Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

192. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 6, 1980, 11:30 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Sitthi Savetsila of Thailand

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• John Negroponte, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
• Roger Sullivan, NSC Staff Member for Vietnam
• Donald Gregg, NSC Staff Member for Thailand
• [name not declassified] Chief East Asia Division/CIA
• Foreign Minister Sitthi Savetsila
• Saktiep Krairikoh, Private Secretary

The Foreign Minister opened the meeting by saying that the Thais faced a number of problems from the Vietnamese. Sitthi said that Vietnamese troops are coming closer to the Thai border and are placing political, military and psychological pressure on the Thais. Sitthi stated that his talk with SRV Foreign Minister Thach had resulted in nothing new and that the Vietnamese official had rejected all ASEAN proposals. Sitthi stated that Thailand will continue its present policy unless the Vietnamese show some flexibility. (C)

Sitthi stated that after the expected positive UN vote on the DK credentials issue, Thailand and ASEAN will propose that a political conference be held on Kampuchea.² Sitthi said that he had been annoyed by Thach’s report to Secretary General Waldheim that the Vietnamese would pull 10,000 troops out of Kampuchea if the Thais stopped support to the DK. Sitthi later told Waldheim that he had heard no such offer being made. Sitthi concluded his opening remarks by saying that he had urged Japanese Foreign Minister Ito to continue aid to Thailand, saying that what Thailand was doing was for ASEAN and Japan and not Thailand alone. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski stated his belief that Mr. Ito is a strong and knowledgeable official and added that he had also urged that the Japanese continue to support Thailand. Sitthi thanked Dr. Brzezinski for expediting arms in the past and stated that more might be needed in the future. Sitthi stated that Thai morale is better now than it was and that ASEAN is more closely united. Sitthi stated that Indonesia still harbors some fear of the PRC and that Sitthi had urged the Chinese to stop their support of local communist parties. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asked if Sitthi expects more direct attacks from the SRV. Sitthi replied that he expected a continuing troop build up and some shallow penetrations into Thailand territory. Sitthi said that he had asked the PRC what they would do if the Vietnamese attacked Thailand again. The Chinese responded that their action would be determined by the gravity of the Vietnamese attack. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asked if resistance in Kampuchea was increasing or decreasing. Sitthi reported that it was increasing and that Ieng Sary of the DK is optimistic about the ability of his forces to continue opposition. Sitthi stated that Kampuchea was devastated and that it might take 60 years to recover. He has thus urged that Japan and the European nations keep up their aid to the refugees. Dr. Brzezinski stated that the President has been very supportive of Thailand in talks with Japanese and European leaders. He agreed that shallow attacks from the Vietnamese are probable. Dr. Brzezinski said that the PRC will keep military units near the border of Vietnam as a deterrent move. He noted that it might take some time to “strike a balance with a revolutionary country such as Vietnam.” He said that it was important for all ASEAN nations to improve their relations with the PRC. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski described the growing relations between the US and the PRC and said he felt that this was in the interest of the region. Sitthi agreed with this but noted that the Soviets had sent advanced weapons to the Vietnamese. Dr. Brzezinski agreed with this, saying that the PRC had suffered a real shock when they attacked the SRV to administer their “first lesson.”³ Dr. Brzezinski said that this attack had cost far more than the PRC had anticipated, and that they had discovered many inadequacies in their command and control structure. He said he thought that they had achieved the tactical goal of overrunning SRV territory, but that they had not achieved the strategic goal of forcing the SRV to pull out of Kampuchea. Turning to SRV reactions, Dr. Brzezinski said that they had been shocked in two ways

—That the attack had taken place at all

—That the Soviets had done virtually nothing to help them

Dr. Brzezinski added that PRC leaders have told him that the entire range of Soviet responses had been listed, and that the PRC had prepared an appropriate response to each one. (C)

Sitthi said that he would be going to the PRC soon again, accompanying Prime Minister Prem. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asked that his best regards be passed to Vice Premier Deng. Sitthi said he would do this. He urged Dr. Brzezinski to have faith in the Thais. Dr. Brzezinski replied that he did have great confidence in Thai leadership. (C)

As Dr. Brzezinski ushered Sitthi to his car, Sitthi stated in private that the Thais will resume the flow of supplies to the DK forces in Kampuchea as soon as the dry season commences. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Thailand, 1980. Confidential. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.
2. The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 35/4A on October 14 accepting the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea. General Assembly Resolution 35/6, adopted on October 22, called for an international conference on Kampuchea. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, pp. 330–335.
3. See Documents 43–45.