Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

79. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 27, 1979

SUBJECT

• 11:00 AM Meeting on the Soviet Brigade

Though your participation in it will be brief, it will be extremely important in setting the tone and in providing guidance for our subsequent deliberations. Your presence will assert your personal leadership and will thus be both substantive and symbolic.²

Let me draw your attention to a few things you may wish to have in mind:

1. As I told you, I am concerned that the exercise in building consensus by convoking a large number of alumni—which no other President did in a crisis—could backfire, and could be perceived on the outside in an adverse manner. Perhaps this has gone too far to be called off, but we certainly have not gone too far to get it under control. I certainly do not favor prolonged discussion with the group of your options and alternatives.³

2. As to the options, the group will be presented with a larger number than is desirable and probably with some that are too extreme to be adopted. In thinking about options, you should take into account the following factors:

—What is needed to preserve SALT?

—What is needed to project firm personal leadership?

—What is needed to show that the United States means business when it concludes that the Soviet/Cuban activity has gone too far?

—How do we impose some penalty on the Soviets themselves without excessively inflaming the situation?

The above calls for a judicious mixture of options that reflect heightened U.S. defense and intelligence efforts, some response to Cuban activism, and some penalty for the Soviets. Confining the problem to Cuba alone will be seen as giving the Soviets a free hand (after all, it is a Soviet brigade that is involved and it is the Soviets who have sponsored the Cubans in Africa), and it will certainly hurt SALT, which is a U.S.-Soviet issue.⁴ Those who wish to reject SALT are doing it largely because of frustration over what they perceive to be a pattern of U.S. acquiescence vs. Soviet assertiveness. We need to demonstrate that we are assertive vs. the Soviets, and thereby strengthen our case that we can proceed with SALT, having responded to the Soviet challenge.

3. Just a reminder regarding the package that I think you should have in your response, in the light of the above: (1) increased military presence in the Caribbean; (2) enhanced Rapid Deployment Force; (3) enhancing intelligence capabilities; (4) lifting of Congressional restrictions on U.S. operations to counter Cuban activism; (5) more assistance to Central America and the Caribbean, both economic and MSA; (6) postponement of the decision on MFN for the Soviet Union until better climate; (7) careful review of technology transfer; (8) presidential commission on manpower; (9) a broad statement that we will resist intrusion of Soviet or Cuban armed forces into Western Hemispheric nations. Harold and Lloyd will have some additional items to recommend. The overall options list is longer. Others may wish to cut this list down.

4. Finally, on the assumption that nothing transpires today with Gromyko⁵ that alters your decision to go on Sunday,⁶ you should tell us what kind of consultations you want with the top Congressional leaders, in addition to the so-called alumni group. I would guess that you will not make your final decision on the options until tomorrow morning’s NSC meeting at the earliest. With Lopez-Portillo eating up much of your time on Friday and Saturday morning,⁷ the best time for the consultation presumably would be on Saturday afternoon. In some cases, moreover, individual consultations may be desirable (e.g., getting Nunn on board). We will be operating on an extremely tight schedule, and therefore the more guidance we get from you earlier, the better.⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 16, Cuba, Soviet Brigade (meetings), 9/79. Top Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum indicating he saw it.
2. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Mondale and other senior officials regarding Cuba from 11:10 to 11:24 a.m. on September 27. No substantive record of this meeting has been found. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
3. The President invited notable policymakers from past administrations to advise him in dealing with the Soviet brigade issue. He met with the “Citizens Advisory Committee” from 12:34 to 2:04 p.m. on September 29. (Ibid.) Participants included Dean Rusk, Roswell Gilpatrick, John McCone, John McCloy, William Rogers, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Brent Scowcroft, Sol Linowitz, W. Averell Harriman, Henry Kissinger, and Clark Clifford. An incomplete account of this meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 9/19–30/79. See also Bernard Gwertzman, “President Gets Wide-Ranging Advice on Soviet Troops From 15 Experts,” The New York Times, September 30, p. 3.
4. Brzezinski hoped that the President would use the brigade issue to adopt a tougher stance toward the Soviets, increase defense spending, condemn Soviet-Cuban activities in the Third World, and ostracize Cuba by developing a dialogue with the nation’s Western European donors. Carter, however, rejected this advice. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 350)
5. See footnote 5, Document 78.
6. September 30. Presumably a reference to the President’s speech.
7. Carter and Lopez Portillo met in Washington on September 28 and 29. No NSC meeting was held that morning. See Documents 164 and 165.
8. At the bottom of the page, Brzezinski wrote, “P.S. Byrd told me, when I called him this a.m., that he will go public on SALT ‛sometime next week.’” On September 23, the President met with Vance and Senator Byrd. Byrd stated that the only way to save the SALT II negotiations was to move beyond the “phony” Soviet brigade issue and cool U.S. rhetoric. Vance concurred, arguing that the issue be limited to Cuba and not involve the entirety of East-West relations. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 350)