Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

39. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, November 22, 1978

SUBJECT

• Cuban Political Prisoners

A rather cynical idea has been growing in my brain since I read the memcon of David’s conversation in Cuernavaca.² For the first time, Padron began fudging—uncharacteristic of him—in his description of the number of political prisoners which Castro would release. At one point, he said 1200 names had already been given, and we could expect 2000 more. Later, he referred to an “additional 3000.” I recalled a cable I read last July in which there was a public discussion for the first time in Cuba—as far as we knew—of an unemployment problem, involving perhaps 18,000 people, 15,000 of whom were formerly political prisoners, probably incorrigibles. I suspect when that figure was brought to Castro’s attention, he first expressed surprise, and then perhaps a lightbulb flashed in his head. He may have thought, what a wonderful way to eliminate Cuba’s human rights problem, its unemployment problem, its problem with the Cuban-American community, and at the same time, make a positive gesture to Jimmy Carter.

As Castro’s press conference yesterday demonstrates, he has effectively exploited this issue, even to the point of putting us on the defensive, forcing us to explain why our procedures are so slow.³ He has whetted the appetite of the Cuban-American community, who most likely would not be disturbed by the prospect of dumping half of the Cuban population into Florida, and has pointed them towards putting pressure on us. And he has begun to suggest that there are many more than just 3000 political prisoners at stake. I sensed the possibility that Castro may be sending us aging political dissidents, rather than recently released political prisoners, and spoke to Harry Brandon of the FBI before he went down to Cuba with the latest Justice Department team. I gave him a series of questions which he could use to test my theories, and he promised to do that. I expect him back next week, and will get a read-out for you. But my guess is that Castro may intend to release as many as 15,000 political dissidents—not including their families.

If this is the case, we are in for real trouble unless the President leans very hard on Griffin Bell. Bell plans to continue processing the prisoners with all deliberateness, and no speed. Furthermore, his assistant has informed me that Bell does not intend to go beyond paroling 1000 political prisoners and their dependents. Then he will consider any case above that on an individual basis.

There are two issues for us to consider: whether to expedite the procedures, and how many parolees will the US take. As regards the procedures, there are a number of things we can do, and I attach a list of items suggested by Wayne Smith of State, at Tab A.⁴

As regards the total number of prisoners, this is a difficult political issue, and we will need some Presidential guidance. The President stands a good chance to turn around the Cuban-American community in Florida, a community approaching one million. The release of prisoners by Castro is a tremendous human rights opportunity, which Castro has exploited more than us. The President really should meet with some of the Cuban political prisoners, and he would score a tremendous triumph if we could tell them that he is prepared to expedite the procedures and take all the political prisoners Castro is willing to release.

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that you chair a small meeting on Monday or Tuesday, involving State and Justice Department officials, with an eye toward preparing a memo on this subject for the President.⁵

One additional item. Castro has seized the initiative, not only on the human rights issue, but on the question of who takes the next step. This is demonstrated by the fact that people have stopped asking us what we are going to do about Cuba in Africa, and have started asking us what steps are we going to take in response to Castro’s “human rights gesture.”

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 13, Cuba, 10–11/78. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action.
2. See Document 37.
3. In telegram 3794 from Havana, November 23, the Interests Section reported that Castro announced at his November 21 press conference that the possibility for family reunification of Cuban political refugees depended largely on the willingness of the U.S. Government to grant entry to those seeking asylum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780483–0186)
4. Not attached and not found.
5. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. In a marginal comment on a follow-up memorandum from Pastor, Aaron wrote, “I agree and we need to start a campaign about Castro ‛dumping’ his unemployed in the U.S.—which is the truth behind his policy!” (Memorandum from Pastor to Aaron, November 27; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 8, Cuba, 8–12/78) In a November 27 memorandum to Aaron and Brzezinski, Pastor stated that he met with Justice Department officials himself. (Ibid.)