Office of the Historian

90. Memorandum From the Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Latin America ([name not declassified]) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci), the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (Clarke), and the Deputy Director for Operations (McMahon)1

Washington, April 11, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Mini-SCC Meeting on Cuban-Peruvian Situation, 11 April 1980

1. David Aaron of the White House chaired the meeting. There were participants from State, NSC, JCS, ICA, ISA, as well as A/NIO/LA and [less than 1 line not declassified] for CIA.

2. There was no charge to CIA as a result of the session.

3. Aaron said that the President had decided the US should announce its willingness to accept up to 3,500 of the roughly 11,000 Cuban asylum seekers in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana. The White House had already canvassed key Congressmen on the issue and had found substantial support for such a policy.

4. There was general consensus that the President’s policy should be made public as soon as possible.2 This would not only demonstrate the degree of US concern but would place early pressure on other governments to make good on offers to accept some of the refugees. Peru has indicated it will take 1,000; lesser offers have come from Costa Rica, Spain, among others.

5. There was considerable discussion of how and when the emigres could be gotten out. It was noted, for example, that Costa Rica had offered to serve as a “staging area”, from which the refugees could ultimately proceed to their ultimate destinations.3 State noted, however, [Page 204] that Costa Rica was really terribly limited. Responding to a subsequent suggestion that the asylees be taken to Guantanamo and then abroad by ship, CIA pointed out the logistical and other difficulties involved in such a move. The idea was quickly shelved.

6. There was general agreement that along with announcing our willingness to take some of the refugees, Washington should also quickly and persuasively urge other nations to make serious efforts to help, insist on better facilities and efficient processing of the refugees in Havana, and call on UN Secretary General Waldheim to issue an appeal echoing our concern for the welfare of the asylum seekers while still in Cuba.4

7. Aaron strongly advocated that we do our utmost to stress before world opinion the “failure” of the Cuban system that the refugee situation represents. Others argued that we ought not to go overboard in this vein; after all, they noted, the incident largely “speaks for itself”, and we don’t want to appear to gloat or to prompt Castro to retaliate with harsh treatment of the refugees.

[name not declassified]
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 18, Folder 15: PRC Meeting—Cuban/Haitian Refugee Problem. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].↩
  2. On April 14, President Carter signed Presidential Determination No. 80–16 allowing “25 to 33 percent of the persons who have taken sanctuary at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, up to a maximum of 3500 refugees,” to settle in the United States. The refugees would be admitted according to the requirements of the Refugee Act of 1980. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 17, Cuba: Refugees, 4/13–25/80) The same day, Powell read a White House statement announcing the President’s policy. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 682–683)↩
  3. Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo attempted to resolve the crisis by offering to fly the Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy to Costa Rica, accept some, and serve as a staging area for moving the rest to other countries. (“300 Cubans Reported Set to Leave,” The New York Times, April 16, p. A4)↩
  4. In telegram 1392 from USUN, April 12, the Mission reported that McHenry had sent Waldheim a note “asking if he might intervene on the Peru Embassy issue in Havana as the issue was reaching crisis proportions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800183–0041)↩