Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

67. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, November 5, 1979, noon

PARTICIPANTS

• SRV Ambassador to the U.N., Ha Van Lau
• SRV Counselor, Cu Dinh Ba
• Interpreter
• Senator James Sasser, (D–Tenn.)
• Senator John Danforth, (R–Missouri)
• Senator Max Baucus, (D–Montana)
• Asst. Secy of State, Richard Holbrooke
• Dennis G. Harter, EA/VLC

SASSER: Mr. Ambassador, we are pleased to meet with you today. My colleagues and I are happy to have this occasion to discuss the situation in Kampuchea with you. We were in Thailand about a week ago and then we went to Kampuchea to meet with its Foreign Minister.² This visit was arranged by representatives of your government who we contacted to secure permission to visit Phnom Penh.

We presented a proposal to FonMin Hun Sen to open a truck route to Kampuchea for the delivery of food and medical supplies on a humanitarian basis. The trucks and the truck route and the drivers all would be selected by international relief agencies in cooperation with the government of Phnom Penh. The whole operation would be handled by the International Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF organizations. We felt then and still believe today that opening a land route over Routes 5 and 6 from Thailand to Phnom Penh is the only way to move adequate quantities of food and medicine rapidly. We believe time is important. We fear that every day more people will die.

We have come here to talk with you today, because, after we went to see the Foreign Minister in Phnom Penh, we had the impression that he had favorably received our proposals. He said that he would take these proposals up with the Central Committee. He agreed with Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Thach of your government that security was not a problem. Afterwards, however, we heard a radio broadcast which was negative on our proposal. But in this broadcast there were several statements which we thought might be a misunderstanding of our proposal. The broadcast said that a truck route was a condition for additional aid. It was not a condition nor was it our intention to impose any conditions on providing assistance to the Kampuchean people. We sought to cooperate in any way possible with food and medical assistance. We were advised by ICRC, by UNICEF, and by other experts that this (the truck route) is the only adequate means to deliver large quantities of food and medicine.

So we come here today, Mr. Ambassador, to ask your help to persuade the Phnom Penh authorities to permit the trucks to enter Kampuchea. We would stress that all of this would be handled by ICRC and UNICEF personnel. We now understand that we will be able to see representatives of the Heng Samrin government and we will deliver a letter to them for their Foreign Minister. I would like to transmit a copy of that letter to you.³

Let me conclude by saying we believe that the situation is urgent. We are concerned that thousands could die from lack of medicine or food. We wish to set aside political considerations and see that adequate supplies get in purely for humanitarian purposes. We are aware that trucks could be rolling in 3 to 5 days, if the Phnom Penh authorities will grant permission to open the truck route. It is not our wish to supply food or medical supplies to any particular political group. We only wish to help the Kampuchean people.

HA VAN LAU: First let me thank you for this meeting today. We understand that you are very concerned about the famine situation in Kampuchea. I am aware of this concern because I personally followed reports of your visit to Thailand and to Phnom Penh. That is why I am willing to meet with you today.

First I would like to emphasize that the final word on any matter which takes place in Kampuchea is within the competence of the People’s Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea. I believe that when you were in Phnom Penh and met with Foreign Minister Hun Sen you realized this and understood that the government was in control of the situation. After you put forth your proposal, the People’s Revolutionary Council gave you an official view. I am ready to pass on your opinions and ideas to my government, but I must say again, that the right to take decisions is with the People’s Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea. And I think, since you will see the Ambassador of the People’s Revolutionary Council in New York, you will be able to raise the problem again.⁴ You will be able to discuss it with him because he is the man authorized to discuss it. He will probably present this to his government and he will tell you what you want to know.

I thank you for giving me the letter and would like to add a few words of personal opinion. In meeting with Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach, you were informed of the factual situation in Kampuchea. It is true that there are serious difficulties in Kampuchea. And I do not believe there is any need to repeat to you the root cause and the current cause of the difficulties. It is also true that the People’s Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea has made great efforts to alleviate these difficulties and to overcome the temporary food shortage.

