Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

145. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

GC M 80–10004

Washington, January 4, 1980

VIETNAM: Prospects for Renewed Refugee Outflow Through Mid-1980

1. Available evidence suggests Hanoi probably plans to continue its policy of pushing out people regarded as unwanted, but there is no evidence suggesting that small-boat emigration over the next three months will approach the mid-1979 record levels. Statistical analysis suggests the second quarter of 1980 may see a sharp rise in boat departures. [portion marking not declassified]

2. The primary target of Hanoi’s policy of pushing out unwanted people is Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese population; a lesser target is the country’s dissenting ethnic Vietnamese population. Most of the Chinese still in the country—estimated to be 500,000 to 1,000,000—live in the Cho Lon section of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). Few remain elsewhere in southern Vietnam; northern Vietnam is believed to be essentially depopulated of its estimated 280,000 Chinese. Recent reporting indicates that Chinese in southern Vietnam continue to be targeted for expulsion: some were reported to have been excluded from the October 1979 national census, and many boats reported to be ready for refugee use are owned by ethnic Chinese. Since most Chinese have had their enterprises nationalized and their property confiscated, most live off savings. As these dwindle, the incentive grows to leave Vietnam. [portion marking not declassified]

3. Some disaffected Vietnamese—as well as some Chinese—have been permitted to leave Vietnam under an “orderly departure” program. This was started by Hanoi as a concession to international pressures in the wake of the Geneva Conference last July. The program is barely alive, however; over the past five months only about 1,800 people have used it to leave Vietnam. The number will rise only if the Vietnamese permit it, and so far they have shown little enthusiasm. [portion marking not declassified]

4. The sharp decline in boat case arrivals in Southeast Asian countries following the Geneva Conference clearly shows that Hanoi can control refugee departures. Hanoi stands to gain by permitting authorized departures: it rids itself of politically dissident Vietnamese and an unwanted ethnic Chinese minority. There is also an economic incentive in that each departing refugee leaves behind his personal assets. [portion marking not declassified]

5. Since the likelihood remains that Hanoi will continue to push out refugees by boat, an examination of past boat case arrival data may indicate possible future trends. The following table summarizes boat refugee arrivals in Southeast Asia over the past 3 years:

Indochinese Boat Refugee Arrivals in Southeast Asian Countries, 1977–79 [portion marking not declassified]

	First Quarter	Second Quarter	Third Quarter	Fourth Quarter
1977:	1,400	4,500	5,100	6,200
1978:	5,200	15,300	18,200	49,200
1979:	30,300	130,000	38,700	7,900

For 1978 and 1979 first quarter arrivals were each less than the total for the preceding quarter. More significant is the fact that in each year the second quarter arrivals have been consistently—and sharply—higher than first quarter arrivals. Part of the explanation is probably in the monsoon wind pattern. Most second quarter arrivals in Thailand and Malaysia come during April and May, before the southwest monsoon presents a headwind to boats heading southwestward from Vietnam toward Thailand and Malaysia. Political considerations may also have affected the data. Vietnam was actively at odds with Kampuchea in 1978 and with both Kampuchea and China in 1979; Hanoi could have chosen to rid itself of a nettlesome internal problem as it dealt with the two adversaries. [portion marking not declassified]

6. Although Vietnam seems to be going ahead with preparations to push out more refugees, we have no hard evidence that such preparations will result in a large outflow of refugees. If the statistical pattern of the past several years continues into 1980, then boat refugee arrivals in Southeast Asia over the next three months are likely to be less than 8,000. If the second quarter arrival trend continues, then refugee arrivals in Southeast Asia for April, May, and June 1980 could be about triple the first quarter arrival total. [portion marking not declassified]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Molander, Box 80, Refugees (Indochinese), 7–10/79. Confidential. Prepared in the Geography Division, Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research of the National Foreign Assessment Center.