Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

378. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, October 27, 1980

SUBJECT

• Mini-PRC on US Policy to Eastern Caribbean—Tuesday, October 28, 1980—10:00 a.m. (C)

It has taken almost a year to drag State to such a meeting, but the last year was not entirely wasted.² We have done a lot of staff work and the leaders in the area have been able to articulate their own needs more clearly and in a way which permits us to respond. But the mini-PRC is still essential because the IG cannot resolve any of these issues and has an institutional habit of dealing with each question in the slowest, narrowest and most piecemeal manner; it will not have an impact on the FY 82 budget, which is what we should aim for. An additional purpose of the meeting is to sensitize OMB to the importance of those issues so that we will not have to rant and rave for every penny. (S)

State’s agenda is at Tab A and background papers follow.³ I have prepared a short summary of State’s positions on the various issues, and their recommended proposals. I have gone over these with Matt Nimetz and with Admiral Hayes of the Coast Guard, and both are in complete agreement. Because State is so internally divided on these issues, Matt will need for you to move these proposals forward, and he will try to maneuver the meeting so that the results reflect these proposals. (At Tab II)⁴ (S)

A Comprehensive Approach

What we have lacked in our approach to the problems of the Eastern Caribbean is a concept. We had such a concept after World War II, when we moved into Latin America to displace the Germans and other Europeans in providing economic and military advice and support. We formalized these arrangements with the Rio Pact and with MAAG groups. (S)

We need as wide-ranging a concept and strategy for the Caribbean today, but it has to be suited to the unique characteristics of those nations and to a different time. We cannot go in in a massive way both because it’s more than they need or could handle and because it would be counterproductive politically. Our objectives are: to enhance the security of the region; to extend our own presence in the most effective and reassuring manner; and to show ourselves determined to help meet their economic concerns. (S)

—To enhance the security of the region, we should ensure that each nation has its Coast Guard and that theirs are all linked with each other and with ours. I have spoken to Admiral Hayes, Commandant of our Coast Guard, several times about this and have encouraged him to visit the area, as he has done. He is enthusiastic about the idea of weaving together a regional Coast Guard, and with our CG playing a leading role. He is only waiting for money and marching orders. We should develop a regional Coast Guard training center in the area—perhaps our old Naval Base in Barbados, which was closed down, but this should be suggested by the nations in the region perhaps at a conference in which the USCG attended. The US Coast Guard is a much better “pointman” than our armed forces as these nations need a CG to stop smuggling narcotics, and arms trafficking, and to defend themselves. Anything more military is inappropriate and unwanted. Our Coast Guard is viewed as “clean” and helpful and not really “military.” But we need to give the boats and the facilities. (S)

—To extend our security presence in the region, I would cut down on port calls by US aircraft carriers and dramatically increase the use of a specialized Seabees battalion that would be trained to work just in the Caribbean and to teach as well as do. The Seabees are in demand in the area, and they give our military a good name. After a couple of years of getting to know the people on the islands, my guess is that the Seabees would be asked to help in a number of other ways, providing added security and assurance to the area and added US presence in an effective way. (S)

—To help meet their economic needs, we need to do a lot more. There are dozens of good proposals on the table as a result of our pushing and also the York and Weintraub reports,⁵ which IDCA commissioned at our initiative at least in part to diffuse our pressure. The latest tack for diffusing the pressure is to consult with the nations of the area about establishing a framework (modeled on the CIEC/OAS of the Alliance) for negotiating the decisions internationally which the bureaucracy is unwilling to take now. The idea is that such a framework would be an action-forcing mechanism; I think it’s an expectation-inflating mechanism and one that confuses the region’s leaders, who are quick to tell us what they need—increase bilateral aid, relax trade barriers, give us a Coast Guard, modify tax provisions, etc.—and wonder why we talk about a framework rather than just do it. They’re right. I would recommend a modest three point program: (1) Establish a bilateral aid fund of $50–$100 million per year for three years for all the nations of the area except Grenada. (They can join when they have free elections.) This would be distinct from our support for the Caribbean Development Bank. (2) Permit all textile and perhaps other import-sensitive products manufactured in the Caribbean Basin to come to the US free of restrictions for a 10-year period (or with fewer restrictions). This would have an enormous impact on employment and industralization in the region and thus on illegal immigration to the US. (3) Expand OPIC guarantees, establish a special loan window in Ex-Im Bank, and modify the tax law so that it would permit tax deductions for professional conventions in the Caribbean area. (S)

Henry Owen has asked to consider the economic issues in a separate forum, and so the last package above will not be considered at the mini-PRC. But you need to insert in the record the importance of our putting together a package which is weighted in favor of the economic side, rather than the military. After the Administration agrees on all of the elements that should be involved in the package, we should invite a group of Congressional leaders, and ask them how we can most effectively get Congress to approve the package. (S)

I recommend you focus on Tab II in advance of the meeting. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 83, PCM 022 [1], Eastern Caribbean 10/28/80. Secret. Copies were sent to Brzezinski, Kimmitt, and Owen.
2. Pastor addressed the apparent desire of the Department of State to delay a meeting that would review its Eastern Caribbean policy in memoranda to Brzezinski, July 21 and September 26. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 83, PCM 022 [2], Mini-PRC Eastern Caribbean; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 28, Folder: Latin America, 9–11/80)
3. Not attached. Dodson circulated the agenda and discussion papers in an October 20 memorandum to participants in the upcoming PRC meeting. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 83, PCM 022 [1], Eastern Caribbean 10/28/80)
4. Dated October 27; a copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 83, PCM 022 [2], Mini-PRC Eastern Caribbean.
5. Not found.