Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia¹

Washington, December 6, 1979, 0115Z

313771. Subject: Holbrooke Testimony on East Timor.

1. Following is text of testimony of Asst. Secy. Holbrooke on East Timor presented before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs (Mr. Holbrooke did not attend; testimony was presented by EA/TMBS Dir), December 4, 1979. Begin Text.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I very much welcome this opportunity to discuss the current humanitarian situation in East Timor. The role of U.S. policy in seeking to promote the welfare of the Timorese people, and what we are doing in cooperation with the Indonesian Government and international organizations to alleviate human suffering there. The welfare of the Timorese people is the major objective of our policy towards East Timor. It has accordingly been the basis of our handling of this issue with the Government of Indonesia and of our position on East Timor at the United Nations. We believe our approach is working as evidenced by the greater efforts on humanitarian relief being made by the Indonesian Government, international organizations, the United States and other governments. However, the needs are great and more must be done.

U.S. Policy Toward East Timor

Before outlining our understanding of the current situation in East Timor, I would like to comment briefly on the environment in which we believe East Timor should be considered.

I have previously (September 27, 1979)² reviewed for this subcommittee U.S. policies related to the dramatic events of this year in Southeast Asia. As you will recall, I stressed it is of vital importance that the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) receive the support they need to maintain stability and confidence. With a population of 135 million, (fifth largest in the world), and the nation with the largest number of adherents to the Islamic faith, Indonesia plays a key role in the mutual cooperation and stability of ASEAN which is very much affected by the Kampuchean situation. Indonesia is playing an important role in seeking to prevent an expansion of that conflict and its tragedies into Thailand. In that context, Indonesia is following a humanitarian approach to the Indochinese refugee problem by offering and preparing a site for a refugee processing center on Galang Island, continuing to receive thousands of refugees, and carrying out a successful effort to transport Indochinese refugees from exposed and dangerous positions in the Anambas Islands to safer locations in Indonesia. The conditions under which the some 40,000 Vietnamese refugees live in Indonesia are among the best in Southeast Asia and are improving.

Our specific policy towards East Timor was reviewed in detail in the March 1977 hearing which you held, Mr. Chairman, jointly with the subcommittee on International Organizations.³ Further hearings were held later in 1977 and in 1978. The complex historical events and considerations which guided this administration in reaching its policy decisions are on the record. Briefly stated, our policy has consisted of three points—(1) The United States accepts the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia; (2) we do not recognize that the people of East Timor have exercised their right of self-determination; and (3) we believe that our major focus must be the well-being of the Timorese people and that greater international humanitarian assistance as well as long term economic development efforts should be provided to supplement Indonesian Government efforts and resources.

The importance of this policy approach is reflected in the current situation. As we confirmed last September, about 200,000 mountain tribal people are now living in some 150 resettlement areas, located throughout the province. According to an earlier survey by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), about 60,000 people are seriously affected by severe malnutrition and disease, including malaria, parasites, upper respiratory infections and skin ulcerations. An estimated one-third (20,000) of the most seriously affected were in critical need of food and medical attention if they were to live. Our Ambassador in Jakarta, Edward E. Masters, and the Deputy Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Christian Holmes, both of whom are here today, visited East Timor in September and witnessed these conditions first hand. The United States, as a result, further expanded its assistance to the relief effort.

The current situation, although still serious, is improving as the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and ICRC operations begun in September and October start to have an impact. Indonesian Government and Red Cross efforts and resources are also taking hold. The joint focus is on medical and malnutrition problems and the death rate is still relatively high. Furthermore, no one is completely sure how many people remain outside areas of relief administration and what their conditions are. Expansion of relief efforts, however, is underway.

Relief Programs

Although representatives of some of the relief agencies are here today, I would like to outline the totality of the current international and Indonesian efforts. Ambassador Masters, of course, is particularly familiar with the situation on the ground in East Timor.