The nation of Kampuchea is in the process of national reconstruction after many years of devastation. I would like to tell you frankly that reports in the Western press and even statements made in this General Assembly meeting lead the people to think that the Kampuchean people can’t do anything. We have our own experience and we know it is difficult for a nation to do things in this situation. A nation must strive its best to survive. If a nation is not self-confident and does not make great efforts, then efforts by the international community cannot solve the problem.

Secondly, we Vietnamese people welcome any impartial aid from the international community to the Vietnamese people, as well as to the brotherly Kampuchean people. But when giving aid, the international community should understand the factual situation in our country—our capabilities and the measures we can take. Outside aid is only effective when it does not demand that the local inhabitants make efforts which override their capabilities. Then there will be delays. But this is not the responsibility of the local people. It is the responsibility of the outside. That is why, Senators, I want you to understand that to formulate a plan, you must formulate a plan in the best way able to help the local authorities receive aid.

Thirdly, how to deliver the assistance, what routes to take, this must also depend on the factual situation and the permission of the local authorities. It is not advisable then for us to pressure them, but we should try to reach agreement with them. Together we and the Phnom Penh Government were able to announce and agree to the opening of the Mekong River route to Phnom Penh. Now, with this decision, they are able to receive a greater amount of aid. Even before aid from the international community, supervised by ICRC and UNICEF, the People’s Revolutionary Council had handled a great amount of aid from the socialist countries. Some here (at the pledging session),⁵ will talk about this today. While giving aid we are not pressuring them to do this or that. We are working with them to overcome difficulties.

Finally, I would like to talk about the pictures and reports by the mass media. Yes, the pictures are real. It is true that there are people who are starving. But this only has to do with a very small part of the people who in the past were forced by Pol Pot troops to go into the jungle with them. They (Pol Pot regime) didn’t care for them and didn’t feed them and now they let them flee to Thailand to instigate world opinion. This is not the real picture at all of Kampuchea. Yesterday I was given a copy by AFP Hanoi which talked about those starving 300,000 along the border and those in the jungles on the border. This is not an overall situation. What is being described is also not different from what exists in many other third-world countries. The mass media is not describing things representative of the problems of the country. I speak openly and frankly to you to help you obtain a proper and full assessment of the situation. And thus from this, you can formulate your proposal in regard to the factual situation.

DANFORTH: When we told Secretary of State Vance that we were going to meet with you, he explained that he wished us to express his warm personal regards. The fact that Secretary Vance is here today shows the importance that this issue has for the American people. He has come here with four members of the Senate, a number of members of the House of Representatives, a number of our State governors, and Father Theodore Hesburgh, President of one of our great universities.⁶ The situation in Kampuchea is of great concern to the American people. Their interests and our interests are solely in feeding people. We are not interested in one political group or another. Only in getting food to people in need.

No matter how hard the Phnom Penh officials try to solve the problem, there are still people in need, civilians, children, people who don’t care about politics. I think it is clear today that the financial resources, the food, the medical supplies—all will be available. The question is delivery to where the people are. So far planes are landing at Phnom Penh and food is being distributed by ICRC and UNICEF. Ships are landing at Kompong Som and delivery is made from the port. Yesterday, it was announced about the opening of the Mekong, a river route to Phnom Penh. All of these are desirable. Every method of delivery is desirable.

We are very pleased to see that permission to use the Mekong has been granted, but we are told by experts that these means of distribution are still not adequate. Trucks are needed within the country to make deliveries. Our proposal was to request the Phnom Penh authorities to permit trucks to come to Kampuchea via Routes 5 and 6 under UNICEF and ICRC control. This letter to Foreign Minister Hun Sen is to clarify some points which we feel were misunderstood. Two of those points are as follows. First, the U.S. does not condition aid on the opening of a truck route. Our assistance is offered without any conditions. We only want to get food to the people. There is no pressure on Phnom Penh. We believe that their decision carried with it decisions on the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

We stated that we hope that ICRC and UNICEF will work directly with you and with officials in Phnom Penh to develop details on a land bridge to Kampuchea. Such matters as how many trucks would be used, which roads would be used, who the drivers would be, how security would be provided, and how distribution inside Kampuchea would be organized—are all matters which would be decided by the Phnom Penh authorities, UNICEF and the ICRC. Therefore, we are very flexible. We are putting forth an idea and hoping for a favorable response.

