacy, and to achieve greater efficiency in our international information and cultural operational activities.
Vance argues that the risks (such as possible reduction in the Department’s influence over the exchange program and greater congressional resistance to funding exchanges) would be minimized if USIA programs were brought into a new relationship with the Department, comparable to that of AID. The exchange programs’ present organizational and budgetary autonomy to that extent would be maintained.
Vance’s is an argument for greater central direction and control of “public diplomacy” activities. It does not address directly the issues of what is done, where and how well.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 2–7/77. No classification marking. Sent for information. An unknown hand drew a downward pointing arrow at Treverton’s name in the “from” line. Aaron initialed the top-right hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it. According to an attached NSC Correspondence Profile, a copy was sent to Gates, and Aaron noted the memorandum on June 30. (Ibid.) A record of the meeting has not been found.↩
- See Document 64.↩