92. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State and the Embassies in Turkey and Malaysia1
26674. Ankara for USDel; Kuala Lumpur for Abramowitz and Negroponte. Subj: My Meeting With SRV Foreign Minister.
1. (S–Entire text)
2. I saw SRV FonMin Nguyen Co Thach for 20–25 minutes morning June 26. He was relaxed and very affable and while we had some repartee, the seriousness of our message was unmistakeable. He occasionally became a little polemical, but he did not strike me as having his usual assurance. He was firm but devoid of threats or arrogance and seemed to want to convey that Vietnamese want no trouble. He denied the intrusion as he has publicly done and swore up and down that the Vietnamese would not invade Thai territory in any way. Following summarizes discussion which was conducted completely in English.
3. He opened by saying that he was pleased to see me and that he apologized for not seeing me last night. He was too tired. I said that I noticed that he had been greeted by a number of friendly Thais at the airport. He laughed and said he didn’t need friends like that but the airport demonstration did not faze him. I alluded to his perpetual travel and major diplomatic campaign, the great attention of the press to it, and to his celebrity status. He laughed and said he wished he would get more feminine attention.
4. I then said that the Secretary knowing he was in Bangkok had asked me to deliver personal message from him.2 The Secretary wanted to be sure that Thach knew the depth of our concern for Thai security and for what had happened on the border. I then read him very slowly the message and gave him a copy.
5. Thach replied quote I have told you repeatedly and I will tell you repeatedly now we will not in any way violate the Thai border. We will not attack Thailand. That is our policy and it will not change. End quote. He went on to deny that they had violated the territorial integrity of Thailand in this case and said this was slander against Vietnam. Every time there is a Ministerial meeting the tempo and [Page 332] slander against Vietnam increases, particularly about troops and threats against Thailand. It had occurred at Bali,3 at the UNGA and now again. He said in fact the Thais were making incursions six kilometers within the border and there would have to be reactions to that.
6. I interrupted to ask if the latest incident on Thai territory was such a response. He recovered and said no, that the reaction only took place in Cambodia. He went on to repeat Vietnamese concern for territorial integrity of Thailand.
7. I told him there was no use in mincing words and we should be clear about each other’s positions. His assertions were simply not credible. All observers have seen and talked to the Vietnamese prisoners and there were Vietnamese troops dead on Thai territory. These are the facts. I said we were concerned about the future. SRV forces are along the border in significant numbers. What are your intentions? Is it your purpose to attack other Thai forces and villages and other refugee concentrations? Your military movements along the border are of serious concern to us. I also said that the fighting has left thousands of Cambodian people dead and wounded. Moreover the supply of food for people of western Cambodia has been completely disrupted. We are deeply apprehensive that there will be widespread famine and death in Cambodia and there will be another 500,000 Khmer at the border. The rainy season is here, distribution is more difficult and you are not assisting in it. The Vietnamese military action has the most serious political and military consequences, and the humanitarian consequences for the people of Cambodia are also very grave.
8. Thach did not respond to the problems of relief on the border or in Cambodia and said he only wanted to reiterate the Vietnamese position. He again said, we respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Thailand. Although you are supporting Pol Pot and the others we will not violate the territorial integrity of Thailand.
9. I said I did not want to engage in a verbal duel with him. He has been having them with Americans far more senior and far more capable than I. But I wanted to make two points: First, that I hope those assurances are conveyed to your military commanders in the field. Secondly, despite your views of what the U.S. is doing, I think I know what we are doing in Thailand. The U.S. has not involved itself in the Cambodian internal situation, with one exception: We have sought to do our best to provide food and medical attention to the people of Cambodia both through the Thai border and through Phnom Penh. But you have not facilitated that operation. We believe the Cambodia situation requires a political settlement urgently and that the [Page 333] security of the region cannot be built on the security of one country and the insecurity of others.
10. Thach said he agreed on this last point, but added, your policy is shortsighted in support of the Thai. They look only to September and October and not to the long term. I said from SRV actions in Cambodia the same could be said of his policy. He said that is your judgment but he went on to say we are firm in our position of respecting the territorial integrity of Thailand. I said again there is no confusion as to Vietnamese presence here on Thai soil. The evidence is incontrovertible. He said evidence can be fabricated as you have done in the past with the Tonkin Gulf incident.4
11. As we got up to leave, Thach said restraint was needed on our part. I said restraint was a two-way street. He smiled and said, you must stop playing the China card. I said I had told him before I don’t play cards. He again laughted and said the China card was an easy game to learn.
12. Thach never once mentioned the irreversibility of the Cambodian situation.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Molander, Box 80, Refugees: (Indochinese) 7/80. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Exdis. Muskie was in Ankara attending the NATO Ministerial meeting June 25–26, then traveled to Kuala Lumpur June 27–28 to meet with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers (see Document 146). Abramowitz and Negroponte joined him there.↩
- Not found.↩
- Reference is to the 12th ASEAN Ministerial meeting June 28–30, 1979.↩
- Reference is to the allegation that the United States fabricated the Tonkin Gulf incident in order to introduce U.S. troops into Vietnam. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, Documents 255–308.↩