Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

187. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, June 24, 1980, 1401Z

26453. Subj: Thai Diplomatic Moves In Response To Clashes With Vietnamese and Request For US Air Support.

1. (S–Entire text)

2. Deputy Foreign Minister Arun provided us a rundown of Thai diplomatic moves in response to armed clashes on the border.² The Thais would be circulating a document to the General Assembly denouncing Vietnamese aggression, proclaiming Thailand’s right to protect itself and referring to the possibility of Thailand calling for a Security Council meeting if events warranted it. The Thais had called in the Vietnamese Ambassador but so far he has failed to show up. The Thai Ambassador in Hanoi has been instructed to lodge a protest with the SRV. Sitthi in Kuala Lumpur would seek to line up firm ASEAN support for the Thai position.

2. Arun expressed appreciation for U.S. political support as reflected in the Department’s statement on the incident.³ He revealed that Congressman Billy Evans had called asking what the U.S. could do. He had discussed this with Prem who had replied that Thailand would welcome additional statements of support, accelerated deliveries of military hardware on order and the movement of U.S. Air Force units closer to Thailand or into Thailand itself. Arun said he was now officially passing these requests to the USG. Ambassador spoke to Foreign Minister about half hour before this conversation with Arun. Sitthi didn’t mention these requests, although he may be getting instructions to do so with the Secretary at K.L.⁴

3. Arun said it was too early to predict where this would all lead. The Thai military told him that the mass media and foreign correspondents were exaggerating the incident. He said that the Vietnamese had shown no inhibitions about using force and he put the clashes in the context of a pattern of increasing Vietnamese belligerence as indicated by last week’s sinking of a Thai patrol boat in the Mekong and the Vietnamese attack on Thai fisherman in the Gulf.

4. Ambassador’s comment: Thai are confused and nervous. They are understandably fishing for support. We can satisfy them on first two parts of request, but I believe it is too early to begin moving Air Force units into Thailand. We still don’t have a clear picture of what is happening or where it’s going. Our intelligence about Vietnamese military movements is lousy. We should wait and see how situation develops.

5. As we see it so far, Vietnamese attack has limited objectives, but may well involve further incursions into Thailand. PAVN is operating under self-imposed limitations and serious SRV threat to Thai security has not yet been demonstrated. Despite their military predominance, SRV has its problems. It has flaunted international opinion, openly violated Thai sovereignty, and endangered thousands of Khmer. We should mobilize efforts to generate worldwide concern this score.

6. There has, nevertheless, been some Thai provocation in history of resistance support, and all this may spur PAVN to escalate activity. If SRV attacks continue and threat to Thailand comes more to fore, we will be faced very quickly with major credibility issue.

7. The latest Thai request was made in a low key and may be something of a trial balloon. Prem hasn’t called me in and I do not intend to take the initiative in order to avoid stimulating more requests. We should finesse matter by concentrating for the moment on the other two requests. Secretary’s planned statement will be very helpful.⁵ KL offers opportunity to mobilize greater support. DOD should now be looking into some air deliveries of equipment. As a precaution we should consider moving carrier nearby if we have one and explore options about possible Air Force movements. But we must be prepared to really move if there is considerable fighting of some duration.

8. Thai policy toward Khmer Rouge shows no sign of changing. Significant amounts of military equipment were delivered in past day or so. We should see what PRC has to say, but should not let them push us out in front.

Abramowitz

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 74, Thailand, 6/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis Cherokee.
2. The Vietnamese incursion into Thailand began on June 23. See Documents 90 and 91.
3. Christopher and Hodding Carter met separately with reporters on June 24 to express U.S. concern. (Michael Getler, “Viet Assault on Thailand ‘Deeply Concerns’ U.S.,” Washington Post, June 25, 1980, p. A23)
4. See Document 188.
5. Telegram 165874 to Bangkok, June 24, transmitted a proposed statement for Muskie that condemned the Vietnamese attack. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800304–0727) Muskie’s statement was read to reporters by Hodding Carter on June 25. See Department of State Bulletin, August 1980, p. 53.