Approximately seven governments including the United States and eleven international organizations and voluntary agencies, primarily the ICRC and CRS, either have contributed or are spending about $15.8 million on relief programs in East Timor. I am pleased to say that the U.S. Government has been particularly supportive of the ICRC and CRS with funds and commodities and we have also actively assisted in encouraging the contributions of other governments.

ICRC—We understand that the ICRC is now working in six of its original eight target areas. The people have been registered and classified according to need—food only, food and medical assistance (20,000 people), and food and special full time medical care (5,000). They receive assistance either on a daily or weekly basis depending on the situation. Local Timorese volunteers who had some medical training or experience under the Portuguese are assisting with and will later carry on the programs. In that regard, one of the positive signs is that the ICRC has dropped or reduced its programs in two of its original target areas in Ermera. Because of the recent good crops, conditions there are reported to have almost returned to normal. We understand the ICRC is now trying to identify two new locations which need help in order to bring its target population from 40,000 back to 60,000.

CRS—Since a representative of CRS is available, I will not discuss their operation except to mention that their target population is larger and includes about 200,000 people. We understand that CRS has reached over 75 percent of the resettlement areas and that it is anticipated that 100 percent will be reached by the end of December. Some locations other than resettlement sites are also being identified and supported by CRS.

United States—As will be discussed by Mr. Holmes, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance provided last June an initial grant (based on the ICRC’s and CRS’s surveys) of $1 million to ICRC and $671,000 to CRS. These initial contributions were followed by further grants as well as PL–480 commodity assistance. Our aid now totals about $8.8 million in cash and commodities. AID has met all ICRC/CRS requests for assistance and expects to continue to be able to meet requests.

Indonesian Government—It is important to emphasize that these international programs are being supported and assisted by the Indonesian Government directly as well as through its own development efforts. The total planned Indonesian assistance to East Timor this year is about $17 million which includes $8.4 million in a special supplementary budget. Half of this latter amount is devoted to the resettlement areas and the other half is for much-needed activities such as road repair, food production, education and the repair of irrigation systems.

Origins

Turning from the current situation to the reasons behind it, we must look to events even before the conflicts began in 1975. The Portuguese colony of Timor was always poor and little was done to develop it economically or educate the vast bulk of the population. The majority lived in the hills practicing slash and burn shifting cultivation. Periodic food shortages were a fact of life. Poor economic conditions and primitive agricultural techniques combined with periodic drought are not unique to East Timor, but also exist on many of the neighboring islands.

Thus in 1975 the collapse of Portuguese authority, civil war between the Timorese political factions and the subsequent Indonesian intervention seriously damaged the already fragile economic balance. This is confirmed by reports of observers who visited East Timor in late 1975, before the Indonesian intervention, who called attention to the possibility of food shortages, especially in areas which had faced famine periodically in the past. Sustained military activity in the following years exacted a heavy toll in both human and economic terms. During that period, large numbers of the civilian population were forced to move and abandon farming, either as a result of Indonesian operations or FRETILIN pressures, and the destruction of the primitive agricultural economy was completed.

It should also be noted that detailed information on conditions in East Timor has been until recently very difficult to evaluate. In the highly charged political atmosphere of the civil war and the Indonesian intervention, available information was used to support the political claims of one side or another. Few outside observers were able to enter the area in which security conditions were uncertain. Nevertheless, what information we did obtain pointed increasingly to the seriousness of the humanitarian situation.

Mr. Chairman, our joint visit to Jakarta in April 1977,⁴ during which two members of your delegation—Congressman Goodling and former Congresswoman Helen Meyner—visited East Timor, was instrumental in focussing attention on the importance of private voluntary agencies assisting in humanitarian relief in the territory. One of their recommendations was that it would be helpful if the International Committee of the Red Cross were permitted to visit East Timor for the purpose of providing humanitarian relief. Under this administration, the objective of initiating international humanitarian relief assistance became the overriding consideration in our approach to East Timor.