I would like to add one point. Our colleagues in the Senate think we are far too moderate. They want to fly in planes. They want to drop food from planes. They want many unilateral ways of bringing in food. It is our view that the best way is for ICRC and UNICEF to work out arrangements with the Phnom Penh authorities and to have your cooperation on meeting security needs. I must say that the public feeling and the feeling in Congress is that people must be saved. Food must be distributed by whatever method available. The suggestion today by the Foreign Minister of France that food simply be dropped out of planes has much support in Congress and the press. Senator Kennedy has talked about this. Senator Levin and Senator Pell have presented this idea and many are considering it.

HA VAN LAU: We are here in the U.S. and so we understand how things are here. We understand the concerns of the U.S. people to help on humanitarian grounds. I think your concern has been proved by your trip to Kampuchea and to the area. I would like to say again to the U.S. representatives of the people that you should help the people to understand the factual situation. I agree that there are women and children and old folks in need of assistance from the international community. I do not deny this. And we welcome the initiative of Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. We welcome the responses of the international community to his international appeal. The question now is can the contributions help the people to overcome their difficulties. I am aware that some say to drop food and medical supplies. I think the American press also comments on this.

HOLBROOKE: Let me interrupt for a moment and state that the only reason we want to talk about that is because we don’t think about anything except bringing food to people in need. There are no political overtones to these proposals. I just want to stress that fact.

HA VAN LAU: Yes, I understand. The Kampuchea people are now looking at the situation.

BAUCUS: We three (Senators) wish to stress that the U.S. interest and the proposal are no idle suggestion. It is a development which has support and which has become most prominent among all the proposals. We come here to you and to Phnom Penh, not as Americans, but just as people trying to help other people. We certainly want to work with the Phnom Penh authorities in order to have the food situation improved. We do not want to have trucks driven by Americans or by Thais, but by ICRC and UNICEF or with Vietnamese or Cambodians, to make sure that the food does not go to Pol Pot or to others with any political purpose. If the borders are opened up and aid comes in, it will be important not only for providing help, but also for international opinion to see the situation favorably. The whole world’s interest is focusing on this issue. Time magazine’s cover story is on this issue this week.⁷ There will be more. The main interest is only to help people. I know this sounds like a political statement—wanting to help people—but we mean it. It is true for ourselves. We have no political considerations or concerns.

HA VAN LAU: We understand your status and your concern. The crux of the problem is what way, what means for aid to be received? When it comes to those who want to help and want to know how to help, I think they should discuss it with Phnom Penh. This is also in accord with the factual situation prevailing in Kampuchea. Speaking also on purely humanitarian grounds and setting aside political considerations, we should discuss who is in charge, who is in control of the country, and discuss the factual situation. We are merely friends of Kampuchea and seek to cooperate with them. And thus as a gesture we permit as a new method use of the Mekong to Phnom Penh. That is a new channel which can be discussed with Phnom Penh. And after consideration, Mr. Hun Sen will give you his answer.

Senators, Holbrooke, and SRV personnel exchange farewell remarks. Timing is arranged for additional meetings with PRK and with SRV and U.S. officials.

1. Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, New York Meetings, 1978–1979. No classification marking. The meeting took place in the Indonesian Lounge at UN Headquarters.
2. See Document 140.
3. The letter to Hun Sen was not found.
4. Senators Sasser, Danforth, and Baucus met with the PRK Ambassador on November 5. (Telegram 293558 to Bangkok, November 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790519–0224)
5. The United Nations convened the Pledging Conference for Emergency Humanitarian Relief to the People of Kampuchea on November 5. For a description of the conference, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, p. 919.
6. Vance headed the U.S. delegation to the Pledging Conference.
7. Reference is to the November 12 issue of Time magazine, with the cover story, “Starvation: Deathwatch in Cambodia.”