210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jamaica1
189469. Subject: Demarches on GOJ Concerning Anti-U.S. Campaign and Security of U.S. Personnel. Kingston 5190.2
1. C—Entire text.
2. Summary. Undersecretary Newsom met with Jamaican Ambassador Rattray July 15 to express the deep concern of the U.S. for the safety of Embassy Kingston personnel, who are jeopardized by the anti-U.S. campaign being conducted in Jamaica.3 Newsom noted that the freedom given those making allegations against the U.S. was not consistent with the good bilateral relations desired by the U.S. In response Rattray emphasized Jamaica’s regard for freedom of the press and the negative treatment accorded the GOJ and Prime Minister Manley in the U.S. media. Newsom argued for the GOJ’s use of persuasion with those making irresponsible and inflammatory attacks against the U.S. and said the U.S. would take the necessary measures to ensure the safety of its personnel. Ambassador is requested to seek an appointment ASAP with Manley to reinforce in Kingston the points made to Rattray here.4 End summary.
3. On July 15 Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David P. Newsom called in Jamaican Ambassador Alfred A. Rattray and made the following points:
—Expressed the deep concern of the U.S. over the attacks on U.S. Embassy personnel;
—Recognized that Jamaica is amidst a heated electoral campaign, toward which the U.S. remains neutral and detached;
[Page 508]—Expressed the further U.S. concern over the freedom allowed those making allegations against the U.S. in the Jamaican media which endangered the safety of U.S. officials in Jamaica;
—Regretted the consequent departure for security reasons of several AID personnel, who had been working on projects of benefit to Jamaica;
—Stated U.S. appreciation for the help promised by Prime Minister Manley following the attack on Mr. Kinsman’s house; and
—Noted that the participation by some GOJ officials in anti-U.S. activities was not consistent with the good bilateral relations the U.S. desired with Jamaica.
When Rattray pressed for details, Newsom explained the U.S. perception of an orchestrated campaign in the Jamaican media, encouraged by individuals such as Landis and Wolf5 and using themes that misrepresented U.S. policy and placed U.S. personnel in jeopardy. Deputy Assistant Secretary Bushnell mentioned the handbills and posters now circulating designed to inflame readers against Embassy personnel and the upcoming seminar sponsored by the People’s National Party youth organization on alleged CIA and imperialist destabilization in the Caribbean.
4. Rattray’s bottom-line response was to say he would convey (A) the U.S. concern over the safety of U.S. personnel and (B) the U.S. request for the GOJ to use its power of dissuasion on the media and individuals attacking the U.S. Before arriving at the bottom line Rattray observed that:
—Jamaica was not a dictatorship where the government could control the press;
—The government-owned media were not government-controlled;
—He had made past representations to the USG about anti-GOJ, anti-Manley reports in the U.S. press (which continue), but to no avail;
—The PNP and its constituent parts were likewise not subject to government control;
—Manley has said publicly he is assured the CIA is not now, in contrast with 1976, trying to destabilize his regime, and he believes this; and
—The GOJ has been responsive to specific requests from the U.S.
5. Newsom explained the extreme sensitivity in the U.S. on the issue of security for diplomats overseas and noted that the USG would take measures if Jamaican diplomats here were subjected to the treat [Page 509] ment American diplomats are receiving in Jamaica. If the GOJ is not prepared to do what it could through persuasion and other means to protect U.S. personnel from being singled out for intimidation and possible acts of violence, the US would take the necessary measures to ensure their safety. Bushnell commented that the GOJ and PNP were certainly related, since both were composed largely of the same people.
6. Rattray commented that the perception was abroad in the U.S. press that the USG favored the electoral defeat of the Manley government, as evidenced by the U.S. stance on aid (including the lack of a PL–480 program in FY–81 and the failure to make a pledge to Jamaica at the recent Caribbean Group meeting). Newsom stated the U.S. record on Jamaica was clear and included (A) hard work to support Jamaica’s relationship with the IMF, (B) continued disbursements of assistance in the pipeline, and (C) a position of neutrality toward the election with no steps to influence its outcome. Bushnell reminded Rattray that the IFI’s had not found Jamaica eligible for extraordinary assistance through the Caribbean Group’s Caribbean Development Facility and that some countries had simply taken the opportunity of the meeting to describe their ongoing programs. He further commented that the U.S. policy of “business as usual” regarding economic assistance could not be maintained if the anti-American campaign continues in Jamaica, forcing U.S. personnel needed to implement our aid programs to depart to protect their safety and well-being.
7. Action. Ambassador is requested to seek an appointment with Manley—Foreign Minister Patterson if the former is unavailable—to make the points contained in para 3 above, and in following paragraphs as appropriate. You should also make the point (drawn from Kingston 5165) that while the U.S. appreciates the Prime Minister’s strong condemnation of the attack on Mr. Kinsman’s house, the problem remains that unfriendly, unwarranted accusations against the U.S. go without rebuttal or discouragement by the GOJ. In relating this demarche to the Ambassador’s previous one of July 4 (Kingston 4916),6 you should refer to the incident outside the Jones residence July 7 and the continuing efforts of the government-owned media that jeopardize the security of U.S. personnel (Kingston 5099, Kingston 5190).7 Department will respond by septel to Kingston telegrams 5164 and 5165.8
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800346–0682. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by LeBourgeois; cleared by Bushnell, Warne, and Pastor; approved by Newsom.↩
- In telegram 5190 from Kingston, July 15, the Embassy reported that allegations that the Daily Gleaner published stories planted by the CIA led to anti-U.S. sentiment in Kingston. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800341–0131)↩
- The Embassy reported in telegram 5165 from Kingston, July 14, that the homes of AID contractor Jesse Jones and Political Officer N. Richard Kinsman were attacked. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800344–0055)↩
- Lawrence met with Manley on July 23. Although Manley stated that he and JLP candidate Seaga were “cooperating to reduce violence,” the Prime Minister “offered no commitment to squelch anti-U.S. campaign.” (Telegram 5415 from Kingston, July 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800354–0295)↩
- Louis Wolf was the co-editor of the Covert Action Information Bulletin, a U.S. publication critical of the CIA; Fred Landis was the individual who initially leaked the story about the CIA collaborating with the Daily Gleaner. Wolf identified Kinsman as the CIA Station Chief in Kingston. (Jo Thomas, “Gunmen in Jamaica Hit Home of U.S. Aide,” The New York Times, July 5, p. 1)↩
- Dated July 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800341–1179)↩
- Telegram 5099 from Kingston is dated July 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800335–1068)↩
- In telegram 5164 from Kingston, July 14, the Embassy requested a change from the “business as usual” policy, in light of the growing Cuban and Soviet influence. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800350–0183) In a note to Pastor on July 21, Aaron asked, “Pastor, is there anything we can/should do about this? Why not recall our Ambassador or break relations?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 10–12/80)↩