Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

118. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 20, 1980

Summary of Conclusions

1. Overview of Current Situation. The “trickle” of Cubans into Florida continues at about 80–100 per day (roughly twice as many as from Haiti), with a relatively higher percentage of family members than before. Incoming processing is handled by INS in Miami, which is over-burdened. The Coast Guard estimates that there are about 35 boats in Mariel now and an average of 3–5 boats going south and 2 northbound per day. The Coast Guard estimates that its interdiction rate is about 50%. Only about 16,000 Cubans remain in camps, but of these about 1500 have serious psychiatric problems, and an additional 2000 unaccompanied minors, many of them also with serious psychological problems. In addition, over 1700 have confessed to serious crimes and are incarcerated in federal prison. Still, the Refugee Coordinator concludes that we have a mechanism in place at this time to manage a flow of 2000–3000 new Cuban entrants per month with some strain on the budget. Wayne Smith, Chief of our Interest Section in Havana, believes that Castro wants to keep Mariel open, permitting a small flow, but that he is unlikely to permit the departure of any large boats or many more criminals. (S)

2. Legal Situation. The Justice Department is vigorously pursuing all possible punitive actions against those persons involved in illegally importing undocumented aliens from Cuba, but Coast Guard feels that the laws are not specific or direct enough to act as a full deterrent. Justice indicated that there is a bill pending in Congress which is relevant to this problem and that they will urgently consult with Committee Chairmen to see if we could get this legislation passed soon. Justice also agreed to examine whether any modifications in that bill or any additional legislation is necessary. Justice feels that we are at the point of maximum deterrence as they have not lost any cases yet, but Justice agreed to draft a statement which the Attorney General could deliver, indicating the seriousness of the problem and trying to raise the consciousness of those who are dealing with this matter in the courts. Justice also agreed to look into two cases where businesses in Florida have been used to send money to Cuba, assisting those participating in the boatlift; these would be violations of the embargo. (S)

3. New Plans for Stopping the Outflow of Boats. Justice agreed to develop a plan in consultation with the Coast Guard and with State and local law enforcement officials for monitoring, and if necessary at some future point, interdicting the movement of boats across the causeway going to Key West with the intention of sailing to Cuba. This plan will include the idea of setting up a checkpoint on the causeway to question people with boats. Such a checkpoint would serve as a psychological deterrent; it would provide a data base to chart irregular flows; and Justice could use the information in prosecuting those who ignore the warning.² (S)

4. Returning the Criminals and Undesirables. We have already identified 1700 criminals and 1500 emotionally disturbed people, whom we would like to repatriate to Cuba, and we estimate that there might be as many as 5000–7000, whom we would like to exclude. Thus far, the Justice Department has completed “final orders” for returning 70 individuals, and they expect to be able to complete action on 1000 cases by the end of the year. This could be accelerated to October. The group examined a number of military options for forcibly returning the criminals to Cuba, but agreed that the options are not feasible. We will not be able to repeat the military action and are not ready legally to move the 70 people now. Moreover, the risk of detection and thus military confrontation is high and the current environment is not suitable for such an action. If we were faced with another Blue Fire-type incident, we might consider intercepting such a boat, and DOD was tasked to do a paper on that, but absent that, no one would recommend a military approach at this point. (Gene Eidenberg suggests that we also consider the possibility of intercepting refugee boats from Haiti outside the three-mile limit and returning the people to Haiti.) We will seek to encourage Cuba to repatriate those individuals directly, and through actions we will take in the OAS, UN and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. (S)

5. Reducing the Flow of Boats at Sea. Currently, the Coast Guard interdicts and turns around about half the number of boats intending to go to Cuba. The Group explored a number of military options aimed at significantly reducing the flow by 70% and 90%. DOD estimated that it would involve 32 small combatants (DD/FF), 24 patrol craft, 1 LSD/LHA, and 6 AWACS at a cost of about $500,000 a day to achieve a 90% interdiction rate. To do this, however, would affect scheduled deployments in other vital areas. DOD judges that it could provide a 70–75% interdiction rate with a lot fewer forces and at the rate of about $75,000 per day. In light of a number of questions raised, DOD promised to re-examine the costs and return with more precise estimates of the budgetary and the opportunity costs and political/military implications for these two options. (S)

6. Negotiations with Cuba. A number of options were reviewed, and the group tasked State to refine one which aimed at beginning a discussion with the Cubans on a narrow range of subjects dealing with the emigration issue and suggest a wider discussion some time in the future. The objective would be to test the intention of the Cubans to shut off Mariel and accept criminals and other undesirables for repatriation in return for a dialogue and a process, which could perhaps develop into a wider range of agreements on the movement of people between the US and Cuba. (S)

7. International Strategy. Although the group did not have an opportunity to review the strategy, State intends to call a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council soon with the purpose of seeking a resolution on: (a) respect for other nations’ immigration laws; and (b) repatriation of a nation’s citizens, including criminals. We would then consult with ASEAN nations and seek a similar resolution at the UN General Assembly this fall. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cuba, 7–8/1980. Secret. On a covering memorandum from Brzezinski dated August 21, Carter checked the approve option for the Summary of Conclusions. A set of background papers for the meeting is attached to a memorandum from Funk to Brzezinski, August 28. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 123, SCM 139 Mini SCC Cuban Refugees 8/20/80)
2. In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.”