Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

95. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 25, 1980, 1855Z

3998. Subj: Cubans Push Small Boat Departures As A Solution. Ref: (A) Havana 3908 (B) Havana 3971 (C) Havana 3866.²

1. C—Entire text.

2. Caught in an embarrassing dilemma, Castro clearly sees the Mariel small-boat formula as a way out. It will put him in a position to claim he is not impeding the departure of the Peruvian Embassy refugees; better, it will (or at least he hopes it will) shift the entire focus and onus to us. His contention will be that it was to the US that the overwhelming majority of those departing wished to go anyway; he is accommodating them. Why go to a processing center in Costa Rica, he will ask, when they can go directly to the US?

3. The other governments involved secretly may be relieved (and some not so secretly), for in fact the Mariel formula does put the onus on us (and removes it from them). Further, experience with the refugees who have arrived in Madrid and Peru indeed suggests that most of them will not be content until they set foot on Flagler St. Other governments may therefore ask themselves why they should put themselves out to take in refugees only to have them immediately demand to go to the US. Hence, we can probably expect little support for the idea of reopening the air bridge to Costa Rica, or to any other third country.

4. We are, then, no longer talking of 3,500 refugees; rather, even if Castro does not pull the plug entirely and resume an unrestricted Camarioca-type operation,³ we are likely to get all of the remaining 8,000 refugees from the Peruvian Embassy, plus several thousand family members and friends of those who come down to pick them up (see Ref A). A conservative estimate would suggest that 12 to 15 thousand Cubans may arrive in Florida from Mariel during the next month or so.

5. There is almost no chance of negotiating a solution with the Cuban Govt at this time. With the Cubans already suspicious of our intentions and embarrassed by their own blunder at the Peruvian Embassy, our announcement of military maneuvers at Guantanamo closed off any possibility of such negotiations, at least for the present. In its ire, Havana can now think only of ways to stick it back to us. And sticking it to us at Mariel helps get them off the horns of the dilemma they themselves had created at the Peruvian Embassy. Recalling that we had done nothing to stop maritime hijackers and that all 400 some-odd Cubans who arrived by small boat in Florida last year had been “greeted as heroes”, the Cuban Govt is now chortling that Mariel will pay us back in kind.

6. Beyond the fallout from the Peruvian Embassy, there looms the possibility that Castro will indeed pull the plug, i.e., that he will issue exit documents to 100 to 200 thousand people and invite their friends and relatives to pick them up at Mariel. That decision has not yet been made, however, and Castro realizes that there are risks involved.

7. The US must carefully review its options as the dimensions of the problem, and Cuban intentions, come into better focus. At least so long as the exodus is related to and includes the refugees from the Peruvian Embassy, it would be a major error on our part to close our doors. Having expressed our sympathy with those seeking refuge in the Peruvian Embassy, it would appear cynical and hypocritical to refuse them entry, especially as they may suffer savage harassment and even physical abuse so long as they are in Cuba. Public statements concerning our immigration laws have no impact on anyone save ourselves. Indeed, they are likely to be seen as a bureaucratic/legalistic response to a humanitarian problem of major proportions.

8. Castro will consider halting the exodus only if it becomes embarrassing. Public statements or postures on our part suggesting alarm or intentions to block the flow will only encourage him and give him fuel for his propaganda. In this regard, USINT considers the statement read by the Spokesman on April 23 as counterproductive.⁴ We should move quietly to take legal action against boat owners on a selective basis, but that should not include arrests. In the final analysis, our best bet for the moment is to turn the exodus against Castro by emphasizing the drama of thousands of people fleeing Cuba by small boat. It is our best bet and yet we seem not yet to have even mounted an effort. USINT has not yet heard a single interview on VOA. Interviews with those arriving by small boat which play up the beatings and intimidations to which the refugees were subjected prior to departure would be especially effective.

9. Meanwhile, to handle the incoming flow in a more orderly manner better designed to protect our own interests, consideration might be given to the establishment in Florida (rather than Costa Rica) of a center where refugees could be concentrated and housed while being processed. We may as well make preparations for the inevitable.

Smith

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 15, Cuba, 5/80. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information Immediate to Caracas, Lima, and San Jose. Carter initialed the telegram.
2. In telegram 3908 from Havana, April 23, the Interests Section reported that Cubans were traveling to Miami in small boats. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800202–0546) In telegram 3971 from Havana, April 24, the Interests Section noted that the Cuban press was withholding information regarding Castro’s decision to stop the airlift to Costa Rica. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800204–0140) In telegram 3866 from Havana, April 22, the Interests Section recommended that U.S. officials should adopt a policy of quietly discouraging American boat owners from participating in the sealift at Mariel. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800200–1031)
3. A reference to the 1965 boatlift. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, Document 308.
4. See footnote 4, Document 92. The statement asserted that “it is a felony to bring into the United States any alien not duly admitted by an immigration officer and is punishable by penalties of up to 5 years in prison, fines of $2,000 and the forfeiture of the vessel.”