39. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Mark) to Secretary of State Vance1
Roles, Gains, and Losses of Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union in the Vietnam-Kampuchea Conflict
Motivations for Hanoi’s Push Against Pol Pot
Hanoi’s lightning victory over Pol Pot’s Kampuchean regime attests anew to the effectiveness of the Vietnamese armed forces. These have absorbed much American equipment captured in 1975 and have lost none of their earlier prowess. Certainly, they are the premier fighting machine of Southeast Asia, and this fact is not likely to be lost on neighboring ASEAN states, especially Thailand.
It is certainly clear that the impetus for Vietnam’s assault came from Hanoi itself, where a decision was probably made sometime early in 1978 to get rid of the one remaining unfriendly regime in Indochina, sooner rather than later. To the extent that “Democratic Kampuchea” initiated provocations against adjacent Vietnamese territory in the 1975–78 period, one can only say that Pol Pot contributed to his own fate by hastening Vietnamese action against him. However, given longstanding aspirations in Hanoi to dominate Indochina politically, it was only a question of time in any case before the much stronger and more numerous Vietnamese imposed their will on their neighbor, though they likely at first hoped to attain their goal by slow subversion and other pressures, rather than by blitzkrieg.
We believe that Hanoi’s determination is the fundamental factor in explaining what has happened. Vietnamese hegemonic ambitions are rooted in Indochinese history, and the Communist Party which Ho Chi Minh established in the 1920s for all three countries was a unitary one. Hanoi’s manipulation and ultimate control of the Pathet Lao Communist movement in Laos has gone on for 30 years, and is still reflected in the presence of 40,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos. The Vietnamese believed that they were enroute to the same relationship with Cambodian Communists when they infiltrated and backed the Pol Pot forces from the middle of 1970 on; but the quirks of personality and somewhat divergent ideological and political objectives led the two groups apart, [Page 146] with the Kampuchean regime’s turning instead toward China for protection and aid.
In these circumstances, there is no need to ask whether Moscow might have pushed Hanoi to impose a new government on Cambodia. Hanoi had much stronger motivations to do that than Moscow. However, the Kremlin was undoubtedly enthusiastic about the project for its own reasons, which arose from the Soviet desire to embarrass China and to enhance the USSR’s political position in Southeast Asia. The Kremlin will be less happy if Hanoi moves in the next few years formally to create some sort of closer association of the three states.
Soviet-Chinese Rivalry in Indochina
In retrospect, it is difficult to know what immediate problem drove Vietnam and China apart after 1975, but there were numerous incidents adversely affecting the bilateral relationship. However, the basic discord between the two states must be the traditional ethnic antagonisms that have existed between China and the Annamese of North Vietnam, which even showed through to some extent during the years of combat with US forces. The Annamese have for hundreds of years felt threatened culturally and politically by their oversized neighbor, and they have instinctively turned to outsiders for counterbalancing force.
In our day, the USSR serves that function, and Vietnam has not hesitated to turn to Moscow, which also, incidentally provided the bulk of the war materiel and economic aid needed by North Vietnam to defeat the South in 1975. The PRC, which had also backed the North, resented this abandonment of Hanoi’s wartime “neutrality” between Moscow and Peking, and looked for other regional assets to undercut the Soviet position. “Democratic Kampuchea” has proven to be a vulnerable reed for China’s policy goals.
In the last two years of maneuvering in Southeast Asia, Hanoi has done all that it could to make adequate political preparations for ousting Pol Pot. Although it required very little additional military support from the USSR, it did need the assurance of both large scale economic aid and impressive foreign policy backing.
The former, which has been necessary to cover the great internal economic difficulties still prevailing in Vietnam (and soon to be aggravated by military operations in Cambodia), came in the form of Vietnam’s admission to COMECON (CEMA) in 1978. Under this umbrella sizable Soviet and East European economic resources have been transferred to Hanoi. The latter, essential for holding China at bay while Cambodia was mopped up, took shape as the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty last fall. It is entirely possible that Moscow had long been importuning Hanoi to agree to such an accord, but that Hanoi had demurred to emphasize its independent position. This, however, became a less cogent factor under the new circumstances.
