Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

101. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, April 29, 1980

CUBA: Implications of Refugee Situation

By initiating a massive exodus of Cubans directly to the US, President Castro hopes to alleviate growing domestic pressures on his regime. The Cuban leader probably believes his tactics will press the US to negotiate on his terms to control the flow. Continued disorder in Mariel, however, could create new domestic problems for Castro and cost him international prestige. [portion marking not declassified]

Castro’s primary objective is to get rid of political malcontents as well as those dissatisfied with economic conditions. Over the past few years crime, vandalism, worker apathy, illegal departures, and even some isolated incidents of antigovernment activity have increased. [portion marking not declassified]

The Cuban leader also is retaliating against Peru and Venezuela, which had embarrassed his regime by granting asylum to people forcing their way into those countries’ embassies. Similarly, Havana is striking back at the US for failing to prosecute boat hijackers.² In addition, Cuba wants to embarrass the US by portraying Washington’s reluctance to accept the refugees as a contradiction of its human rights policy. [portion marking not declassified]

Castro apparently believes that he is in the driver’s seat and that he can retain the initiative regardless of what the US does. He will continue—and may step up—the flow of refugees in order to press Washington to enter into formal negotiations.³ [portion marking not declassified]

In any discussions with the US, Castro will resist attempts to involve other countries or international organizations and will push the US to accept large numbers of refugees. He also may seek assurances that, despite planned US military maneuvers and “threatening” statements by US leaders, the US has no hostile intent toward Cuba. In addition, he may exert pressure on the US to prosecute those who hijack boats to Florida. [portion marking not declassified]

Castro hopes to keep the US on the defensive by stirring up an international outcry over the US military exercises beginning on 8 May at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. His address at a massive rally on 1 May probably will key the campaign.⁴ The Cubans also are planning their own military maneuvers and large demonstrations throughout the island on the first day of the US exercises—including a march of one million people past the US Interests Section in Havana. [portion marking not declassified]

Pressures on the Regime

In recent months, Castro has become increasingly disturbed by signs of what he regards as growing US hostility toward Cuba. He probably also fears that Washington might—particularly in the wake of the abortive rescue attempt in Iran—act precipitously against his regime. The Cuban President sees events in Central America as heightening internal pressures on the US for action to contain Communism, and he believes that Cuba would be the most inviting target. [portion marking not declassified]

If the chaos caused by the refugee exodus begins to work against him, however, Castro could find it more difficult to dictate terms. Over 1,000 boats are tied up at Mariel harbor, and the Cubans are encountering growing problems in processing the refugees. Such difficulties apparently already have forced Havana to suspend plans for permitting private aircraft to pick up refugees. [portion marking not declassified]

Although Havana had announced that any Cuban may leave the island, some have been denied exit permits. As the flow of emigres becomes more orderly the government is likely to tighten its restrictions for departure—particularly on military-aged males. The refusal of several hundred Cubans to vacate the Peruvian Embassy pending guarantee of safe passage could further undercut Castro’s credibility. [portion marking not declassified]

Implications

The departure of between 200,000 to 500,000 persons—2 to 5 percent of the population—would alleviate some economic difficulties. The actual benefits, however, would be limited. [portion marking not declassified]

Such an exodus would reduce pressure in the housing sector, but it would bring only a small and temporary reduction in demand for food and scarce consumer goods. While Cuba has an overall surplus of labor, the sudden departure of skilled individuals could disrupt some sectors of the economy. [portion marking not declassified]

The domestic political benefits could be higher. Castro has been successfully using the refugees as a scapegoat for the regime’s economic failures, and a mass exodus would reduce the need for greater repression. On the other hand, the continued presence of boats waiting to pick up friends and relatives could have an increasingly unsettling effect over time on those who remain. [portion marking not declassified]

Castro evidently recognizes that his actions will have negative repercussions in Latin America, and he probably has written off any major Cuban gains there in the near future. Relations with Peru and Venezuela will be the most seriously affected, but the negative fallout probably will not be significant in those states generally friendly toward the Castro regime. If Castro does not resolve the refugee issue rapidly, however, Cuba is likely to fail again in its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council. [portion marking not declassified]

Havana is on the defensive elsewhere because of its efforts to softpedal the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Prolonging the refugee crisis is likely to erode Havana’s influence among Third World states. Moreover, no matter how the refugee issue is resolved, Cuba is bound to lose some of its allure as a model for economic development. [portion marking not declassified]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Refugees, 4/26–30/80. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Prepared by [2 names not declassified], CIA.
2. See Document 88.
3. Palmieri, in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on April 30, said that the United States was not in direct negotiations with the Cuban Government to control the flow of refugees. (“Refugee Coordinator Says U.S. Is Not Negotiating With Havana,” The New York Times, May 1, p. A23)
4. In his speech, Castro said the United States must accept the Cuban refugees and warned the Cuban people to prepare for a naval blockade. (Marlise Simons, “Castro Says U.S. Must Accept Refugees,” The New York Times, May 2, p. A22) The Department transmitted details of the speech in telegram 116535 to select diplomatic posts, May 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800219–0509)