It was also in 1977 that we saw the beginnings of the current problem of displaced people. In August, President Suharto proclaimed an amnesty and in the months that followed a reported 40,000 people left areas under FRETILIN influence for Indonesian controlled territory. To meet the needs of these people, the Government of Indonesia began to develop plans for resettlement and self-sufficiency of those leaving FRETILIN zones, as well as providing emergency assistance through the Indonesian Red Cross. During a visit to Timor in April 1978,⁵ officers of our Embassy commented on the continuing movement of population into Indonesian controlled areas. In September, 1978, Ambassador Masters visited the area for two days.⁶ Food, clothing and medications were being distributed to the refugees by the Indonesian Red Cross and Indonesian military authorities who were coping with a problem of growing momentum. Ambassador Masters emphasized to Washington that the economic conditions of the province were worse than anticipated and that additional humanitarian assistance would be needed. However, at that time the Indonesian Government preferred to continue to rely primarily on its own efforts.

In late 1978, FRETILIN guerrilla strength in the hills was significantly reduced and more of the upland population shifted to the low-lands. Bad crops in 1978 and an even drier 1978/79 growing season caused a major drop in food supplies. By the spring of 1979, therefore, these factors had resulted in the current situation reaching its present dimensions.

I have outlined the evolution of the situation both to explain how people got to where they now are and to illustrate the difficulty in obtaining accurate and timely assessments. However, during this period, we continued to encourage Indonesian officials to accelerate their plans to allow international humanitarian organizations—such as the Catholic Relief Services and the International Committee of the Red Cross—to assist in the relief effort. In late 1978, the Indonesian Red Cross also came to the conclusion that it did not have adequate resources to handle the humanitarian problem and began to discuss the possibility of assistance from other donors. ICRC and CRS were invited by the Indonesian Government to make surveys in April and May of 1979 and were approved for relief operations in June. An ICRC team arrived in Jakarta in late July. Relief supplies began arriving in early September.

The Future

More will need to be done by all participants to continue progress in the relief and longer term development efforts. One of the problems in the relief effort, for example, has been and remains the lack of trained medical personnel. ICRC plans to add more medical teams and there is as well the prospect of others from different sources. We will, of course, support financing for additional medical personnel and services if and when requested by international organizations. We have also encouraged the Indonesian Government to make available additional medical personnel to work with the relief effort and believe such steps are now being taken.

Overall, we have responded effectively to past ICRC/CRS requests for support. We expect to receive more requests in the future and intend to support them. The current efforts by the Indonesian Government and the ICRC/CRS are reaching several hundred thousand people needing immediate assistance. Seeds are also being distributed in time for planting to start the way to self-sufficiency in resettlement areas.

However, we will have to be prepared for reversals, including crop failures and slow recovery. The rainy season will soon begin further hampering an already difficult situation. Moreover, more people may come out of remote areas in need of food and medicine. We must be prepared to respond. In the longer term, some of the development projects supported by our aid program in Indonesia may be extended into East Timor to treat the fundamental problems of poverty, disease and food shortages.

In conclusion, I believe that the United States in concert with others is playing an important and constructive role in the East Timor relief effort in accordance with our previous consultations with the Congress. I appreciate the Committee’s interest in the effort and we will bring any major difficulties to its attention if they arise during the next several crucial months. End Text.

2. Additional copies of this testimony will be pouched.

Vance

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Molander, Box 79, Refugees (East Timor). Unclassified. Sent for information to Canberra, Wellington, and the Mission in Geneva.
2. See Robert G. Kaiser, “Millions Facing Starvation in Cambodia,” Washington Post, September 28, 1979, p. A34.
3. For Oakley’s statement at the March 17, 1977, hearings, see Department of State Bulletin, April 11, 1977, pp. 342–343.
4. See Document 106. Lester Wolff was Chairman of the Subcommittee.
5. Telegram 5366 from Jakarta, April 25, described the trip to East Timor. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780176–0234)
6. Telegram 12189 from Jakarta, September 8, transmitted Masters’s report of his trip to East Timor. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780366–0052)