Office of the Historian

52. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, May 17, 1979

SUBJECT

  • Vietnam (U)

Cy Vance requests Vietnam be placed on the Friday2 morning agenda (Tab A).3 I concur. It is an important issue. (C)

I am somewhat doubtful of the proposition that “we are driving the Vietnamese into the arms of the Soviets,” since the Vietnamese made that choice themselves, in part because of China. I am also skeptical that we are missing “important opportunities,” and we did indicate to [Page 185] the Vietnamese that if they invaded Cambodia, it would adversely affect their relations with us. Another zigzag on this issue will not enhance our credibility.

Instead, I would propose that a formal PRC be held, for the purpose of designing a strategy for promoting a more stable Indochina. This strategy should involve, in my opinion, the following steps:

—Consultations with the Japanese, Chinese and ASEAN countries about Vietnam and regional security;

—some tangible demonstration of our interest in the security of Thailand, so that neither Vietnam nor Thailand conclude that our willingness to talk with Vietnam is a demonstration of our inconstancy;

—some direct efforts to reduce the Soviet military presence in Vietnam, perhaps with consultations with Brezhnev at the Summit, or through counteractions (e.g. some additional form of collaboration with the Chinese?), thereby indicating that we were serious when we expressed concern about the growing Soviet presence.

While Sonoda did make some comments about Vietnam, I noticed that Ohira did not raise the issue at all. The attitude of the ASEAN countries is probably ambivalent, and it is a fact that they actually approved the Chinese actions against Vietnam.

Finally, as far as domestic politics is concerned, a secret dialogue with the Vietnamese will not be of any value, while a publicly announced one, I suspect, is not going to be helpful.

In brief, I think the issue deserves more serious analysis, and I simply do not share this sudden sense of urgency.

(I cannot speak for Harold,4 but I have the feeling that he would concur with what I say above.)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 33, Chron, 5/1–16/79. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.↩
  2. May 18. See footnote 2, Document 50.↩
  3. See Document 51.↩
  4. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.↩