201. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Conversations with Manley (S)
At Tab I is a long memcon which I did on the conversation with Manley. Habib has cleared it.2 (U)
As per your instructions, I met with CIA, State, and Ambassador Lawrence to discuss specific indicators which we can watch in Jamaica which will permit us to judge Manley’s performance during the next six months on the issues which we raised with him. Ambassador Lawrence will be returning to Jamaica on Saturday and will be seeing Manley on Monday.3 I suggested to him that he review with Manley in the clearest terms our concerns and his assurances on the four major issues which we discussed. Since the meeting went for four hours and ended on a cordial note, I told Lawrence that it is possible that Manley may have left it with the wrong impression. Lawrence understands that point, and intends to be very clear in reasserting our concerns, and indicating that we will be watching the situation in Jamaica very closely over the next six months. (S)
With regard to the indicators, there are essentially two kinds: passive and active indicators. “Passive indicators” are decisions which Manley’s government will make over the next six months, and we will monitor. If he or his government does anything that (a) suggests a tilt in foreign policy to Cuba or away from the U.S., (b) discourages private investment, (c) threatens Jamaica’s democratic institutions including the press, or (d) suggests a conspiracy between the Jamaican secret police and the KGB or DGI, our Ambassador should immediately bring this piece of evidence to Manley’s attention and protest. Similarly, if Manley does anything positive in these four areas of concern, we should [Page 495] positively reinforce him. An “active indicator” is a test which we would give Manley. For example, when we develop good, hard evidence on collaboration with the KGB or DGI, we should bring it to his attention and make clear that we see this as a test of his sincerity. Ambassador Lawrence is alert to both kinds of indicators, and will bring them to our attention. (S)
The CIA believes that they can already see evidence that the moderates in Manley’s Cabinet have had an important impact on him, and this has been reinforced by our reaction. Apparently Manley has either accepted Bell’s plan to readjust political and economic policy towards a more moderate course, or he is about to do that. Of course, Manley’s recent speeches have been clear signals of moderation. But, as Habib said, “One swallow does not a summer make.” We will have to watch closely over the next few months. (S)
I have tasked the CIA to go back and look closely at all their evidence on KGB/DGI collaboration to see what we can present to Manley. I told Lawrence to keep that door explicitly open when he meets Manley, by saying that we intend to follow up his invitation for evidence in this area soon. As soon as I have something good, I will forward it to you. (S)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 23, Jamaica, 1979. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Owen. A stamped notation on the document reads, “ZB has seen.” Brzezinski wrote a note to Pastor at the top of the first page, “Should we ask the P to approve the indicators? Then we can go back in 6 months.”↩
- Not attached; printed as Document 200.↩
- The Embassy reported in telegram 9069 from Kingston, December 14, that on December 10 Lawrence reiterated to Manley the points that were made by Habib and Young on November 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790581–0809)↩