[Page 147]The International Repercussions of Vietnamese Victory
Vietnam’s victory is a strong psychological setback for China and, correspondingly, some improvement for the Soviet political position in Southeast Asia, mainly because Vietnam, its client state, has so successfully again demonstrated military preeminence. For Peking, the loss is primarily in prestige, and the leadership will certainly feel that there is a score to be settled some day. The outcome has shown that China is strong enough neither to intimidate a small country (Vietnam) with one-twentieth of China’s population, nor to protect a weak client state within a region where Chinese influence has long been significant. It may feel doubly humiliated that Vietnam decided that it could act with impunity, following the recent Hanoi-Moscow treaty. China’s very small consolation is that it is no longer saddled with defending the obnoxious Pol Pot regime.
How Peking will seek now to deal with Indochina is less clear. It will surely step up efforts to convince the non-Communist countries of the area about the dangers of Soviet imperialism, and it will portray Vietnam as a menacing Soviet tool. Chinese leaders probably have no illusions about the possibility of reestablishing satisfactory relations any time soon with Hanoi; and, besides anti-Vietnamese propaganda campaigns, they may therefore consider efforts to organize and support anti-Vietnamese guerrilla movements in Laos and Cambodia, as well as possibly to help currently ineffective dissident groups in South Vietnam.
The Vietnamese government will certainly lose no time in reestablishing the facade of Cambodian sovereignty under new management. The latter, to justify itself, will most probably throw part of its energies into exposing the depredations of the Pol Pot government against the Cambodian populace. Both Hanoi and the new Phnom Penh will make reassuring approaches to the ASEAN states about pacific intentions. Thailand will be left in no doubt that it will suffer penalties for any moves to support opposition to the new regime. Hanoi will repeat its claims to being fully sovereign and independent, even vis-a-vis the USSR; and, indeed, it will not be without considerable leverage in this regard, since Moscow can ill afford to antagonize its one ally in the area by crude pressures. On the other hand, of course, there is for the time being an extensive coincidence of Soviet and Vietnamese political and security interests.
In fact, the Soviet Union’s gains will derive mainly from its association with Vietnam’s coattails, and from China’s discomfort. The renewed evidence of Vietnam’s military power will impress ASEAN states, but hardly endear Hanoi (or Moscow) to them more than before. Except for Thailand, none of the five is within the ready range of Vietnamese strength, and even Thailand may conclude that, if it is [Page 148] circumspect in regard to Indochina, Vietnam will have too much on its military and economic hands for some time to come to be tempted by additional adventures in Thailand. The Communist insurgency in North and Northeast Thailand will probably sputter along much as before.
In short, Vietnam’s 1978/9 war in Cambodia is not likely to lead to any major geopolitical changes in Southeast Asia, though it will bring a definite transformation within Kampuchea and in Kampuchea’s relations with Vietnam. No careful observer doubted the military might of Vietnam in the local arena before the campaign, and this judgment has been proved correct. Everyone knew the crucial role of the USSR in deterring China from intimidating Soviet client states (including Vietnam), and this too has also been confirmed. China has had to “eat crow” in a political sense, but its drive to realize its huge potential strength has thereby become all the more urgent. The five ASEAN nations have been reminded again of their weaknesses, as well as of their dependence on outside powers (or, rather, on the jockeying and rivalry of outside powers) for their individual and collective security. The events have not revealed enough new Soviet-Vietnamese strength to intimidate ASEAN into kowtowing to the USSR; but all, particularly Thailand, will, as before, show prudence in their dealings with the Communist powers. Their desire for enhanced Western (US, Japanese, Australian, and West European) support will be further evidenced.
One final speculation is whether North Korea will draw some lessons from signs of Chinese military weakness in Southeast Asia and, in consequence, act to repair its frayed relations with the USSR. We would think that Pyongyang’s moves in this regard will not be much affected. It has surely long been aware of the relative strengths of the USSR and PRC, and it has tilted toward Peking in recent years for other reasons. That policy, in any case, has probably been under some review, as China moved to bolster its Western (including American) connections. But the main determinant of Pyongyang’s policies will be Moscow’s decision about whether it wishes to make forthcoming overtures to North Korea.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 86, Vietnam, 1/79–1/81. Confidential.↩